Article 6 - Trials - § 9-11-56. Summary Judgment - Georgia Code

For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 30 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.
For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof.
Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 30 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law; but nothing in this Code section shall be construed as denying to any party the right to trial by jury where there are substantial issues of fact to be determined. A summary judgment may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damage.
Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this Code section judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel shall, if practicable, ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in the evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. All affidavits shall be filed with the court and copies thereof shall be served on the opposing parties. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this Code section, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this Code section, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot, for reasons stated, present by affidavits facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment, or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had, or may make such other order as is just.
Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this Code section are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
Appeal. An order granting summary judgment on any issue or as to any party shall be subject to review by appeal. An order denying summary judgment shall be subject to review by direct appeal in accordance with subsection (b) of Code Section 5-6-34.

(Ga. L. 1966, p. 609, § 56; Ga. L. 1967, p. 226, § 25; Ga. L. 1975, p. 757, § 3.)

Cross references.

- Motions in civil actions, Uniform Superior Court Rules, Rule 6.

Reply, Uniform State Court Rules, Rule 6.2.

Motions for summary judgment in probate court proceedings, Uniform Rules for the Probate Courts, Rules 6.5 and 6.6.

U.S. Code.

- For provisions of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56, see 28 U.S.C.

Law reviews.

- For article discussing effective use of motions for summary judgment prior to adoption of this section, see 23 Ga. B.J. 439 (1961). For article summarizing summary judgment in this state, see 27 Mercer L. Rev. 285 (1975). For article discussing interplay of the Appellate Practice Act (Art. 2, Ch. 6, T. 5), § 9-11-54(b), and subsection (h) of this section, see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 1 (1979). For survey of Georgia trial practice and procedure from June 1979 through May 1980, see 32 Mercer L. Rev. 225 (1980). For survey of Georgia trial practice and procedure from mid-1980 through mid-1981, see 33 Mercer L. Rev. 275 (1981). For article discussing expert testimony and summary judgment motions in medical malpractice actions, see 18 Ga. St. B.J. 44 (1981). For survey of Georgia trial practice and procedure from mid-1981 through mid-1982, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 299 (1982). For annual survey of law of torts, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 351 (1986). For annual survey of trial practice and procedure, see 58 Mercer L. Rev. 405 (2006). For survey article on appellate practice and procedure, see 59 Mercer L. Rev. 21 (2007). For survey article on appellate practice and procedure, see 60 Mercer L. Rev. 21 (2008). For annual survey of law on real property, see 62 Mercer L. Rev. 283 (2010). For note, "Summary Judgment in Medical Malpractice Actions," see 7 Ga. St. B.J. 470 (1971). For case note, "Lynch v. Waters: Tolling Georgia's Statute of Limitations for Medical Malpractice," see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 1493 (1987). For note, "Employer Beware: Changing the Landscape of Employment Discrimination Claims at the Summary Judgment Stage," see 68 Mercer L. Rev. 1145 (2017). For case comment, "Yost v. Torok and Abusive Litigation: A New Tort to Solve an Old Problem," see 21 Ga. L. Rev. 429 (1986). For comment, "Overruling Tradition: Summary Judgment in the Eleventh Circuit After 1986," see 41 Mercer L. Rev. 737 (1990).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

ANALYSIS

General Consideration
Purpose of Summary Judgment
Applicability to Certain Actions, Proceedings, Issues, and Defenses
Propriety of Summary Judgment
Burdens on Motion for Summary Judgment
Evidence on Motion
A. In General
B. Personal Knowledge
C. Records and Supporting Documentation
D. Application
Construction of Evidence and Inferences
Time and Notice for Hearing of Motion for Summary Judgment
Hearing of Motion for Summary Judgment
Conversion of Other Motions to Motions for Summary Judgment
Construction with Notice and Hearing Provisions of Superior Court Rules
Service and Filing of Affidavits
Procedure When Affidavits Unavailable
Affidavits Made in Bad Faith
Function of Trial Court
Appealability and Finality

General Consideration

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under Ga. L 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq., are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Constitutionality.

- Summary judgment does not unconstitutionally deprive litigants of their right to a jury trial since summary judgment may be entered only when there is no issue of fact for consideration. Harry v. Glynn County, 269 Ga. 503, 501 S.E.2d 196 (1998).

Due process requirements.

- Although a motion for summary judgment is a vehicle for disposing of a controversy without the necessity of a trial and a summary disposition of the issues in order to efficiently resolve litigation, nevertheless, due process requires that the respondent not be surprised; rather, that the respondent be given reasonable opportunity to refute the movant's showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact. Porter Coatings v. Stein Steel & Supply Co., 247 Ga. 631, 278 S.E.2d 377 (1981).

Crux of summary judgment procedure.

- Crux of summary judgment procedure is that if there is no substantial issue as to any material fact, then the court can apply the appropriate legal principles and define the legal rights of the parties without lengthy trials to establish already undisputed facts. Caldwell v. Mayor of Savannah, 101 Ga. App. 683, 115 S.E.2d 403 (1960);(decided under Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq.)

Essence of a motion for summary judgment is that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be resolved by the trier of facts, and that the movant is entitled to judgment on the law applicable to the established fact. McCarty v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 107 Ga. App. 178, 129 S.E.2d 408 (1962);(decided under Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq.)

Similarity to federal rule.

- O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 is similar to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, and on review it is proper for the appellate court to consider federal rulings. Federal Ins. Co. v. Oakwood Steel Co., 126 Ga. App. 479, 191 S.E.2d 298 (1972).

Summary Judgment Act of 1959, Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq., was substantially identical to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Practice and Procedure, 28 U.S.C. Holland v. Sanfax Corp., 106 Ga. App. 1, 126 S.E.2d 442 (1962).

O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 must be strictly followed in consideration of a motion for summary judgment. Southeastern Metal Prods., Inc. v. Horger, 166 Ga. App. 205, 303 S.E.2d 536 (1983).

Unawareness of rules not excusable.

- Florida attorney's unawareness of Georgia rule permitting motion for summary judgment to be decided by the court without oral hearing was not excusable neglect that warranted reconsideration of the grant of summary judgment. Dominiak v. Camden Tel. & Tel. Co., 205 Ga. App. 620, 422 S.E.2d 887, cert. denied, 205 Ga. App. 899, 422 S.E.2d 887 (1992).

Ga. L. 1966, p. 609, § 56 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56) must be construed with Ga. L. 1967, p. 226, § 25 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-11-1). Taylor v. Donaldson, 227 Ga. 496, 181 S.E.2d 340, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 805, 92 S. Ct. 163, 30 L. Ed. 2d 38 (1971).

O.C.G.A.

§ 9-11-56 controls over local court rules. - Local court rules that are not in substantial compliance with the requirements of the Civil Practice Act (see now O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9) with regard to summary judgment proceedings are of no effect. Smith v. Conley, 152 Ga. App. 589, 263 S.E.2d 453 (1979).

No conflict with superior court rules.

- O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 and Rule 6.3 of the Uniform Rules of Superior Courts work together consistently. Furthermore, Rule 6.3 does not thwart the obvious purpose of a hearing in summary judgment, which is to provide counsel with an opportunity to persuade the court and to provide the court with an opportunity to interrogate counsel. Kelley v. First Franklin Fin. Corp., 256 Ga. 622, 351 S.E.2d 443 (1987).

There is no conflict between the requirements of Uniform Superior Court Rules 6.2 and 6.5 and O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56; rather, the requirements are in addition to those set out in the Civil Practice Act, O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9. West v. Nodvin, 183 Ga. App. 645, 359 S.E.2d 729 (1987).

Rule 6.3 of the Uniform Superior Court Rules is not inconsistent with subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56, and it is not error for the trial court to grant summary judgment in accordance with Rule 6.3 without an oral-argument hearing, if neither party requested such a hearing. Dallas Blue Haven Pools, Inc. v. Taslimi, 256 Ga. 739, 354 S.E.2d 160 (1987).

Subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 refers only to filing of opposing affidavits prior to the day of hearing and provides no authority for other responsive materials to be filed outside the 30-day period prescribed in Superior Court Rule 6.2. Winchester v. Sun Valley-Atlanta Assocs., 206 Ga. App. 140, 424 S.E.2d 85 (1992); Coastal Plains Trucking Co. v. Thomas County Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 224 Ga. App. 885, 482 S.E.2d 493 (1997).

Section 9-11-55 controlling as to default.

- Motion for summary judgment is not an appropriate means by which a plaintiff can secure a judgment based upon the defendant's alleged default. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-55 is the controlling statute on the issue of default. Watson v. Georgia State Dep't of Educ. Credit Union, 201 Ga. App. 761, 412 S.E.2d 286 (1991).

Summary judgment is analogous to directed verdict; operation of the motions is essentially the same in reference to those issues upon which a movant for summary judgment would have, at trial, the burden of proof, but somewhat different if the motion is made by the opponent of the party with the trial burden. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Beaver, 120 Ga. App. 420, 170 S.E.2d 737 (1969).

"Claim" defined.

- General Assembly did not intend to give a restrictive meaning to the term "claim" in Ga. L. 1967, p. 226, § 25 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56), and this term is not confined to such actions as contracts, torts, or the like. Taylor v. Donaldson, 227 Ga. 496, 181 S.E.2d 340, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 805, 92 S. Ct. 163, 30 L. Ed. 2d 38 (1971).

Appeal to superior court by propounder of will as "claim".

- Term "claim," as used in O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56, applies if the propounder of a purported will, upon appeal to the superior court, seeks to establish it as the last will and testament of the decedent. Taylor v. Donaldson, 227 Ga. 496, 181 S.E.2d 340, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 805, 92 S. Ct. 163, 30 L. Ed. 2d 38 (1971).

Statute of limitations may be raised in brief in opposition to a motion for summary judgment. Brown v. Quarles, 154 Ga. App. 350, 268 S.E.2d 403 (1980).

Law of the case doctrine.

- Because the law of the case doctrine did not apply to issues not previously ruled upon below, enumerated as error on appeal, or discussed in a prior appellate decision, the trial court erred in denying summary judgment to a boat's charterer, and partial summary judgment to both the charterer and the boat's owner, in an action arising out of injuries sustained by a longshoreman while on board a cargo ship as the law of the case rule did not preclude consideration of the charterer's status and the issue of whether both were liable under the International Safety Management Code as such were not previously addressed by the trial court. Eastern Car Liner, Ltd. v. Kyles, 280 Ga. App. 362, 634 S.E.2d 129 (2006).

Respondent to a motion to dismiss is entitled to notice of conversion of the motion into one for summary judgment and to 30 days to respond to the motion for summary judgment unless such notice and opportunity are waived. Bonner v. Fox, 204 Ga. App. 666, 420 S.E.2d 312 (1992).

Adjudication on summary judgment is an adjudication on the merits. Summer-Minter & Assocs. v. Giordano, 231 Ga. 601, 203 S.E.2d 173 (1974); Dickson v. Dickson, 238 Ga. 672, 235 S.E.2d 479 (1977); Fierer v. Ashe, 147 Ga. App. 446, 249 S.E.2d 270 (1978); National Heritage Corp. v. Mount Olive Mem. Gardens, Inc., 148 Ga. App. 398, 251 S.E.2d 311 (1978), rev'd on other grounds, 244 Ga. 240, 260 S.E.2d 1 (1979); Walter E. Heller & Co. v. Aetna Bus. Credit, Inc., 158 Ga. App. 249, 280 S.E.2d 144 (1981).

Summary judgment is an abbreviated trial of no less importance than any other trial on the merits. Summer-Minter & Assocs. v. Giordano, 231 Ga. 601, 203 S.E.2d 173 (1974); Davidson Mineral Properties, Inc. v. Gifford-Hill & Co., 235 Ga. 176, 219 S.E.2d 133 (1975).

Grant of summary judgment is a ruling on merits. Usher v. Johnson, 157 Ga. App. 420, 278 S.E.2d 70 (1981).

Granting summary judgment is a decision on the merits and ends the case; amendments and subsequent motions for summary judgment made after this decision on the merits are too late. Ellington v. Tolar Constr. Co., 142 Ga. App. 218, 235 S.E.2d 729, cert. dismissed, 239 Ga. 849, 240 S.E.2d 551 (1977).

Party against whom summary judgment is granted is in the same position as if having lost a verdict. Summer-Minter & Assocs. v. Giordano, 231 Ga. 601, 203 S.E.2d 173 (1974); Dickson v. Dickson, 238 Ga. 672, 235 S.E.2d 479 (1977); National Heritage Corp. v. Mount Olive Mem. Gardens, Inc., 148 Ga. App. 398, 251 S.E.2d 311 (1978), rev'd on other grounds, 244 Ga. 240, 260 S.E.2d 1 (1979); Walter E. Heller & Co. v. Aetna Bus. Credit, Inc., 158 Ga. App. 249, 280 S.E.2d 144 (1981).

There is no such thing as a "default summary judgment." By failing to respond to a motion for summary judgment, a party merely waives the right to present evidence in opposition to the motion. It does not automatically follow that the motion should be granted. McGivern v. First Capital Income Properties, Ltd., 188 Ga. App. 716, 373 S.E.2d 817 (1988); Hughes v. Montgomery Contracting Co., 189 Ga. App. 814, 377 S.E.2d 723 (1989).

Effect of summary judgment on abusive litigation counterclaim.

- Because trial courts are not "infallible" when determining whether questions of fact exist on motions for summary judgment, a trial court's grant of summary judgment on a complaint does not control the merits of a subsequent motion for summary judgment on the defendant's abusive litigation counterclaim arising out of the filing of that complaint. Seckinger v. Holtzendorf, 200 Ga. App. 604, 409 S.E.2d 76, cert. denied, 200 Ga. App. 897, 409 S.E.2d 76 (1991).

Denial of motion for summary judgment decides nothing except that under the evidence before the court at that time there can be rendered no judgment as a matter of law. Ellington v. Tolar Constr. Co., 142 Ga. App. 218, 235 S.E.2d 729, cert. dismissed, 239 Ga. 849, 240 S.E.2d 551 (1977); Graham Bros. Constr. Co. v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 150 Ga. App. 193, 257 S.E.2d 321 (1979); T.L. Rogers Oil Co. v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 203 Ga. App. 605, 417 S.E.2d 336, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 908, 417 S.E.2d 336 (1992).

When the plaintiffs contended that because the trial court originally denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment based on the running of the statute of limitations, it was barred from later entering an order granting such a motion, based on the doctrine of res judicata, it was held that the denial of a motion for summary judgment decides nothing, and thus the plaintiffs' argument based on the doctrine of res judicata was inapposite. Gaskins v. A.B.C. Drug Co., 183 Ga. App. 518, 359 S.E.2d 364 (1987).

Costs, fees, awards despite summary judgment denial.

- Denial of summary judgment does not preclude as a matter of law the exercise of the trial court's discretion under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 to award litigation costs and attorney's fees for frivolous actions upon the trial of the case. Porter v. Felker, 261 Ga. 421, 405 S.E.2d 31 (1991).

Denial of summary judgment in a prior case resulted in collateral estoppel of a later claim of abusive litigation. The previous denial of summary judgment to the plaintiff in the abusive litigation case, who was the defendant in the prior case, constituted a binding determination that the claim in the prior case did not lack substantial justification. Walker v. McLarty, 199 Ga. App. 460, 405 S.E.2d 294 (1991), cert. denied, 199 Ga. App. 907, 405 S.E.2d 294 (1991) But see. Graves v. State, 269 Ga. 772, 504 S.E.2d 679 (1998), overruled on other grounds, Jones v. State, 272 Ga. 900, 537 S.E.2d 80 (2000), reversing Graves v. State, 227 Ga. App. 628, 490 S.E.2d 111 (1997).

Subsection (d) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 provides specifically for partial summary judgment. There is no requirement that all claims pled be included in a motion for partial summary judgment. Clark v. West, 196 Ga. App. 456, 395 S.E.2d 884 (1990).

Judgment on the pleadings held not partial summary judgment.

- If the record shows that no matter outside the pleadings is presented or considered by the court when making an order on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, entry of judgment is not a partial summary judgment, but a judgment on the pleadings only. Goolsby v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 Ga. App. 881, 204 S.E.2d 789 (1974).

Disposition of motion to dismiss under summary judgment procedure when matter outside pleadings considered.

- Although a petition may amply meet liberalized requirements of notice pleading so as to preclude dismissal from consideration of the petition alone, the court has authority to consider the matter outside the pleadings, if presented, and if the court does so, the court must dispose of the matter under summary judgment procedures. Kiker v. Hefner, 119 Ga. App. 629, 168 S.E.2d 637 (1969).

Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, insufficiency of process, and insufficiency of service of process was not converted to a summary judgment motion upon consideration of matters outside the pleadings and, thus, dismissal was not directly appealable under the summary judgment statute. Church v. Bell, 213 Ga. App. 44, 443 S.E.2d 677 (1994).

Motion to dismiss by the state transportation department was treated as a motion for summary judgment because the department, the surviving relatives of the decedents who died in an auto accident, and the trial court relied on numerous documents outside the pleadings. DOT v. Carr, 254 Ga. App. 781, 564 S.E.2d 14 (2002).

Motion for summary judgment on basis of complaint equivalent to motion to dismiss.

- If a motion for summary judgment is made by the defendant solely on the basis of the complaint, such motion is functionally equivalent to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim; such complaint should be liberally construed in favor of the complainant, with the facts alleged in the complaint taken as true, and the motion for summary judgment must be denied if a claim has been pled. Guthrie v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 141 Ga. App. 21, 232 S.E.2d 369 (1977).

Trial judge has inherent power, during the same term of court in which judgment is rendered, to revise, correct, revoke, modify, or vacate such judgment, even upon the court's own motion, for purpose of promoting justice and in the exercise of sound legal discretion. LeCraw v. Atlanta Arts Alliance, Inc., 126 Ga. App. 656, 191 S.E.2d 572 (1972).

Number of motions for summary judgment.

- There is nothing limiting the number of times a party may make a motion for summary judgment. Graham Bros. Constr. Co. v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 150 Ga. App. 193, 257 S.E.2d 321 (1979); T.L. Rogers Oil Co. v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 203 Ga. App. 605, 417 S.E.2d 336, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 908, 417 S.E.2d 336 (1992).

Renewed or second motion for summary judgment may be considered within the discretion of a trial court, even though there has been no expansion of the record since the denial of the first motion for summary judgment. Southeastern Metal Prods., Inc. v. Horger, 166 Ga. App. 205, 303 S.E.2d 536 (1983); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Thomas, 172 Ga. App. 816, 324 S.E.2d 735 (1984).

Nothing in O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 limits the number of times a party may make a motion for summary judgment, even without proffering additional evidence, leaving it within the trial judge's discretion to consider such motions. Eastern Car Liner, Ltd. v. Kyles, 280 Ga. App. 362, 634 S.E.2d 129 (2006).

Although the court found that summary judgment was improperly granted, nothing in O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 limited the number of times a party could make a motion for summary judgment; thus, upon remand, either party could file a motion for summary judgment and seek a determination based upon the evidence and standard for summary adjudication. Gold Creek SL, LLC v. City of Dawsonville, 290 Ga. App. 807, 660 S.E.2d 858 (2008).

Grant after previous denial.

- Previous denial of summary judgment does not preclude the subsequent grant thereof on the basis of an expanded record. Ellington v. Tolar Constr. Co., 142 Ga. App. 218, 235 S.E.2d 729, cert. dismissed, 239 Ga. 849, 240 S.E.2d 551 (1977); Graham Bros. Constr. Co. v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 150 Ga. App. 193, 257 S.E.2d 321 (1979); Christian v. Allstate Ins. Co., 152 Ga. App. 358, 262 S.E.2d 621 (1979); T.L. Rogers Oil Co. v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 203 Ga. App. 605, 417 S.E.2d 336, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 908, 417 S.E.2d 336 (1992).

Prior denial of summary judgment does not foreclose the subsequent grant thereof, as an order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before entry of judgment adjudicating all claims, rights, and liabilities of all parties. Fierer v. Ashe, 147 Ga. App. 446, 249 S.E.2d 270 (1978).

Although the plaintiffs filed the plaintiffs' negligence lawsuit in the superior court of one county and that court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the circuit court in the county to which the lawsuit was transferred did not err in reconsidering the defendants' motion for summary judgment and granting the motion because nothing limits the number of times a party may make a motion for summary judgment and res judicata does not apply to a denial of a motion for summary judgment. Hubbard v. DOT, 256 Ga. App. 342, 568 S.E.2d 559 (2002).

Striking of a counterclaim after consideration of the proposed pretrial orders of the plaintiff and the defendant, pleadings, evidence, and arguments of counsel is tantamount to a grant of summary judgment motion and appealable without certificate of immediate review, even though interlocutory. Aiken v. Citizens & S. Bank, 249 Ga. 481, 291 S.E.2d 717, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 973, 103 S. Ct. 307, 74 L. Ed. 2d 287 (1982).

Third-party defendant is entitled to move for summary judgment against the original plaintiff on any ground for which the original defendant would be entitled to summary judgment against the plaintiff. Empire Shoe Co. v. Nico Indus., Inc., 197 Ga. App. 411, 398 S.E.2d 440 (1990).

When motion to dismiss is treated as motion for summary judgment.

- If a motion to dismiss is supplemented by argument of counsel and matters outside of the pleadings, it is treated as a motion for summary judgment. Blasingame v. Blasingame, 249 Ga. 791, 294 S.E.2d 519 (1982).

An exhibit offered at a hearing on an interlocutory injunction that was the basis of the trial court's decision to grant the appellee's motion to dismiss converted the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment, and the appellants were entitled to have the notice required in the summary judgment provisions. Wallis v. Trustees, Sugar Hill United Methodist Church, 252 Ga. 51, 310 S.E.2d 915 (1984).

In an action filed by children to recover damages for injuries sustained by their parent in a fall in a nursing home facility, a motion to dismiss the action for failure to state a claim filed by the center that operated the facility was converted to a motion for summary judgment and, on appeal, was to be reviewed as such; the children, as nonmovants, submitted documentary evidence in response to the motion, and, by doing so, in effect requested that the motion be converted into one for summary judgment and acquiesced in the trial court's decision not to give notice of the actual nature of the pending motion. Gaddis v. Chatsworth Health Care Ctr., Inc., 282 Ga. App. 615, 639 S.E.2d 399 (2006).

Treatment of O.C.G.A.

§ 9-11-12(b)(6) motion as one for summary judgment. - So long as the parties are afforded sufficient time within which to file affidavits and other evidentiary materials, a trial court sua sponte can treat an O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(b)(6) motion as one for summary judgment, even though neither party has introduced matter outside of the pleadings. Zepp v. Mayor of Athens, 180 Ga. App. 72, 348 S.E.2d 673 (1986).

Although the trial court converted the defendant limited liability company's (LLC's) motion to dismiss the plaintiff sanitation company's action into a motion for summary judgment when the court considered matters outside the pleadings, the appellate court refused to reverse the trial court's judgment finding that an agreement which allowed the sanitation company to purchase the LLC for $500,000 less than any amount offered by a third party was an unreasonable restraint on alienation because the trial court allowed the sanitation company to introduce evidence in support of the company's claims. RTS Landfill, Inc. v. Appalachian Waste Sys., LLC, 267 Ga. App. 56, 598 S.E.2d 798 (2004).

Notice of conversion of motion to motion for summary judgment.

- In a case alleging unfair employment termination, the trial court's failure to notify the employee of the trial court's conversion of the employer's motion to dismiss to a summary judgment motion, and the court's failure to give the employee at least 30 days to respond, although error, was not reversible because the employee failed to show that the employee was harmed by this deficiency in the notice; because the employee failed to provide the appellate court with a transcript of the summary judgment hearing, the trial court's summary judgment was presumed to have been correct on appeal and was affirmed. Bynum v. Horizon Staffing, 266 Ga. App. 337, 596 S.E.2d 648 (2004).

Motion in limine held not to be, in effect, a motion for summary judgment.

- Motion in limine in a dispossessory action that the issuance of the writ of possession had rendered the issue of possession moot was not in effect a motion for summary judgment and, in granting the motion and dismissing the case, the court did not violate the defendant's right, pursuant to subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 and Rule 6.2 of the Uniform Rules for Superior and State Courts, to have at least 30 days to respond to the motion, when none of the parties wished to pursue their damage claims and, therefore, nothing remained to be tried. Diplomat Restaurant, Inc. v. Anthony, 180 Ga. App. 431, 349 S.E.2d 284 (1986).

Standing to oppose motion made by codefendant.

- Codefendant in a tort action has no standing to oppose a motion for summary judgment made by the other codefendant, if the codefendant has no existing rights that will be adversely affected by the grant thereof. Southeastern Erection Co. v. Flagler Co., 108 Ga. App. 831, 134 S.E.2d 822 (1964);(decided under Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq.)

Effect of ruling at earlier hearing on admissibility.

- Grant of judgment for the plaintiffs on the pleadings after a ruling that no issuable defense had been alleged was not error on the ground that the court had, some months earlier, denied a motion for summary judgment made on behalf of the plaintiffs, when the court was considering the effect of evidence, whereas at the preliminary hearing the court was considering the admissibility of the evidence. Phillips v. Marcin, 162 Ga. App. 202, 290 S.E.2d 546 (1982).

Seventh Amendment right to jury trial not infringed.

- Because the Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution did not apply in state courts, and an insured's right to a jury trial thereunder was not infringed when genuine issues of material fact were lacking and disposition of the matter was best handled by way of summary judgment, the insured's Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial was not infringed; as a result, the insured failed to demonstrate any constitutional deprivation warranting a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Cuyler v. Allstate Ins. Co., 284 Ga. App. 409, 643 S.E.2d 783, cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 510 (Ga. 2007).

Cited in Algernon Blair, Inc. v. National Sur. Corp., 222 Ga. 672, 151 S.E.2d 724 (1966); Atlanta Funtown, Inc. v. Crouch, 114 Ga. App. 702, 152 S.E.2d 583 (1966); Harrington v. Frye, 116 Ga. App. 755, 159 S.E.2d 84 (1967); Grizzard v. Grizzard, 224 Ga. 42, 159 S.E.2d 400 (1968); O'Kelley v. Evans, 224 Ga. 49, 159 S.E.2d 418 (1968); Jackson v. Kight, 117 Ga. App. 385, 160 S.E.2d 668 (1968); Norton Realty & Loan Co. v. City of Gainesville, 224 Ga. 166, 160 S.E.2d 819 (1968); Kerry v. Brown, 224 Ga. 200, 160 S.E.2d 832 (1968); Passmore v. Truman & Smith Inst., Inc., 117 Ga. App. 620, 161 S.E.2d 323 (1968); McLeod v. Westmoreland, 117 Ga. App. 659, 161 S.E.2d 335 (1968); Levy v. G.E.C. Corp., 117 Ga. App. 673, 161 S.E.2d 339 (1968); Boatright v. Padgett Motor Sales, Inc., 117 Ga. App. 578, 161 S.E.2d 402 (1968); Brooks v. Holman, 117 Ga. App. 615, 161 S.E.2d 512 (1968); Futch v. Futch, 224 Ga. 350, 161 S.E.2d 868 (1968); McCurry v. Bailey, 224 Ga. 318, 162 S.E.2d 9 (1968); Dyer v. Lanier, 224 Ga. 371, 162 S.E.2d 340 (1968); Trammell v. West, 224 Ga. 365, 162 S.E.2d 353 (1968); Ryder v. Schreeder, 224 Ga. 382, 162 S.E.2d 375 (1968); Kiker v. Hefner, 224 Ga. 511, 162 S.E.2d 731 (1968); Moulder v. Steele, 118 Ga. App. 87, 162 S.E.2d 785 (1968); Atlanta Biltmore Hotel Corp. v. Martell, 118 Ga. App. 172, 162 S.E.2d 815 (1968); Flowers v. Flowers, 118 Ga. App. 85, 162 S.E.2d 818 (1968); Zappa v. Allstate Ins. Co., 118 Ga. App. 235, 162 S.E.2d 911 (1968); Sanfrantello v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 Ga. App. 205, 163 S.E.2d 256 (1968); Rubel Baking Co. v. Levitt, 118 Ga. App. 306, 163 S.E.2d 437 (1968); Wade v. Howell, 224 Ga. 626, 163 S.E.2d 717 (1968); National Factor & Inv. Corp. v. State Bank, 224 Ga. 535, 163 S.E.2d 817 (1968); Fidelity-Phenix Ins. Co. v. Mauldin, 118 Ga. App. 401, 163 S.E.2d 834 (1968); Seaview Dev. Co. v. Galanti, 118 Ga. App. 378, 163 S.E.2d 845 (1968); Savannah Elec. & Power Co. v. Edenfield, 118 Ga. App. 531, 164 S.E.2d 366 (1968); Zeesman v. Cordele Credit Jewelry, Inc., 224 Ga. 732, 164 S.E.2d 729 (1968); Farmers Union Whse. v. Bird, 224 Ga. 842, 165 S.E.2d 148 (1968); Todd v. Windsor, 118 Ga. App. 805, 165 S.E.2d 438 (1968); Malone v. Ottinger, 118 Ga. App. 778, 165 S.E.2d 660 (1968); Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Holt, 118 Ga. App. 826, 166 S.E.2d 30 (1969); Duncan Cleaners, Inc. v. Shuman Co., 119 Ga. App. 128, 166 S.E.2d 387 (1969); Davis v. American Acceptance Corp., 119 Ga. App. 265, 167 S.E.2d 222 (1969); Herrington v. LaCount, 225 Ga. 232, 167 S.E.2d 631 (1969); Hood v. General Shoe Corp., 119 Ga. App. 649, 168 S.E.2d 326 (1969); Carden v. LaGrone, 225 Ga. 365, 169 S.E.2d 168 (1969); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Pullin, 120 Ga. App. 69, 169 S.E.2d 688 (1969); City of Atlanta v. Royal Peaco*ck Social Club, Inc., 225 Ga. 474, 169 S.E.2d 807 (1969); Summerlin v. Beacon Inv. Co., 120 Ga. App. 296, 170 S.E.2d 307 (1969); Morris v. Morris, 121 Ga. App. 100, 172 S.E.2d 872 (1970); Worley v. Travelers Indem. Co., 121 Ga. App. 179, 173 S.E.2d 248 (1970); Reynolds v. Wilson, 121 Ga. App. 153, 173 S.E.2d 256 (1970); Johnson v. Frazier, 121 Ga. App. 212, 173 S.E.2d 434 (1970); Askew v. Carroll, 121 Ga. App. 305, 173 S.E.2d 463 (1970); Ward v. Ward, 226 Ga. 212, 173 S.E.2d 703 (1970); Herring v. R.L. Mathis Cert. Dairy Co., 121 Ga. App. 373, 173 S.E.2d 716 (1970); Phillips v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 121 Ga. App. 342, 173 S.E.2d 723 (1970); Elberton-Elbert County Hosp. Auth. v. Watson, 121 Ga. App. 550, 174 S.E.2d 470 (1970); Brooks v. Holman, 121 Ga. App. 720, 175 S.E.2d 131 (1970); Kirkland v. Jones, 122 Ga. App. 131, 176 S.E.2d 510 (1970); American Bank v. Gray, 122 Ga. App. 443, 177 S.E.2d 208 (1970); Adamson v. Adamson, 226 Ga. 719, 177 S.E.2d 241 (1970); Williams v. Williams, 226 Ga. 734, 177 S.E.2d 481 (1970); Bulloch County Bank v. Dodd, 226 Ga. 773, 177 S.E.2d 673 (1970); Citizens Bank v. Alexander-Smith Academy, Inc., 226 Ga. 871, 178 S.E.2d 178 (1970); Georgia Power Co. v. Jones, 122 Ga. App. 614, 178 S.E.2d 265 (1970); Dodson v. Phagan, 122 Ga. App. 752, 178 S.E.2d 748 (1970); Shepard v. Wilson, 123 Ga. App. 74, 179 S.E.2d 550 (1970); Abco Bldrs., Inc. v. Peavy Concrete Prod., Inc., 123 Ga. App. 167, 179 S.E.2d 695 (1971); Sorrells v. Smith, 227 Ga. 262, 180 S.E.2d 238 (1971); Smith v. Standard Oil Co., 227 Ga. 268, 180 S.E.2d 691 (1971); Rader v. Rayette Faberge, Inc., 123 Ga. App. 328, 181 S.E.2d 83 (1971); Citizens Bank v. Barber, 123 Ga. App. 507, 181 S.E.2d 545 (1971); Bekins Van Lines Co. v. Barlow, 123 Ga. App. 601, 181 S.E.2d 908 (1971); Goodwin v. First Baptist Church, 227 Ga. 603, 182 S.E.2d 105 (1971); Leathers v. Klebold, 227 Ga. 683, 182 S.E.2d 423 (1971); Salters v. Pugmire Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 124 Ga. App. 414, 184 S.E.2d 56 (1971); Rushing v. Ellis, 124 Ga. App. 621, 184 S.E.2d 667 (1971); Whittle v. Johnston, 124 Ga. App. 785, 186 S.E.2d 129 (1971); Burdell v. Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust Co., 124 Ga. App. 828, 186 S.E.2d 291 (1971); J.H. Ewing & Sons v. Montgomery, 124 Ga. App. 836, 186 S.E.2d 335 (1971); Sumter County v. Pritchett, 125 Ga. App. 222, 186 S.E.2d 798 (1971); Crowder v. Electro-Kinetics Corp., 228 Ga. 610, 187 S.E.2d 249 (1972); Corbin v. Gulf Ins. Co., 125 Ga. App. 281, 187 S.E.2d 312 (1972); Johnson v. Wormsloe Found., Inc., 228 Ga. 722, 187 S.E.2d 682 (1972); Cheek v. J. Allen Couch & Son Funeral Home, 125 Ga. App. 438, 187 S.E.2d 907 (1972); Stewart v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 229 Ga. 244, 190 S.E.2d 520 (1972); Leachman v. Cobb Dev. Co., 229 Ga. 207, 190 S.E.2d 537 (1972); Beaubien v. Bogle, 126 Ga. App. 406, 190 S.E.2d 830 (1972); Frost v. Gasaway, 229 Ga. 354, 190 S.E.2d 902 (1972); Byers v. Lieberman, 126 Ga. App. 582, 191 S.E.2d 470 (1972); General Fin. Corp. v. Davis, 126 Ga. App. 821, 191 S.E.2d 865 (1972); Roy D. Warren Co. v. Wagnon, 126 Ga. App. 776, 191 S.E.2d 894 (1972); Haber v. Georgia Power Co., 127 Ga. App. 19, 192 S.E.2d 436 (1972); Payne v. Payne, 229 Ga. 822, 194 S.E.2d 458 (1972); Bloodworth v. Smith, 128 Ga. App. 378, 196 S.E.2d 691 (1973); Equity Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Shelnutt, 128 Ga. App. 849, 198 S.E.2d 350 (1973); Howell v. Harden, 129 Ga. App. 200, 198 S.E.2d 890 (1973); Trammell v. Elliott, 230 Ga. 841, 199 S.E.2d 194 (1973); Tingle v. Arnold, Cate & Allen, 129 Ga. App. 134, 199 S.E.2d 260 (1973); Henry v. Allstate Ins. Co., 129 Ga. App. 223, 199 S.E.2d 338 (1973); Mattison v. Jackson-Atlantic, Inc., 129 Ga. App. 279, 199 S.E.2d 387 (1973); Brown v. Harwell, 129 Ga. App. 313, 199 S.E.2d 637 (1973); Food Fair, Inc. v. Mock, 129 Ga. App. 421, 199 S.E.2d 820 (1973); Frey v. Friendly Motors, Inc., 129 Ga. App. 636, 200 S.E.2d 467 (1973); Ernst v. Little, 129 Ga. App. 756, 201 S.E.2d 185 (1973); Continental Carriers, Inc. v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 129 Ga. App. 889, 201 S.E.2d 826 (1973); National Bank v. Merritt, 130 Ga. App. 85, 202 S.E.2d 193 (1973); Cooper v. Plott, 121 Ga. App. 488, 174 S.E.2d 446 (1974); Register v. Kandlbinder, 231 Ga. 786, 204 S.E.2d 145 (1974); Ryle v. Ryle, 130 Ga. App. 680, 204 S.E.2d 339 (1974); Georgia Auto Sales, Inc. v. Hinrichsen, 131 Ga. App. 43, 205 S.E.2d 65 (1974); Bernath Barrel & Drum Co. v. Ostrum Boiler Serv., Inc., 131 Ga. App. 140, 205 S.E.2d 459 (1974); Whitehurst v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 131 Ga. App. 202, 205 S.E.2d 489 (1974); Smith v. Rothstein, 131 Ga. App. 632, 206 S.E.2d 592 (1974); Thibadeau v. Crane, 131 Ga. App. 591, 206 S.E.2d 609 (1974); Pritchett v. Rainey, 131 Ga. App. 521, 206 S.E.2d 726 (1974); Townsend v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 131 Ga. App. 824, 207 S.E.2d 230 (1974); Hannah v. Shauck, 131 Ga. App. 834, 207 S.E.2d 239 (1974); Holbrook Waterproofing Co. v. Cleaver, 132 Ga. App. 24, 207 S.E.2d 562 (1974); O'Pry v. Goodman, 132 Ga. App. 191, 207 S.E.2d 674 (1974); Lowe v. American Mach. & Foundry Co., 132 Ga. App. 572, 208 S.E.2d 585 (1974); Adams v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 132 Ga. App. 622, 208 S.E.2d 628 (1974); Jaciewicki v. Gordarl Assocs., 132 Ga. App. 888, 209 S.E.2d 693 (1974); Avis Rent A Car Sys. v. Rice, 132 Ga. App. 857, 209 S.E.2d 270 (1974)

Aiken Asphalt Paving Co. v. Winn, 133 Ga. App. 3, 209 S.E.2d 700 (1974); Sasser & Co. v. Griffin, 133 Ga. App. 83, 210 S.E.2d 34 (1974); Thomas v. Allstate Ins. Co., 133 Ga. App. 193, 210 S.E.2d 361 (1974); Wielgorecki v. White, 133 Ga. App. 834, 212 S.E.2d 480 (1975); First Nat'l Bank v. Osborne, 233 Ga. 602, 212 S.E.2d 785 (1975); Harrell v. Wilson, 233 Ga. 899, 213 S.E.2d 871 (1975); Duval & Co. v. Malcom, 233 Ga. 784, 214 S.E.2d 356 (1975); R.L. Kimsey Cotton Co. v. Ferguson, 233 Ga. 962, 214 S.E.2d 360 (1975); Stein v. Maddox, 234 Ga. 164, 215 S.E.2d 231 (1975); Dutch Inns of Am., Inc. v. United Va. Leasing Corp., 134 Ga. App. 525, 215 S.E.2d 290 (1975); Taylor v. B. & W. Elec. Supply Co., 134 Ga. App. 634, 215 S.E.2d 530 (1975); Jackson v. Jackson, 234 Ga. 587, 216 S.E.2d 808 (1975); Langley v. Pacific Indem. Co., 135 Ga. App. 29, 217 S.E.2d 369 (1975); Bob's Dairy Barn & Restaurant, Inc. v. I.D.S. Leasing Corp., 135 Ga. App. 227, 217 S.E.2d 462 (1975); Freeman v. Phillips, 135 Ga. App. 466, 218 S.E.2d 144 (1975); John Deere Indus. Equip. Co. v. Ponder, 135 Ga. App. 688, 218 S.E.2d 686 (1975); Tax Assessors v. Chitwood, 235 Ga. 147, 218 S.E.2d 759 (1975); Capes v. Morgan, 235 Ga. 1, 218 S.E.2d 764 (1975); Jones v. Young, 136 Ga. App. 21, 220 S.E.2d 24 (1975); McKinnon v. Trivett, 136 Ga. App. 59, 220 S.E.2d 63 (1975); Barone v. Adcox, 235 Ga. 588, 221 S.E.2d 6 (1975); Clements v. Warner Robins Supply Co., 235 Ga. 612, 221 S.E.2d 35 (1975); United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Day, 136 Ga. 359, 221 S.E.2d 467 (1975); Central Soya Co. v. Bundrick, 137 Ga. App. 63, 222 S.E.2d 852 (1975); Southland Inv. Corp. v. McIntosh, 137 Ga. App. 216, 223 S.E.2d 257 (1976); Allan v. Allan, 236 Ga. 199, 223 S.E.2d 445 (1976); Lindgren v. Dowis, 236 Ga. 278, 223 S.E.2d 682 (1976); Graves Refrigeration, Inc. v. Haswell, 137 Ga. App. 515, 224 S.E.2d 494 (1976); Georgia Motor Club, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 137 Ga. App. 521, 224 S.E.2d 498 (1976); Strickland v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 137 Ga. App. 538, 224 S.E.2d 504 (1976); Kleiner v. Silver, 137 Ga. App. 560, 224 S.E.2d 508 (1976); Rowland v. Kellos, 236 Ga. 799, 225 S.E.2d 302 (1976); Waters v. Groover, 138 Ga. App. 276, 226 S.E.2d 74 (1976); Shepherd Constr. Co. v. State Hwy. Dep't, 138 Ga. App. 252, 226 S.E.2d 79 (1976); Phillips v. Hertz Com. Leasing Corp., 138 Ga. App. 441, 226 S.E.2d 287 (1976); Wilson v. Coite Somers Co., 138 Ga. App. 455, 226 S.E.2d 277 (1976); LaCount v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 138 Ga. App. 476, 226 S.E.2d 307 (1976); Massey v. Henderson, 138 Ga. App. 565, 226 S.E.2d 750 (1976); National Bank & Trust Co. v. Grant, 237 Ga. 337, 227 S.E.2d 372 (1976); Bingham v. Advance Indus. Sec., Inc., 138 Ga. App. 875, 228 S.E.2d 1 (1976); Cornwell v. Williams Bros. Lumber Co., 139 Ga. App. 773, 229 S.E.2d 551 (1976); Henderson Mill, Ltd. v. McConnell, 237 Ga. 807, 229 S.E.2d 660 (1976); Foster Wheeler Corp. v. Georgia Power Co., 140 Ga. App. 261, 230 S.E.2d 494 (1976); Thomas v. Jackson, 238 Ga. 90, 231 S.E.2d 50 (1976); First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. AMF Skamper Corp., 140 Ga. App. 422, 231 S.E.2d 456 (1976); Stern v. Wyatt, 140 Ga. App. 704, 231 S.E.2d 519 (1976); Raven v. S.S. Kresge Co., 140 Ga. App. 799, 232 S.E.2d 122 (1976); Crisp v. First Nat'l Bank, 141 Ga. App. 30, 232 S.E.2d 376 (1977); Hoffman v. PMC Dev. Co., 238 Ga. 258, 232 S.E.2d 541 (1977); Hampton v. McCord, 141 Ga. App. 97, 232 S.E.2d 582 (1977); Burgess v. Clermont Properties, Inc., 141 Ga. App. 112, 232 S.E.2d 627 (1977); Young v. Climatrol S.E. Distrib. Corp., 141 Ga. App. 235, 233 S.E.2d 54 (1977); Nipper v. Crisp County, 141 Ga. App. 312, 233 S.E.2d 270 (1977); Johnson v. Heifler, 141 Ga. App. 460, 233 S.E.2d 853 (1977); Wood v. Metropolitan Atlanta Girls' Club, Inc., 141 Ga. App. 473, 233 S.E.2d 862 (1977); Parker v. Centrum Int'l Film Corp., 141 Ga. App. 521, 233 S.E.2d 877 (1977); Ideal Paint Contractors, Inc. v. Home Mart Bldg. Ctrs., Inc., 141 Ga. App. 830, 234 S.E.2d 670 (1977); Little v. Home Transp. Co., 142 Ga. App. 30, 234 S.E.2d 833 (1977); Mayer v. Turner, 142 Ga. App. 63, 234 S.E.2d 853 (1977); Harbin Lumber Co. v. Fowler, 142 Ga. App. 167, 235 S.E.2d 638 (1977); Stallings v. Chance, 142 Ga. App. 491, 236 S.E.2d 110 (1977); Farnan v. National Bank, 142 Ga. App. 777, 236 S.E.2d 923 (1977); Price v. Winn, 142 Ga. App. 790, 237 S.E.2d 409 (1977); Newton Bros. v. Shank, 143 Ga. App. 21, 237 S.E.2d 412 (1977); Moore v. Trust Co. Bank, 142 Ga. App. 877, 237 S.E.2d 471 (1977); Sims v. Sims, 239 Ga. 451, 238 S.E.2d 32 (1977); Stallings v. Chance, 239 Ga. 567, 238 S.E.2d 327 (1977); Jones v. Doe, 143 Ga. App. 451, 238 S.E.2d 555 (1977); Shaw v. First Nat'l Bank, 143 Ga. App. 416, 238 S.E.2d 719 (1977); Wilson v. Citizens Bank, 143 Ga. App. 402, 238 S.E.2d 754 (1977); Mahler v. Paquin, 143 Ga. App. 773, 240 S.E.2d 185 (1977); Davis v. South Carolina Ins. Co., 143 Ga. App. 782, 240 S.E.2d 191 (1977); McAllister v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 240 Ga. 246, 240 S.E.2d 247 (1977); Shipp v. World Automotive, Inc., 144 Ga. App. 38, 240 S.E.2d 590 (1977); Freeman v. Saxton, 240 Ga. 309, 240 S.E.2d 708 (1977); Security Branding, Inc. v. Corbitt, 144 Ga. App. 164, 240 S.E.2d 728 (1977); Peek v. Southern Guar. Ins. Co., 240 Ga. 498, 241 S.E.2d 210 (1978); Fairington, Inc. v. Yeargin Constr. Co., 144 Ga. App. 491, 241 S.E.2d 608 (1978); Mercury Rising, Inc. v. Gwinnett Bank & Trust Co., 144 Ga. App. 502, 241 S.E.2d 620 (1978); Johnson v. Citizens & S. Bank, 144 Ga. App. 515, 241 S.E.2d 625 (1978); Goolsby v. Oakes, 240 Ga. 493, 241 S.E.2d 836 (1978); Canal Ins. Co. v. Cambron, 240 Ga. 708, 242 S.E.2d 32 (1978); Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Martin Co., 240 Ga. 662, 242 S.E.2d 135 (1978); Goodwin v. Trust Co., 144 Ga. App. 787, 242 S.E.2d 302 (1978); Columbus, Ga., By Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Outreach For Christ, Inc., 241 Ga. 2, 243 S.E.2d 42 (1978); Floyd v. DeVille, 145 Ga. App. 161, 243 S.E.2d 115 (1978); Wall v. Citizens & S. Bank, 145 Ga. App. 76, 243 S.E.2d 271 (1978); LDH Properties, Inc. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 145 Ga. App. 132, 243 S.E.2d 278 (1978); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Christian Brokerage Co., 145 Ga. App. 126, 243 S.E.2d 281 (1978); National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Rouse, 145 Ga. App. 40, 243 S.E.2d 300 (1978); Currington v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 145 Ga. App. 350, 243 S.E.2d 713 (1978); Barber v. Adams, 145 Ga. App. 627, 244 S.E.2d 149 (1978); Smith v. Gibbs, 145 Ga. App. 647, 244 S.E.2d 615 (1978); Whiteside v. Douglas County Bank, 145 Ga. App. 775, 245 S.E.2d 2 (1978); Hollingsworth v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., 145 Ga. App. 870, 245 S.E.2d 60 (1978); Parker v. Fidelity Bank, 146 Ga. App. 52, 245 S.E.2d 364 (1978); fa*gala v. Morrison, 146 Ga. App. 377, 246 S.E.2d 408 (1978); Applebaum v. David, Inc., 146 Ga. App. 406, 246 S.E.2d 424 (1978); Owens v. Griggs, 146 Ga. App. 478, 246 S.E.2d 480 (1978); Cooper v. Public Fin. Corp., 146 Ga. App. 250, 246 S.E.2d 684 (1978); Tally v. Atlanta Nat'l Real Estate Trust, 146 Ga. App. 585, 246 S.E.2d 700 (1978); Whiteside v. Douglas County Bank, 146 Ga. App. 888, 247 S.E.2d 558 (1978); Bozard v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 146 Ga. App. 877, 247 S.E.2d 605 (1978); Boling v. Golden Arch Realty Corp., 242 Ga. 3, 247 S.E.2d 744 (1978); Nationwide Fin. Corp. v. Banks, 147 Ga. App. 73, 248 S.E.2d 54 (1978); Shepherd v. Epps, 242 Ga. 322, 249 S.E.2d 33 (1978); Chambers v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 242 Ga. 498, 249 S.E.2d 214 (1978); Robinson v. Carswell, 147 Ga. App. 521, 249 S.E.2d 331 (1978); Oliver v. City of Atlanta, 147 Ga. App. 790, 250 S.E.2d 519 (1978); Stubbs v. Olshan, 147 Ga. App. 793, 250 S.E.2d 535 (1978); Concept-National, Inc. v. DiMattina Supply Co., 147 Ga. App. 865, 250 S.E.2d 552 (1978); Skyway Cycle Sales, Inc. v. Gordon, 148 Ga. App. 150, 251 S.E.2d 118 (1978); McFarland v. Beardsly, 148 Ga. App. 645, 252 S.E.2d 72 (1979); Century Bldrs., Inc. v. Carter, 243 Ga. 14, 252 S.E.2d 507 (1979); Thomasson v. Trust Co. Bank, 149 Ga. App. 556, 254 S.E.2d 881 (1979); Carl E. Jones Dev., Inc. v. Wilson, 149 Ga. App. 679, 255 S.E.2d 135 (1979)

Gobbi v. Hurt, 150 Ga. App. 60, 256 S.E.2d 664 (1979); Dunaway v. North Ga. Co., 150 Ga. App. 66, 256 S.E.2d 669 (1979); Luedtke v. National Stor-All, Inc., 150 Ga. App. 93, 256 S.E.2d 672 (1979); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Sloan, 150 Ga. App. 464, 258 S.E.2d 146 (1979); Gorlin v. First Nat'l Bank, 150 Ga. App. 637, 258 S.E.2d 290 (1979); Albert v. Bryan, 150 Ga. App. 649, 258 S.E.2d 300 (1979); Tanner v. Ayers, 150 Ga. App. 709, 258 S.E.2d 545 (1979); Corbin v. Pilgrim Realty Co., 151 Ga. App. 102, 258 S.E.2d 758 (1979); Sumner v. Adel Banking Co., 244 Ga. 73, 259 S.E.2d 32 (1979); Ivey Contracting Co. v. Elliott, 151 Ga. App. 361, 259 S.E.2d 658 (1979); Knight v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 151 Ga. App. 447, 260 S.E.2d 511 (1979); Great N. Nekoosa Corp. v. Board of Tax Assessors, 244 Ga. 624, 261 S.E.2d 346 (1979); A.R. Hudson Realty, Inc. v. Hood, 151 Ga. App. 778, 262 S.E.2d 189 (1979); Johnson v. Lastinger, 152 Ga. App. 328, 262 S.E.2d 601 (1979); Walter E. Heller & Co. v. Color-Set. Inc., 152 Ga. App. 347, 262 S.E.2d 614 (1979); Peppers v. Siefferman, 153 Ga. App. 206, 265 S.E.2d 26 (1980); Tahoe Carpet Indus., Inc. v. Aetna Bus. Credit, Inc., 153 Ga. App. 317, 265 S.E.2d 116 (1980); Ogletree v. Upson County Hosp. Auth., 153 Ga. App. 429, 265 S.E.2d 347 (1980); Ramsey Winch Co. v. Trust Co. Bank, 153 Ga. App. 500, 265 S.E.2d 848 (1980); Reese v. Sanders, 153 Ga. App. 654, 266 S.E.2d 313 (1980); Bennett v. Shipman, 153 Ga. App. 876, 267 S.E.2d 271 (1980); Commercial Credit Equip. Corp. v. Bates, 154 Ga. App. 71, 267 S.E.2d 469 (1980); Bailey v. Johnson, 245 Ga. 823, 268 S.E.2d 147 (1980); Hart v. Trust Co., 154 Ga. App. 329, 268 S.E.2d 384 (1980); Ford v. Whitmire, 154 Ga. App. 382, 268 S.E.2d 430 (1980); Jankowski v. Taylor, 154 Ga. App. 752, 269 S.E.2d 871 (1980); Jordan v. Jordan, 246 Ga. 395, 271 S.E.2d 450 (1980); McCray v. Hunter, 157 Ga. App. 509, 277 S.E.2d 795 (1981); Benton Bros. Ford Co. v. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co., 157 Ga. App. 448, 278 S.E.2d 40 (1981); Huckabee Buick, Inc. v. Miller, 157 Ga. App. 429, 278 S.E.2d 79 (1981); Premium Distrib. Co. v. National Distrib. Co., 157 Ga. App. 666, 278 S.E.2d 468 (1981); King's Appliance & Elecs., Inc. v. Citizens & S. Bank, 157 Ga. App. 857, 278 S.E.2d 733 (1981); Hill Aircraft & Leasing Corp. v. Planes, Inc., 158 Ga. App. 151, 279 S.E.2d 250 (1981); Sigmon v. Womack, 158 Ga. App. 47, 279 S.E.2d 254 (1981); Miller Grading Contractors v. Georgia Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 247 Ga. 730, 279 S.E.2d 442 (1981); Cole v. Jordan, 158 Ga. App. 200, 279 S.E.2d 497 (1981); Sheppard v. Yara Eng'g Corp., 248 Ga. 147, 281 S.E.2d 586 (1981); Richards v. Mayor of Americus, 158 Ga. App. 693, 282 S.E.2d 122 (1981); Holt v. Bray, 159 Ga. App. 43, 282 S.E.2d 693 (1981); Goss v. Thornton, 159 Ga. App. 166, 283 S.E.2d 63 (1981); Hawkins v. Greenberg, 159 Ga. App. 302, 283 S.E.2d 301 (1981); Sanders v. Colwell, 248 Ga. 376, 283 S.E.2d 461 (1981); Thompson v. Hurt, 159 Ga. App. 656, 284 S.E.2d 671 (1981); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Mells, 159 Ga. App. 796, 285 S.E.2d 197 (1981); Floyd v. Lamar Ferrell Chevrolet, Inc., 159 Ga. App. 756, 285 S.E.2d 218 (1981); Northcutt v. Mills, 159 Ga. App. 768, 285 S.E.2d 228 (1981); Stender v. Fulton County, 160 Ga. App. 852, 287 S.E.2d 696 (1982); Lang v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 161 Ga. App. 760, 287 S.E.2d 729 (1982); Mintz v. Frazier, 160 Ga. App. 668, 288 S.E.2d 24 (1981); Ridge v. Espinoza, 160 Ga. App. 678, 288 S.E.2d 56 (1981); International Sys. v. City of Jackson, 161 Ga. App. 423, 288 S.E.2d 344 (1982); Utz v. Powell, 160 Ga. App. 888, 288 S.E.2d 601 (1982); Telligman v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 161 Ga. App. 13, 288 S.E.2d 846 (1982); Voliton v. Piggly Wiggly, 161 Ga. App. 813, 288 S.E.2d 924 (1982); Neely v. Richmond County, 161 Ga. App. 71, 289 S.E.2d 258 (1982); Sharpe's Appliance Store, Inc. v. Anderson, 161 Ga. App. 112, 289 S.E.2d 312 (1982); Property Pickup, Inc. v. Morgan, 249 Ga. 239, 290 S.E.2d 52 (1982); First Nat'l Bank v. National Bank, 249 Ga. 216, 290 S.E.2d 55 (1982); Moya Enters., Inc. v. Harry Anderson Trucking, Inc., 162 Ga. App. 39, 290 S.E.2d 145 (1982); Keasler v. Cedar Bluff Bank, 162 Ga. App. 57, 290 S.E.2d 150 (1982); Robinson v. Stevens Indus., Inc., 162 Ga. App. 132, 290 S.E.2d 336 (1982); Hawkins v. Travelers Ins. Co., 162 Ga. App. 231, 290 S.E.2d 348 (1982); Miles v. Edgewood Chenille, Inc., 162 Ga. App. 168, 290 S.E.2d 494 (1982); Holland v. Tri-City Hosp. Auth., 162 Ga. App. 256, 291 S.E.2d 107 (1982); J.L. Lester & Sons v. Smith, 162 Ga. App. 506, 291 S.E.2d 251 (1982); Cohran v. Carlin, 249 Ga. 510, 291 S.E.2d 538 (1982); Baker v. Baker, 249 Ga. 429, 292 S.E.2d 75 (1982); Donehoo v. Phillips, 162 Ga. App. 671, 292 S.E.2d 542 (1982); Williams v. Physicians & Surgeons Community Hosp., 249 Ga. 588, 292 S.E.2d 705 (1982); Stroup v. Castellucis, 163 Ga. App. 113, 293 S.E.2d 523 (1982); McCullough v. Molyneaux, 163 Ga. App. 352, 294 S.E.2d 560 (1982); Atlanta Professional Ass'n for Thoracic & Cardiovascular Surgery v. Allen, 163 Ga. App. 400, 294 S.E.2d 647 (1982); Young v. Hinton, 163 Ga. App. 692, 295 S.E.2d 150 (1982); Cato Oil & Grease Co. v. Lewis, 250 Ga. 24, 295 S.E.2d 527 (1982); Maddox v. Allstate Ins. Co., 164 Ga. App. 21, 296 S.E.2d 84 (1982); Sawyer v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 164 Ga. App. 177, 296 S.E.2d 134 (1982); Northside Cleaners, Inc. v. Paleologou, 163 Ga. App. 827, 296 S.E.2d 361 (1982); Ashburn Motor Inn, Inc. v. White Adv. Int'l, 164 Ga. App. 438, 296 S.E.2d 220 (1982); Slaughter v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 164 Ga. App. 428, 296 S.E.2d 428 (1982); Davis v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 164 Ga. App. 137, 296 S.E.2d 431 (1982); Georgia Hwy. Express, Inc. v. UPS, Inc., 164 Ga. App. 674, 297 S.E.2d 497 (1982); National Carloading Corp. v. Security Van Lines, 164 Ga. App. 850, 297 S.E.2d 740 (1982); Frazier v. Petecraft Aviation Servs., Inc., 164 Ga. App. 568, 298 S.E.2d 532 (1982); Peluso v. Central of Ga. R.R., 165 Ga. App. 215, 299 S.E.2d 51 (1983); Gilbert v. Decker, 165 Ga. App. 11, 299 S.E.2d 65 (1983); Fields Realty & Ins. Co. v. Teper, 165 Ga. App. 28, 299 S.E.2d 74 (1983); Brown v. City of Atlanta, 165 Ga. App. 310, 299 S.E.2d 101 (1983); Dobbs v. Cobb E.N.T. Assocs., 165 Ga. App. 238, 299 S.E.2d 141 (1983); Willingham v. Bridges, 165 Ga. App. 35, 299 S.E.2d 392 (1983); Regional Pacesetters, Inc. v. Halpern Enters., Inc., 165 Ga. App. 777, 300 S.E.2d 180 (1983); Burgett v. Thamer Constr., Inc., 165 Ga. App. 404, 300 S.E.2d 211 (1983); A-Larms, Inc. v. Alarms Device Mfg. Co., 165 Ga. App. 382, 300 S.E.2d 311 (1983); Johnson v. G.A.B. Bus. Servs. Inc., 165 Ga. App. 284, 300 S.E.2d 325 (1983); Browning v. Powell, 165 Ga. App. 315, 301 S.E.2d 52 (1983); City of Acworth v. John J. Harte Assocs., 165 Ga. App. 438, 301 S.E.2d 499 (1983); Smith v. Smith, 165 Ga. App. 532, 301 S.E.2d 696 (1983); Marconi Avionics, Inc. v. DeKalb County, 165 Ga. App. 628, 302 S.E.2d 384 (1983); Jones v. Rodzewicz, 165 Ga. App. 635, 302 S.E.2d 402 (1983); Vizzini v. Blonder, 165 Ga. App. 840, 303 S.E.2d 38 (1983); Bartley v. Augusta Country Club, Inc., 166 Ga. App. 1, 303 S.E.2d 129 (1983); Spell v. Bible Baptist Church, Inc., 166 Ga. App. 22, 303 S.E.2d 156 (1983); Wiard v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 166 Ga. App. 47, 303 S.E.2d 161 (1983); Whirlpool Corp. v. Hurlbut, 166 Ga. App. 95, 303 S.E.2d 284 (1983); Morrison Dental Assocs. v. Wilcher, 166 Ga. App. 236, 303 S.E.2d 775 (1983); Higginbottom v. Thiele Kaolin Co., 251 Ga. 148, 304 S.E.2d 365 (1983); Klorer-Willhardt, Inc. v. Martz, 166 Ga. App. 446, 304 S.E.2d 442 (1983); Murch v. Brown, 166 Ga. App. 538, 304 S.E.2d 750 (1983); Purcell v. C. Goldstein & Sons, 166 Ga. App. 547, 305 S.E.2d 10 (1983); Marchman Oil & Chem. Co. v. Southern Petro. Trading Co., 167 Ga. App. 691, 307 S.E.2d 509 (1983); Christian v. M & R Collection Adjustment, Inc., 167 Ga. App. 712, 307 S.E.2d 523 (1983); Partridge v. Partridge, 167 Ga. App. 716, 307 S.E.2d 524 (1983); Parks v. Atlanta Pub. Sch. Sys. Bd. of Educ., 168 Ga. App. 572, 309 S.E.2d 645 (1983)

Bennett v. Bank of S., 168 Ga. App. 536, 309 S.E.2d 682 (1983); Logan v. American Bankers Life Assurance Co., 168 Ga. App. 647, 310 S.E.2d 263 (1983); Hayes v. Murray, 169 Ga. App. 78, 311 S.E.2d 477 (1983); Wright v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 169 Ga. App. 454, 313 S.E.2d 150 (1984); Groover Eng'g Co. v. Capital Assocs., 169 Ga. App. 480, 313 S.E.2d 498 (1984); Hayes v. Murray, 252 Ga. 529, 314 S.E.2d 885 (1984); Perry v. International Indem. Co., 169 Ga. App. 818, 315 S.E.2d 13 (1984); Avera v. Avera, 253 Ga. 16, 315 S.E.2d 883 (1984); Evans v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 170 Ga. App. 145, 316 S.E.2d 517 (1984); Lawrence v. Timber Prods. Inspection, Inc., 170 Ga. App. 156, 316 S.E.2d 525 (1984); Continental Ins. Co. v. Hawkins, 170 Ga. App. 274, 316 S.E.2d 596 (1984); Pritchard v. Wilson, 170 Ga. App. 313, 316 S.E.2d 604 (1984); El-Amin v. Trust Co. Bank, 171 Ga. App. 35, 318 S.E.2d 655 (1984); Bradley v. Tattnall Bank, 170 Ga. App. 821, 318 S.E.2d 657 (1984); Georgia Am. Ins. Co. v. Varnum, 171 Ga. App. 190, 318 S.E.2d 814 (1984); Richards v. Southern Fin. Corp., 171 Ga. App. 268, 319 S.E.2d 103 (1984); Smith v. Maner, 171 Ga. App. 363, 319 S.E.2d 532 (1984); Coast Catamaran Corp. v. Mann, 171 Ga. App. 844, 321 S.E.2d 353 (1984); Suttle v. Northside Realty Assocs., 171 Ga. App. 928, 321 S.E.2d 424 (1984); Williams v. Heykow, Inc., 171 Ga. App. 936, 321 S.E.2d 431 (1984); Jahncke Serv., Inc. v. DOT, 172 Ga. App. 215, 322 S.E.2d 505 (1984); Poss v. Moreland, 253 Ga. 730, 324 S.E.2d 456 (1985); Sparks v. Parks, 172 Ga. App. 823, 324 S.E.2d 784 (1984); Wisseh v. Bank of Credit & Commerce Int'l, 173 Ga. App. 286, 325 S.E.2d 897 (1985); Wood v. Chatham Eng'g & Constr. Co., 173 Ga. App. 289, 326 S.E.2d 8 (1985); Baker v. Wulf, 173 Ga. App. 674, 327 S.E.2d 796 (1985); Mingledolph v. University Emergency Physicians, 174 Ga. App. 75, 329 S.E.2d 222 (1985); Duenas v. Bence, 174 Ga. App. 80, 329 S.E.2d 260 (1985); Blackburn v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 174 Ga. App. 157, 329 S.E.2d 284 (1985); Lewis v. Rickenbaker, 174 Ga. App. 371, 330 S.E.2d 140 (1985); Guillebeau v. Yeargin, 254 Ga. 490, 330 S.E.2d 585 (1985); Payne v. Dixie Elec. Co., 174 Ga. App. 610, 330 S.E.2d 749 (1985); Bradbury v. Mead Corp., 174 Ga. App. 601, 330 S.E.2d 801 (1985); Bandy v. Hospital Auth., 174 Ga. App. 556, 332 S.E.2d 46 (1985); Anderberg v. Georgia Elec. Membership Corp., 175 Ga. App. 14, 332 S.E.2d 326 (1985); Franklin v. Piggly Wiggly Food S., Inc., 175 Ga. App. 20, 332 S.E.2d 329 (1985); Alexander v. Heritage Corp., 175 Ga. App. 55, 332 S.E.2d 667 (1985); Collie v. Hutson, 175 Ga. App. 672, 334 S.E.2d 13 (1985); Drohan v. Carriage Carpet Mills, 175 Ga. App. 717, 334 S.E.2d 219 (1985); Anderson v. Hendrix, 175 Ga. App. 720, 334 S.E.2d 697 (1985); Bentley v. National Bank, 175 Ga. App. 732, 334 S.E.2d 331 (1985); Hayes v. Fernandez, 176 Ga. App. 332, 335 S.E.2d 735 (1985); Messex v. Lynch, 255 Ga. 208, 336 S.E.2d 755 (1985); J.M. Clayton Co. v. Martin, 177 Ga. App. 228, 339 S.E.2d 280 (1985); Edelschick v. Blanchard, 177 Ga. App. 410, 339 S.E.2d 628 (1985); Bekele v. Ryals, 177 Ga. App. 445, 339 S.E.2d 655 (1986); Skinner v. Perkins, 255 Ga. 366, 339 S.E.2d 717 (1986); Fulghum v. Kelly, 255 Ga. 652, 340 S.E.2d 589 (1986); Edmonds v. Bates, 178 Ga. App. 69, 342 S.E.2d 476 (1986); Evans v. Bibb Co., 178 Ga. App. 139, 342 S.E.2d 484 (1986); Reynolds v. Transport Ins. Co., 178 Ga. App. 462, 343 S.E.2d 502 (1986); Watkins v. Watkins, 256 Ga. 58, 344 S.E.2d 220 (1986); Brown v. Rowe, 178 Ga. App. 575, 344 S.E.2d 245 (1986); Nicholson v. Harris, 179 Ga. App. 35, 345 S.E.2d 63 (1986); Advanced Contouring, Inc. v. McMillan Div. of States Eng'g Corp., 179 Ga. App. 128, 345 S.E.2d 666 (1986); Douglas County v. Anneewakee, Inc., 179 Ga. App. 270, 346 S.E.2d 368 (1986); Buffington v. Gold Kist, Inc., 179 Ga. App. 393, 346 S.E.2d 577 (1986); Hodges Plumbing & Elec. Co. v. ITT Grinnell Co., 179 Ga. App. 521, 347 S.E.2d 257 (1986); Clark v. McBride, 256 Ga. 308, 348 S.E.2d 634 (1986); Capital Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 180 Ga. App. 413, 349 S.E.2d 201 (1986); Cline v. McLeod, 180 Ga. App. 286, 349 S.E.2d 232 (1986); Davis v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 180 Ga. App. 567, 349 S.E.2d 525 (1986); Helmich v. Kennedy, 796 F.2d 1441 (11th Cir. 1986); Hunnicutt v. Hunnicutt, 180 Ga. App. 798, 350 S.E.2d 770 (1986); Kirk v. Lithonia Mobile Homes, Inc., 181 Ga. App. 533, 352 S.E.2d 788 (1987); Yates Paving & Grading Co. v. Waters, 181 Ga. App. 537, 352 S.E.2d 791 (1987); Seymour v. Vaughn, 181 Ga. App. 604, 353 S.E.2d 91 (1987); Arre Indus., Inc. v. Aralmex, 181 Ga. App. 607, 353 S.E.2d 94 (1987); Dein v. Lesack, 181 Ga. App. 671, 353 S.E.2d 602 (1987); Hively v. Davis, 181 Ga. App. 733, 353 S.E.2d 622 (1987); Brown v. Coastal Emergency Servs., Inc., 181 Ga. App. 893, 354 S.E.2d 632 (1987); Jones v. Gordon, 182 Ga. App. 29, 354 S.E.2d 658 (1987); Alliance Auto Acceptance Lease, Inc. v. Chuck Clancy Ford, Inc., 182 Ga. App. 182, 355 S.E.2d 112 (1987); Goldkist, Inc. v. Brownlee, 182 Ga. App. 287, 355 S.E.2d 773 (1987); Patterson v. Lanham, 182 Ga. App. 343, 355 S.E.2d 738 (1987); Goodman v. Kahn, 182 Ga. App. 724, 356 S.E.2d 757 (1987); Baker v. Baker, 257 Ga. 187, 356 S.E.2d 873 (1987); Showalter v. Villa Prado Assocs., 182 Ga. App. 705, 356 S.E.2d 895 (1987); Jones v. Clark, 182 Ga. App. 871, 357 S.E.2d 285 (1987); Coca-Cola Co. v. Denmark, 182 Ga. App. 883, 357 S.E.2d 286 (1987); Dixie Constr. Prods., Inc. v. Southeastern Council on Comp. Ins., 183 Ga. App. 101, 357 S.E.2d 831 (1987); Williams v. Thomas, 183 Ga. App. 51, 357 S.E.2d 872 (1987); Watkins v. Laser/Print-Atlanta, Inc., 183 Ga. App. 172, 358 S.E.2d 477 (1987); Burns v. Gleason, 183 Ga. App. 245, 358 S.E.2d 646 (1987); Cook v. Arrington, 183 Ga. App. 384, 358 S.E.2d 869 (1987); ARA Transp. v. Barnes, 183 Ga. App. 424, 359 S.E.2d 157 (1987); Smoky Mt. Enters., Inc. v. Bennett, 183 Ga. App. 514, 359 S.E.2d 366 (1987); Falcone Int'l, Inc. v. Clowes, 184 Ga. App. 442, 361 S.E.2d 708 (1987); Lynch v. Georgia Power Co., 185 Ga. App. 256, 363 S.E.2d 777 (1987); Sofet v. Roberts, 185 Ga. App. 451, 364 S.E.2d 595 (1987); My Fair Lady of Ga., Inc. v. Harris, 185 Ga. App. 459, 364 S.E.2d 580 (1988); Sutton v. Sullivan & Carden, 185 Ga. App. 577, 364 S.E.2d 887 (1988); Smith v. Southeastern Fid. Ins. Co., 258 Ga. 15, 365 S.E.2d 105 (1988); Schwartz v. Rennie, 185 Ga. App. 638, 365 S.E.2d 159 (1988); Moffie v. Oglethorpe Univ., Inc., 186 Ga. App. 328, 367 S.E.2d 112 (1988); Jernigan Auto Parts, Inc. v. Commercial State Bank, 186 Ga. App. 267, 367 S.E.2d 250 (1988); Southerland v. Dalton Paving & Constr., Inc., 186 Ga. App. 743, 368 S.E.2d 193 (1988); Brice v. Northwest Ga. Bank, 186 Ga. App. 871, 368 S.E.2d 816 (1988); Menningmann v. Independent Fire Ins. Co., 187 Ga. App. 118, 369 S.E.2d 295 (1988); Young v. Wooldridge, 187 Ga. App. 661, 371 S.E.2d 100 (1988); Reahard v. Ivester, 188 Ga. App. 17, 371 S.E.2d 905 (1988); Willis v. Allen, 188 Ga. App. 390, 373 S.E.2d 79 (1988); Peck v. Rollins Protective Servs., Inc., 189 Ga. App. 381, 375 S.E.2d 494 (1988); Calhoun v. Bone, 189 Ga. App. 396, 375 S.E.2d 871 (1988); Hunt v. Lee, 190 Ga. App. 403, 379 S.E.2d 215 (1989); Ledbetter v. Delight Whsle. Co., 191 Ga. App. 64, 380 S.E.2d 736 (1989); Reese v. Georgia Power Co., 191 Ga. App. 125, 381 S.E.2d 110 (1989); Barnes v. GMAC, 191 Ga. App. 201, 381 S.E.2d 146 (1989); Adams v. Atlanta Faith Mem. Church, Inc., 191 Ga. App. 215, 381 S.E.2d 397 (1989); Wilson v. Wickes-Homecrafters, Inc., 191 Ga. App. 474, 382 S.E.2d 194 (1989); Doug Howles' Paces Ferry Dodge, Inc. v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 191 Ga. App. 556, 382 S.E.2d 364 (1989); Lynburn Enters., Inc. v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 191 Ga. App. 710, 382 S.E.2d 599 (1989); Whelchel v. Laing Properties, Inc., 190 Ga. App. 182, 378 S.E.2d 478 (1989); Brygider v. Atkinson, 192 Ga. App. 424, 385 S.E.2d 95 (1989); Deal v. Builders Transp., Inc., 192 Ga. App. 511, 385 S.E.2d 293 (1989); Edmunds v. Cowan, 192 Ga. App. 616, 386 S.E.2d 39 (1989)

International Bus. Consulting, Ltd. v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 192 Ga. App. 742, 386 S.E.2d 400 (1989); Hill v. Federal Employees Credit Union, 193 Ga. App. 44, 386 S.E.2d 874 (1989); Baughcum v. Cecil Key Paving, Inc., 190 Ga. App. 21, 378 S.E.2d 151 (1989); Clemons v. Piggly Wiggly Food S., Inc., 193 Ga. App. 309, 387 S.E.2d 600 (1989); Jacobs v. Spano, 193 Ga. App. 447, 387 S.E.2d 924 (1989); Harris v. Boyd, 193 Ga. App. 467, 388 S.E.2d 60 (1989); Campbell v. Hyatt Regency, 193 Ga. App. 542, 388 S.E.2d 341 (1989); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Weathers, 193 Ga. App. 557, 388 S.E.2d 393 (1989); Houston v. Georgia N.E.R.R., 193 Ga. App. 687, 388 S.E.2d 762 (1989); Simmons v. Holsey Temple Christian Methodist Church, 193 Ga. App. 770, 389 S.E.2d 1 (1989); Lewis v. McDowell, 194 Ga. App. 429, 390 S.E.2d 605 (1990); Steerman v. American States Ins. Co., 194 Ga. App. 461, 390 S.E.2d 669 (1990); Barnes v. Johnson, 194 Ga. App. 568, 390 S.E.2d 921 (1990); Miller v. Smith & Smith Land Surveyors, 194 Ga. App. 474, 391 S.E.2d 20 (1990); Mark Singleton Buick, Inc. v. Taylor, 194 Ga. App. 630, 391 S.E.2d 435 (1990); King v. Sheraton Savannah Corp., 194 Ga. App. 618, 391 S.E.2d 457 (1990); Webb v. Rushing, 194 Ga. App. 732, 391 S.E.2d 709 (1990); Hyzer v. Hickman, 195 Ga. App. 213, 393 S.E.2d 79 (1990); Stuckey Diamonds, Inc. v. Jones, 195 Ga. App. 351, 393 S.E.2d 706 (1990); Electrical Distrib., Inc. v. Turner Constr. Co., 196 Ga. App. 359, 395 S.E.2d 879 (1990); Hudgins v. Bawtinhimer, 196 Ga. App. 386, 395 S.E.2d 909 (1990); Collier v. Powell, 196 Ga. App. 522, 396 S.E.2d 264 (1990); Wall v. Southern Ry., 196 Ga. App. 483, 396 S.E.2d 266 (1990). But see CSX Transp., Inc. v. Trism Specialized Carriers, Inc., 9 F. Supp. 2d 1374 (N.D. Ga. 1998); Lee v. North Am. Life & Cas. Co., 196 Ga. App. 792, 397 S.E.2d 64 (1990); Miller v. Jeff Davis Apts., Ltd. II, 196 Ga. App. 600, 396 S.E.2d 494 (1990); Primo's, Inc. v. Clayton Common Assocs., 197 Ga. App. 286, 398 S.E.2d 231 (1990); Bell v. Coronet Ins. Co., 197 Ga. App. 211, 398 S.E.2d 242 (1990); Cheeley v. Henderson, 197 Ga. App. 543, 398 S.E.2d 787 (1990); Taquechel v. Chattahoochee Bank, 260 Ga. 755, 400 S.E.2d 8 (1991); Hill-Everett v. Jones, 197 Ga. App. 872, 399 S.E.2d 739 (1990); Hall v. Scott USA, Ltd., 198 Ga. App. 197, 400 S.E.2d 700 (1990); Kievman v. Kievman, 260 Ga. 853, 400 S.E.2d 317 (1991); Jones v. Campbell, 198 Ga. App. 83, 400 S.E.2d 364 (1990); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ainsworth, 198 Ga. App. 740, 402 S.E.2d 759 (1991); Battle v. Sandy Springs Assocs., 198 Ga. App. 584, 402 S.E.2d 336 (1991); Kelley v. Baker Protective Servs., Inc., 198 Ga. App. 378, 401 S.E.2d 585 (1991); Owen v. M & M Metro Supply, Inc., 198 Ga. App. 420, 401 S.E.2d 612 (1991); Joiner v. Lee, 197 Ga. App. 754, 399 S.E.2d 516 (1990); Arnall, Golden & Gregory v. Health Serv. Ctrs., Inc., 197 Ga. App. 791, 399 S.E.2d 565 (1990); Precise v. City of Rossville, 261 Ga. 210, 403 S.E.2d 47 (1991); Judge v. Wellman, 198 Ga. App. 782, 403 S.E.2d 76 (1991); 944, Inc. v. Georgia State Bank, 198 Ga. App. 893, 403 S.E.2d 466 (1991); Brown v. Apollo Indus., Inc., 199 Ga. App. 260, 404 S.E.2d 447 (1991); Kelly v. Vargo, 261 Ga. 422, 405 S.E.2d 36 (1991); Artis v. Gaither, 199 Ga. App. 114, 404 S.E.2d 322 (1991); Doctors Bldg. Partners v. Grimes Bridge Assocs., 199 Ga. App. 216, 404 S.E.2d 582 (1991); S & W Masonry Contractor, Inc. v. Jamison Co., 199 Ga. App. 628, 405 S.E.2d 519 (1991); Collier v. Evans, 199 Ga. App. 763, 406 S.E.2d 90 (1991); Bailey v. Butler, 199 Ga. App. 753, 406 S.E.2d 97 (1991); Daniel v. Safeway Ins. Co., 199 Ga. App. 833, 406 S.E.2d 266 (1991); Wilson v. Tara Ford, Inc., 200 Ga. App. 98, 406 S.E.2d 807 (1991); Fulton v. Pilon, 199 Ga. App. 861, 406 S.E.2d 517 (1991); Evans v. City of Atlanta, 199 Ga. App. 878, 406 S.E.2d 530 (1991); Dent v. Memorial Hosp., 200 Ga. App. 499, 408 S.E.2d 473 (1991); Moore v. Service Merchandise Co., 200 Ga. App. 463, 408 S.E.2d 480 (1991); E.H. Crump Co. v. Millar, 200 Ga. App. 598, 409 S.E.2d 235 (1991); Costanzo v. Jones, 200 Ga. App. 806, 409 S.E.2d 686 (1991); Sullenberger v. Grand Union Co., 201 Ga. App. 194, 410 S.E.2d 381 (1991); Sims v. Foss, 201 Ga. App. 345, 411 S.E.2d 59 (1991); Culberson v. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 201 Ga. App. 347, 411 S.E.2d 75 (1991); Northside Bldg. Supply Co. v. Foures, 201 Ga. App. 259, 411 S.E.2d 87 (1991); Mauldin v. Weinstock, 201 Ga. App. 514, 411 S.E.2d 370 (1991); Johnson v. Lomas Mtg. USA, Inc., 201 Ga. App. 562, 411 S.E.2d 731 (1991); Sarantis v. Kroger Co., 201 Ga. App. 552, 411 S.E.2d 758 (1991); Jones v. Ward, 201 Ga. App. 757, 412 S.E.2d 576 (1991); Jackson v. DOT, 201 Ga. App. 863, 412 S.E.2d 847 (1991); First Community Bank v. Bryan Starr & Assocs., 203 Ga. App. 696, 417 S.E.2d 330 (1992); Bethco, Inc. v. Cinema 'N' Drafthouse Int'l, Inc., 204 Ga. App. 143, 418 S.E.2d 467 (1992); Famble v. State Farm Ins. Co., 204 Ga. App. 332, 419 S.E.2d 143 (1992); T.L. Rogers Oil Co. v. Sommers Co., 203 Ga. App. 404, 417 S.E.2d 44 (1992); Lend Lease Trucks, Inc. v. TRW, Inc., 206 Ga. App. 410, 425 S.E.2d 293 (1992); Scott v. Hamilton Dorsey Alston Co., 206 Ga. App. 504, 426 S.E.2d 55 (1992); Tri-City Constr. Co. v. Sandy Plains Partnership, 206 Ga. App. 506, 426 S.E.2d 57 (1992); Alco Std. Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 206 Ga. App. 794, 426 S.E.2d 648 (1992); Corry v. Robinson, 207 Ga. App. 167, 427 S.E.2d 507 (1993); Georgia Canoeing Ass'n v. Henry, 263 Ga. 77, 428 S.E.2d 336 (1993); Thurmond v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 207 Ga. App. 437, 428 S.E.2d 392 (1993); Hasty v. Spruill, 207 Ga. App. 485, 428 S.E.2d 420 (1993); King v. Crain-Daly Volkswagen, Inc., 207 Ga. App. 583, 428 S.E.2d 586 (1993); First Nat'l Bank v. Loggins, 207 Ga. App. 814, 429 S.E.2d 278 (1993); Sagnibene v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., 209 Ga. App. 44, 432 S.E.2d 639 (1993); Hailey v. Blalock, 209 Ga. App. 345, 433 S.E.2d 337 (1993); Lawal v. Stanley Bostitch Co., 209 Ga. App. 439, 433 S.E.2d 706 (1993); Smith v. Tommy Roberts Trucking Co., 209 Ga. App. 826, 435 S.E.2d 54 (1993); Riverdale Pools & Constr., Inc. v. Evans, 210 Ga. App. 127, 435 S.E.2d 501 (1993); Pope v. Department of Human Resources, 209 Ga. App. 835, 434 S.E.2d 731 (1993); Dixieland Truck Brokers, Inc. v. International Indem. Co., 210 Ga. App. 160, 435 S.E.2d 520 (1993); Spartan Food Sys. v. Williams, 212 Ga. App. 674, 442 S.E.2d 489 (1994); Schulman v. MIS Resources Int'l, 212 Ga. App. 588, 443 S.E.2d 2 (1994); Brown v. Southeastern Sec. Ins. Co., 216 Ga. App. 234, 454 S.E.2d 158 (1995); Conklin v. Zant, 216 Ga. App. 357, 454 S.E.2d 159 (1995); Southern Medical Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 216 Ga. App. 289, 454 S.E.2d 180 (1995); Cooper v. Corporate Property Investors, 220 Ga. App. 889, 470 S.E.2d 689 (1996); Washington v. Jefferson County, 221 Ga. App. 81, 470 S.E.2d 714 (1996); Sullivan v. Horn, 221 Ga. App. 289, 470 S.E.2d 765 (1996); Young v. John Deere Co., 221 Ga. App. 157, 471 S.E.2d 19 (1996); Brown v. Super Disc. Mkts., Inc., 223 Ga. App. 174, 477 S.E.2d 839 (1996); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sapp, 223 Ga. App. 443, 477 S.E.2d 869 (1996); Saxton v. Coastal Dialysis & Medical Clinic, Inc., 220 Ga. App. 805, 470 S.E.2d 252 (1996); Hansen v. Mt. Yonah Scenic Estates Club, Inc., 227 Ga. App. 258, 488 S.E.2d 732 (1997); Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ga., Inc. v. Kell, 227 Ga. App. 266, 488 S.E.2d 735 (1997); Nicholl v. NationsBank, 227 Ga. App. 287, 488 S.E.2d 751 (1997); Jenkins v. Brice, 231 Ga. App. 843, 499 S.E.2d 734 (1998); Stephens v. Clairmont Ctr., Inc., 230 Ga. App. 793, 498 S.E.2d 307 (1998); Kitfield v. Henderson, Black & Greene, 231 Ga. App. 130, 498 S.E.2d 537 (1998); Jones v. Krystal Co., 231 Ga. App. 102, 498 S.E.2d 565 (1998); Patriot Gen. Ins. Co. v. Millis, 233 Ga. App. 867, 506 S.E.2d 145 (1998); La Petite Academy, Inc. v. Prescott, 234 Ga. App. 32, 506 S.E.2d 183 (1998); Taylor v. Gelfand, 233 Ga. App. 835, 505 S.E.2d 222 (1998); Kelson v. Central of Ga. R.R., 234 Ga. App. 200, 505 S.E.2d 803 (1998)

Mullis v. Speight Seed Farms, Inc., 234 Ga. App. 27, 505 S.E.2d 818 (1998); Roberts v. City of Macon, 234 Ga. App. 287, 506 S.E.2d 650 (1998); Hannah v. Hampton Auto Parts, Inc., 234 Ga. App. 392, 506 S.E.2d 910 (1998); Re/Max Executives, Inc. v. Vacalis, 234 Ga. App. 659, 507 S.E.2d 235 (1998); Davis v. First Healthcare Corp., 234 Ga. App. 744, 507 S.E.2d 563 (1998); Fulton County Tax Comm'r v. GMC, 234 Ga. App. 459, 507 S.E.2d 772 (1998); Lewis v. Lease Atlanta, Inc., 234 Ga. App. 812, 508 S.E.2d 188 (1998); Zampatti v. Tradebank Int'l Franchising Corp., 235 Ga. App. 333, 508 S.E.2d 750 (1998); Woods v. State, 243 Ga. App. 195, 532 S.E.2d 747 (2000); Bakhtiarnejad v. Cox Enters., 247 Ga. App. 205, 541 S.E.2d 33 (2000); Georgialina Enters. v. Frakes, 250 Ga. App. 250, 551 S.E.2d 95 (2001); Wallace v. Stringer, 250 Ga. App. 850, 553 S.E.2d 166 (2001); Bob Davidson & Assocs. v. Norm Webster & Assocs., 251 Ga. App. 56, 553 S.E.2d 365 (2001); Little Tallapoosa Dev., Inc. v. Baldwin Paving Co., 251 Ga. App. 238, 553 S.E.2d 860 (2001); Span v. Phar-Mor, Inc., 251 Ga. App. 320, 554 S.E.2d 309 (2001); Milestone v. David, 251 Ga. App. 832, 555 S.E.2d 163 (2001); Sherrill v. Stockel, 252 Ga. App. 276, 557 S.E.2d 8 (2001).

Benedict v. Snead, 253 Ga. App. 749, 560 S.E.2d 278 (2002); Conley v. Dawson, 257 Ga. App. 665, 572 S.E.2d 34 (2002); Sheridan v. DataNational, Inc., 258 Ga. App. 28, 572 S.E.2d 718 (2002); Estate of Jennings v. Psychiatric Health Servs., 258 Ga. App. 111, 573 S.E.2d 115 (2002); Durham v. Mathis, 258 Ga. App. 749, 575 S.E.2d 6 (2002); Mustaqeem-Graydon v. SunTrust Bank, 258 Ga. App. 200, 573 S.E.2d 455 (2002); Smith v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 258 Ga. App. 570, 574 S.E.2d 627 (2002); Hall v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 258 Ga. App. 712, 574 S.E.2d 902 (2002); Charles v. Glover, 258 Ga. App. 710, 574 S.E.2d 910 (2002); Ponder v. Brooks, 256 Ga. App. 596, 569 S.E.2d 267 (2002); West Coast Cambridge, Inc. v. Rice, 262 Ga. App. 106, 584 S.E.2d 696 (2003); Ga. DOD v. Johnson, 262 Ga. App. 475, 585 S.E.2d 907 (2003); Holt & Holt, Inc. v. Choate Constr. Co., 271 Ga. App. 292, 609 S.E.2d 103 (2004); Gay v. Ga. Dep't of Corr., 270 Ga. App. 17, 606 S.E.2d 53 (2004); Carswell v. Oconee Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 270 Ga. App. 155, 605 S.E.2d 879 (2004); Condon v. Vickery, 270 Ga. App. 322, 606 S.E.2d 336 (2004); Park Regency Ptnrs., L.P. v. Gruber, 271 Ga. App. 66, 608 S.E.2d 667 (2004); Harrison v. Williams, 270 Ga. App. 308, 605 S.E.2d 923 (2004); Palma v. Ga. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 270 Ga. App. 333, 606 S.E.2d 341 (2004); Mathews v. Marietta Toyota, Inc., 270 Ga. App. 337, 606 S.E.2d 862 (2004); Albany Bone & Joint Clinic, P.C. v. Hajek, 272 Ga. App. 464, 612 S.E.2d 509 (2005); Dierkes v. Crawford Orthodontic Care, P.C., 284 Ga. App. 96, 643 S.E.2d 364 (2007); Harris v. Inn of Lake City, 285 Ga. App. 521, 647 S.E.2d 277 (2007); Kennedy v. Ga. Dep't of Human Res. Child Support Enforcement, 286 Ga. App. 222, 648 S.E.2d 727 (2007); Hamburger v. PFM Capital Mgmt., 286 Ga. App. 382, 649 S.E.2d 779 (2007); Kay-Lex Co. v. Essex Ins. Co., 286 Ga. App. 484, 649 S.E.2d 602 (2007); Mooneyham v. Provident Auto Leasing Co., 288 Ga. App. 837, 655 S.E.2d 640 (2007); Exel Transp. Servs. v. Sigma Vita, Inc., 288 Ga. App. 527, 654 S.E.2d 665 (2007); Hous. Auth. v. Ellis, 288 Ga. App. 834, 655 S.E.2d 621 (2007); CDP Event Servs. v. Atcheson, 289 Ga. App. 183, 656 S.E.2d 537 (2008); Edwards v. Sewell, 289 Ga. App. 128, 656 S.E.2d 246 (2008); Pazur v. Belcher, 290 Ga. App. 703, 659 S.E.2d 804 (2008); Alcatraz Media, LLC v. Yahoo! Inc., 290 Ga. App. 882, 660 S.E.2d 797 (2008); Roylston v. Bank of Am., N.A., 290 Ga. App. 556, 660 S.E.2d 412 (2008); Smith v. Stewart, 291 Ga. App. 86, 660 S.E.2d 822 (2008); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sutton, 290 Ga. App. 154, 658 S.E.2d 909 (2008); Beasley v. Northside Hosp., Inc., 289 Ga. App. 685, 658 S.E.2d 233 (2008); Somers v. M.A.U., Inc., 289 Ga. App. 731, 658 S.E.2d 242 (2008); Brookview Holdings, LLC v. Suarez, 285 Ga. App. 90, 645 S.E.2d 559 (2007); Drew v. Istar Fin., Inc., 291 Ga. App. 323, 661 S.E.2d 686 (2008); McLaine v. McLeod, 291 Ga. App. 335, 661 S.E.2d 695 (2008); Davis v. Harpagon Co., LLC, 283 Ga. 539, 661 S.E.2d 545 (2008); Rosado v. Rosado, 291 Ga. App. 670, 662 S.E.2d 761 (2008); Miller v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 292 Ga. App. 189, 663 S.E.2d 756 (2008); Johnson v. GAPVT Motors, Inc., 292 Ga. App. 79, 663 S.E.2d 779 (2008); Scott v. Bank of Am., 292 Ga. App. 34, 663 S.E.2d 386 (2008); Secured Equity Fin., LLC v. Washington Mut. Bank, F. A., 293 Ga. App. 50, 666 S.E.2d 554 (2008); Coote v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 292 Ga. App. 164, 664 S.E.2d 554 (2008); Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Beasley, 293 Ga. App. 8, 666 S.E.2d 83 (2008); Rooks v. Tenet Health Sys. GB, Inc., 292 Ga. App. 477, 664 S.E.2d 861 (2008); Bickerstaff Real Estate Mgmt., LLC v. Hanners, 292 Ga. App. 554, 665 S.E.2d 705 (2008); Rheem Mfg. v. Butts, 292 Ga. App. 523, 664 S.E.2d 878 (2008); Greater Ga. Life Ins. Co. v. Eason, 292 Ga. App. 682, 665 S.E.2d 725 (2008); Weatherly v. Weatherly, 292 Ga. App. 879, 665 S.E.2d 922 (2008); Morrill v. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co., 293 Ga. App. 259, 666 S.E.2d 582 (2008); Avion Sys. v. Thompson, 293 Ga. App. 60, 666 S.E.2d 464 (2008); McCall v. Couture, 293 Ga. App. 305, 666 S.E.2d 637 (2008); Partain v. Oconee County, 293 Ga. App. 320, 667 S.E.2d 132 (2008); Triple Net Props., LLC v. Burruss Dev. & Constr., Inc., 293 Ga. App. 323, 667 S.E.2d 127 (2008); Custer v. Coward, 293 Ga. App. 316, 667 S.E.2d 135 (2008); AMLI Residential Props. v. Ga. Power Co., 293 Ga. App. 358, 667 S.E.2d 150 (2008); Harris Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Tarene Farms, LLC, 293 Ga. App. 430, 667 S.E.2d 200 (2008); Kinzy v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 293 Ga. App. 509, 667 S.E.2d 673 (2008); Am. Teleconferencing Servs. v. Network Billing Sys., LLC, 293 Ga. App. 772, 668 S.E.2d 259 (2008); Clay v. Oxendine, 285 Ga. App. 50, 645 S.E.2d 553 (2007); Dowse v. Southern Guar. Ins. Co., 263 Ga. App. 435, 588 S.E.2d 234 (2003); Dalton Paving & Constr., Inc. v. South Green Constr. of Ga., Inc., 284 Ga. App. 506, 643 S.E.2d 754 (2007); MCG Health, Inc. v. Barton, 285 Ga. App. 577, 647 S.E.2d 81 (2007); Bullington v. Blakely Crop Hail, Inc., 294 Ga. App. 147, 668 S.E.2d 732 (2008); DaimlerChrysler Motors Co. v. Clemente, 294 Ga. App. 38, 668 S.E.2d 737 (2008); Schofield Interior Contrs., Inc. v. Std. Bldg. Co., 293 Ga. App. 812, 668 S.E.2d 316 (2008); City of Decatur v. DeKalb County, 284 Ga. 434, 668 S.E.2d 247 (2008); Dennis v. First Nat'l Bank of the S., 293 Ga. App. 890, 668 S.E.2d 479 (2008); Coleman v. Arrington Auto Sales & Rentals, 294 Ga. App. 247, 669 S.E.2d 414 (2008); Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Stribling, 294 Ga. App. 382, 670 S.E.2d 154 (2008); Savage v. E. R. Snell Contr., Inc., 295 Ga. App. 319, 672 S.E.2d 1 (2008); Dyess v. Brewton, 284 Ga. 583, 669 S.E.2d 145 (2008); De Castro v. Durrell, 295 Ga. App. 194, 671 S.E.2d 244 (2008); Mullis v. Bibb County, 294 Ga. App. 721, 669 S.E.2d 716 (2008); C & H Dev., LLC v. Franklin County, 294 Ga. App. 792, 670 S.E.2d 491 (2008); DeSarno v. Jam Golf Mgmt., LLC, 295 Ga. App. 70, 670 S.E.2d 889 (2008); McCullough v. Reyes, 287 Ga. App. 483, 651 S.E.2d 810 (2007); Monfort v. Colquitt County Hosp. Auth., 288 Ga. App. 202, 653 S.E.2d 535 (2007); Pruette v. Phoebe Putney Mem. Hosp., 295 Ga. App. 335, 671 S.E.2d 844 (2008); Creeden v. Fuentes, 296 Ga. App. 96, 673 S.E.2d 611 (2009); Lamb v. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 297 Ga. App. 529, 677 S.E.2d 328 (2009); Kitchen v. Insuramerica Corp., 296 Ga. App. 739, 675 S.E.2d 598 (2009); Russell v. Barrett, 296 Ga. App. 114, 673 S.E.2d 623 (2009); Iwan Renovations, Inc. v. N. Atlanta Nat'l Bank, 296 Ga. App. 125, 673 S.E.2d 632 (2009); Calloway v. City of Fayetteville, 296 Ga. App. 200, 674 S.E.2d 66 (2009); Daniel v. Allstate Ins. Co., 290 Ga. App. 898, 660 S.E.2d 765 (2008); Davis v. MARTA, 296 Ga. App. 355, 674 S.E.2d 627 (2009); Haugabook v. Crisler, 297 Ga. App. 428, 677 S.E.2d 355 (2009); McCray v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 291 Ga. App. 317, 661 S.E.2d 691 (2008); Rachels v. Thompson, 290 Ga. App. 115, 658 S.E.2d 890 (2008); Safe Shield Workwear, LLC v. Shubee, Inc., 296 Ga. App. 498, 675 S.E.2d 249 (2009); Hanson Staple Co. v. Eckelberry, 297 Ga. App. 356, 677 S.E.2d 321 (2009); Am. Nat'l Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Amerieast, Inc., 297 Ga. App. 443, 677 S.E.2d 663 (2009); Gardner v. Marcum, 292 Ga. App. 369, 665 S.E.2d 336 (2008); Ins. Co. of Pa. v. APAC-Southeast, Inc., 297 Ga. App. 553, 677 S.E.2d 734 (2009); Hicks v. Heard, 297 Ga. App. 689, 678 S.E.2d 145 (2009); Riding v. Ellis, 297 Ga. App. 740, 678 S.E.2d 178 (2009); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 297 Ga. App. 751, 678 S.E.2d 196 (2009); Tookes v. Murray, 297 Ga. App. 765, 678 S.E.2d 209 (2009); Lee v. Phoebe Putney Mem. Hosp., Inc., 297 Ga. App. 692, 678 S.E.2d 340 (2009); Abdul-Malik v. AirTran Airways, Inc., 297 Ga. App. 852, 678 S.E.2d 555 (2009); Greenhorne & O'Mara, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 298 Ga. App. 261, 679 S.E.2d 818 (2009); Mason v. Allstate Ins. Co., 298 Ga. App. 308, 680 S.E.2d 168 (2009); Lehman v. Keller, 297 Ga. App. 371, 677 S.E.2d 415 (2009); Gettner v. Fitzgerald, 297 Ga. App. 258, 677 S.E.2d 149 (2009); Keyingham Invs., LLC v. Fid. Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 298 Ga. App. 467, 680 S.E.2d 442 (2009)

Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Snipes, 298 Ga. App. 405, 680 S.E.2d 438 (2009); Yim v. J's Fashion Accessories, Inc., 298 Ga. App. 399, 680 S.E.2d 466 (2009); McGregor v. Columbia Nat'l Ins. Co., 298 Ga. App. 491, 680 S.E.2d 559 (2009); Rushin v. Ussery, 298 Ga. App. 830, 681 S.E.2d 263 (2009); Leo v. Waffle House, Inc., 298 Ga. App. 838, 681 S.E.2d 258 (2009); Summit Auto. Group, LLC v. Clark Kia Motors Ame., Inc., 298 Ga. App. 875, 681 S.E.2d 681 (2009); Irvin Int'l, Inc. v. Riverwood Int'l Corp., 299 Ga. App. 633, 683 S.E.2d 158 (2009); Jones v. City of Willacoochee, 299 Ga. App. 741, 683 S.E.2d 683 (2009); Reynolds Props. v. Bickelmann, 300 Ga. App. 484, 685 S.E.2d 450 (2009); OnBrand Media v. Codex Consulting, Inc., 301 Ga. App. 141, 687 S.E.2d 168 (2009); Quarles v. Quarles, 285 Ga. 762, 683 S.E.2d 583 (2009); Textile Rubber & Chem. Co. v. Thermo-Flex Techs., Inc., 301 Ga. App. 491, 687 S.E.2d 919 (2009); Solley v. Mullins Trucking Co., 301 Ga. App. 565, 687 S.E.2d 924 (2009); Northland Ins. Co. v. Am. Home Assur. Co., 301 Ga. App. 726, 689 S.E.2d 87 (2009); Hollis & Spann, Inc. v. Hopkins, 301 Ga. App. 29, 686 S.E.2d 817 (2009); Stefano Arts v. Sui, 301 Ga. App. 857, 690 S.E.2d 197 (2010); Drury v. Harris Ventures, Inc., 302 Ga. App. 545, 691 S.E.2d 356 (2010); Kaplan v. City of Sandy Springs, 286 Ga. 559, 690 S.E.2d 395 (2010); Henderson v. Sargent, 297 Ga. App. 504, 677 S.E.2d 709 (2009); Buckler v. DeKalb County Bd. of Comm'rs, 299 Ga. App. 465, 683 S.E.2d 22 (2009); Gallagher v. Buckhead Cmty. Bank, 299 Ga. App. 622, 683 S.E.2d 50 (2009); Weaver v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 298 Ga. App. 645, 680 S.E.2d 668 (2009); Jones v. O'Day, 303 Ga. App. 159, 692 S.E.2d 774 (2010); Baker v. Harcon, Inc., 303 Ga. App. 749, 694 S.E.2d 673 (2010); Powerhouse Custom Homes, Inc. v. 84 Lumber Co., L.P., 307 Ga. App. 605, 705 S.E.2d 704 (2011); AAF-McQuay, Inc. v. Willis, 308 Ga. App. 203, 707 S.E.2d 508 (2011); Lee v. McCord, 292 Ga. App. 707, 665 S.E.2d 414 (2008); Lewis v. Ritz Carlton Hotel Co., LLC, 310 Ga. App. 58, 712 S.E.2d 91 (2011); Karle v. Belle, 310 Ga. App. 115, 712 S.E.2d 96 (2011); Davis v. Foreman, 311 Ga. App. 775, 717 S.E.2d 295 (2011); Jones v. White, 311 Ga. App. 822, 717 S.E.2d 322 (2011); In re Estate of Tapley, 312 Ga. App. 234, 718 S.E.2d 92 (2011); Aleman v. Sugarloaf Dialysis, LLC, 312 Ga. App. 658, 719 S.E.2d 551 (2011); Griffin v. State Bank, 312 Ga. App. 87, 718 S.E.2d 35 (2011); Hays v. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 314 Ga. App. 110, 722 S.E.2d 923 (2012); Sands v. Lindsey, 314 Ga. App. 160, 723 S.E.2d 471 (2012); Trendmark Homes, Inc. v. Bank of N. Ga., 314 Ga. App. 886, 726 S.E.2d 138 (2012); Boatright v. Glynn County Sch. Dist., 315 Ga. App. 468, 726 S.E.2d 591 (2012); Amtrust N. Am., Inc. v. Smith, 315 Ga. App. 133, 726 S.E.2d 628 (2012); McCrary v. Middle Ga. Mgmt. Servs., 315 Ga. App. 247, 726 S.E.2d 740 (2012); Tallahassee State Bank v. Macon, 317 Ga. App. 128, 730 S.E.2d 646 (2012); Sun Nurseries, Inc. v. Lake Erma, LLC, 316 Ga. App. 832, 730 S.E.2d 556 (2012); Greenway v. Northside Hosp., 317 Ga. App. 371, 730 S.E.2d 742 (2012); Brown v. Seaboard Constr. Co., 317 Ga. App. 667, 732 S.E.2d 325 (2012); McRae v. Hogan, 317 Ga. App. 813, 732 S.E.2d 853 (2012); Dixie Roadbuilders, Inc. v. Sallet, 318 Ga. App. 228, 733 S.E.2d 511 (2012); Ga. Cash Am. v. Greene, 318 Ga. App. 355, 734 S.E.2d 67 (2012); Meek v. Mallory & Evans, Inc., 318 Ga. App. 407, 734 S.E.2d 109 (2012); Parker v. All Am. Quality Foods, Inc., 318 Ga. App. 689, 734 S.E.2d 510 (2012); Maxum Indem. Co. v. Jimenez, 318 Ga. App. 669, 734 S.E.2d 499 (2012); Coweta County v. Cooper, 318 Ga. App. 41, 733 S.E.2d 348 (2012); Shell v. Tidewater Fin. Co., 318 Ga. App. 69, 733 S.E.2d 375 (2012); Kovacs v. Cornerstone Nat'l Ins. Co., 318 Ga. App. 99, 736 S.E.2d 105 (2012); Circle K Stores, Inc. v. T. O. H. Assocs., 318 Ga. App. 753, 734 S.E.2d 752 (2012); Cox v. Mayan Lagoon Estates Ltd., 319 Ga. App. 101, 734 S.E.2d 883 (2012); Samuels v. CBOCS, Inc., 319 Ga. App. 421, 742 S.E.2d 141 (2012); Kammerer Real Estate Holdings, LLC v. PLH Sandy Springs, LLC, 319 Ga. App. 393, 740 S.E.2d 635 (2012), overruled on other grounds, 322 Ga. App. 859, 747 S.E.2d 68 (2013); Oduok v. Wedean Props., 319 Ga. App. 785, 738 S.E.2d 626 (2013); Bogart v. Wis. Inst. for Torah Study, 321 Ga. App. 492, 739 S.E.2d 465 (2013); Garrett v. S. Health Corp. of Ellijay, Inc., 320 Ga. App. 176, 739 S.E.2d 661 (2013); Garner & Glover Co. v. Barrett, 321 Ga. App. 205, 738 S.E.2d 721 (2013); Nash v. Twp. Invs., LLC, 320 Ga. App. 494, 740 S.E.2d 236 (2013); Floyd County v. Scott, 320 Ga. App. 549, 740 S.E.2d 277 (2013); Henderson v. Sugarloaf Residential Prop. Owners Ass'n, 320 Ga. App. 544, 740 S.E.2d 273 (2013); Dixie Group, Inc. v. Shaw Indus. Group, 303 Ga. App. 459, 693 S.E.2d 888; Freund v. Warren, 320 Ga. App. 765, 740 S.E.2d 727 (2013); Clayton County v. Austin-Powell, 321 Ga. App. 12, 740 S.E.2d 831 (2013), overruled on other grounds, Phillips v. Harmon, 297 Ga. 386, 774 S.E.2d 596 (2015); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 321 Ga. App. 738, 742 S.E.2d 762 (2013); Woodcraft by MacDonald, Inc. v. Ga. Cas. & Sur. Co., 293 Ga. 9, 743 S.E.2d 373 (2013); Bobick v. Cmty. & S. Bank, 321 Ga. App. 855, 743 S.E.2d 518 (2013); Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga. v. Barnes, 322 Ga. App. 47, 743 S.E.2d 609 (2013), overruled on other grounds by Wolfe v. Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 300 Ga. 223, 794 S.E.2d 85 (Ga. 2016); Ansley v. Raczka-Long, 293 Ga. 138, 744 S.E.2d 55 (2013); Sherman v. City of Atlanta, 317 Ga. 345, 730 S.E.2d 113 (2013); McGraw v. IDS Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 323 Ga. App. 408, 744 S.E.2d 891 (2013); Hanna v. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co., Inc., 323 Ga. App. 321, 744 S.E.2d 894 (2013); UWork.com, Inc. v. Paragon Techs., Inc., 321 Ga. App. 584, 740 S.E.2d 887 (2013); Price v. Thapa, 323 Ga. App. 638, 745 S.E.2d 311 (2013); Aubain-Gray v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 323 Ga. App. 672, 747 S.E.2d 684 (2013); Carter v. Riggins, 323 Ga. App. 747, 748 S.E.2d 117 (2013); Cmty. Music Ctrs. of Atlanta, LLC v. JW Broad., Inc., 323 Ga. App. 757, 748 S.E.2d 127 (2013); Norfolk S. Ry. v. Zeagler, 293 Ga. 582, 748 S.E.2d 846 (2013); Benfield v. Wells, 324 Ga. App. 85, 749 S.E.2d 384 (2013); Houston v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 324 Ga. App. 105, 749 S.E.2d 400 (2013); Patel v. Ameris Bank, 324 Ga. App. 227, 749 S.E.2d 809 (2013); Freeman v. Smith, 324 Ga. App. 426, 750 S.E.2d 739 (2013), overruled on other grounds by Franklin v. Pitts, 349 Ga. App. 544, 826 S.E.2d 427 (2019); Danes v. Rogers, 324 Ga. App. 504, 751 S.E.2d 135 (2013); Stillwater Enters. v. Hanson Pipe & Precast, LLC, 324 Ga. App. 582, 751 S.E.2d 193 (2013); O'Dell v. Mahoney, 324 Ga. App. 360, 750 S.E.2d 689 (2013); STC Two, LLC v. Shulman-Weiner, 325 Ga. App. 245, 750 S.E.2d 730 (2013); Herren v. Sucher, 325 Ga. App. 219, 750 S.E.2d 430 (2013); Aquanaut Diving & Eng'g, Inc. v. Guitar Ctr. Stores, Inc., 324 Ga. App. 570, 751 S.E.2d 175 (2013); Bedsole v. Action Outdoor Adver. JV, LLC, 325 Ga. App. 194, 750 S.E.2d 445 (2013); The Kroger Co. v. Schoenhoff, 324 Ga. App. 619, 751 S.E.2d 438 (2013); Johnson v. Burrell, 294 Ga. 301, 751 S.E.2d 301 (2013); Crabapple Lake Parc Cmty. Ass'n v. Circeo, 325 Ga. App. 101, 751 S.E.2d 866 (2013); Quinney v. Phoebe Putney Mem. Hosp., 325 Ga. App. 112, 751 S.E.2d 874 (2013); DJ Mortg., LLC v. Synovus Bank, 325 Ga. App. 382, 750 S.E.2d 797 (2013); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Twenty Six Properties, LLC, 325 Ga. App. 662, 754 S.E.2d 630 (2014); Richards v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 325 Ga. App. 722, 754 S.E.2d 770 (2014); Burke v. Prime Rate Premium Fin. Corp., 325 Ga. App. 760, 754 S.E.2d 802 (2014); First Chatham Bank v. Liberty Capital, LLC, 325 Ga. App. 821, 755 S.E.2d 219 (2014); Wooden v. Synovus Bank, 325 Ga. App. 876, 756 S.E.2d 19 (2014); Southern LNG, Inc. v. MacGinnitie, 294 Ga. 657, 755 S.E.2d 683 (2014); Askew v. Rogers, 326 Ga. App. 24, 755 S.E.2d 836 (2014); Scrocca v. Ashwood Condominium Ass'n, 326 Ga. App. 226, 756 S.E.2d 308 (2014)

Taylor v. McGraw, 327 Ga. App. 654, 760 S.E.2d 657 (2014); Reed v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co., 327 Ga. App. 130, 755 S.E.2d 356 (2014); Thompson-El v. Bank of Am., N.A., 327 Ga. App. 309, 759 S.E.2d 49 (2014); Cartersville Ranch, LLC v. Dellinger, 295 Ga. 195, 758 S.E.2d 781 (2014); Fabian v. Pontikakis, 327 Ga. App. 392, 759 S.E.2d 295 (2014); Adams v. DeWitt, 327 Ga. App. 576, 760 S.E.2d 191 (2014); Roca Properties, LLC v. Dance Hotlanta, Inc., 327 Ga. App. 700, 761 S.E.2d 105 (2014); Internet Brands, Inc. v. Jape, 328 Ga. App. 272, 760 S.E.2d 1 (2014); 915 Indian Trail, LLC v. State Bank & Trust Co., 328 Ga. App. 524, 759 S.E.2d 654 (2014); Barzey v. City of Cuthbert, 295 Ga. 641, 763 S.E.2d 447 (2014); Hayek v. Chastain Park Condo. Ass'n, 329 Ga. App. 164, 764 S.E.2d 183 (2014); Sanchez v. Atlanta Union Mission Corp., 329 Ga. App. 158, 764 S.E.2d 178 (2014); Courtland Hotel, LLC v. Salzer, 330 Ga. App. 264, 767 S.E.2d 750 (2014); Boston v. Athearn, 329 Ga. App. 890, 764 S.E.2d 582 (2014); Cope v. Evans, 329 Ga. App. 354, 765 S.E.2d 40 (2014); DeKalb County v. Kirkland, 329 Ga. App. 262, 764 S.E.2d 867 (2014); Hill v. VNS Corp., 329 Ga. App. 274, 764 S.E.2d 876 (2014); Maree v. ROMAR Joint Venture, 329 Ga. App. 282, 763 S.E.2d 899 (2014), overruled on other grounds by SRM Group, Inc. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am., 308 Ga. 404, 841 S.E.2d 729 (2020). Rumsey v. Gillis, 329 Ga. App. 488, 765 S.E.2d 665 (2014); Holcomb v. Long, 329 Ga. App. 515, 765 S.E.2d 687 (2014); Davidson v. Meticulously Clean Sweepers, LLC, 329 Ga. App. 640, 765 S.E.2d 783 (2014); Justice v. SCI Ga. Funeral Servs., 329 Ga. App. 635, 765 S.E.2d 778 (2014); Rollins v. Rollins, 329 Ga. App. 768, 766 S.E.2d 162 (2014), vacated, remanded, 298 Ga. 161, 780 S.E.2d 328 (2015); First Citizens Bank & Trust, Inc. v. Ruddell, 330 Ga. App. 82, 766 S.E.2d 538 (2014); Godwin v. Mizpah Farms, LLLP, 330 Ga. App. 31, 766 S.E.2d 497 (2014); Sentinel Offender Services, LLC v. Glover, 296 Ga. 315, 766 S.E.2d 456 (2014); Wright v. Waterberg Big Game Hunting Lodge Otjahewita (Pty), Ltd., 330 Ga. App. 508, 767 S.E.2d 513 (2014).

Lowry v. Fenzel, 331 Ga. App. 603, 769 S.E.2d 522 (2015); Brazeal v. NewPoint Media Group, LLC, 331 Ga. App. 49, 769 S.E.2d 763 (2015); Buttacavoli v. Owen, Gleaton, Egan, Jones & Sweeney LLP, 331 Ga. App. 88, 769 S.E.2d 794 (2015), cert. denied, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 416 (Ga. 2015); Gaslowitz v. Stabilis Fund I, LP, 331 Ga. App. 152, 770 S.E.2d 245 (2015); Sanders v. Riley, 296 Ga. 693, 770 S.E.2d 570 (2015); Ashton Atlanta Residential, LLC v. Ajibola, 331 Ga. App. 231, 770 S.E.2d 311 (2015); Roberts v. Cmty. & S. Bank, 331 Ga. App. 364, 771 S.E.2d 68 (2015); 9766, LLC v. Dwarf House, Inc., 331 Ga. App. 287, 771 S.E.2d 1 (2015); Southern States-Bartow County, Inc. v. Riverwood Farm Prop. Owners Ass'n, Inc., 331 Ga. App. 878, 769 S.E.2d 823 (2015); In re Estate of Wade, 331 Ga. App. 535, 771 S.E.2d 214 (2015); SJN Props., LLC v. Fulton County Bd. of Assessors, 296 Ga. 793, 770 S.E.2d 832 (2015).

Tuohy v. City of Atlanta, 331 Ga. App. 846, 771 S.E.2d 501 (2015); Cheeley Invs., L.P. v. Zambetti, 332 Ga. App. 115, 770 S.E.2d 350 (2015), cert. denied, No. S15C1298, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 615 (Ga. 2015); Barking Hound Vill., LLC v. Monyak, 331 Ga. App. 811, 771 S.E.2d 469 (2015); Brown v. GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc., 331 Ga. App. 890, 770 S.E.2d 56 (2015), cert. denied, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 732 (Ga. 2015); Barbour-Amir v. Comcast of Georgia/Virginia, Inc., 332 Ga. App. 279, 772 S.E.2d 231 (2015); Padilla v. Medrano, 332 Ga. App. 393, 772 S.E.2d 836 (2015); Doctors Hosp. of Augusta, LLC v. Alicea, 332 Ga. App. 529, 774 S.E.2d 114 (2015), aff'd, 299 Ga. 315, 788 S.E.2d 392 (2016); Caraway v. Spillers, 332 Ga. App. 588, 774 S.E.2d 162 (2015); Dolan v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 333 Ga. App. 601, 773 S.E.2d 789 (2015); Allan v. Jefferson Lakeside, L.P., 333 Ga. App. 222, 775 S.E.2d 763 (2015); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Cook, 332 Ga. App. 834, 775 S.E.2d 199 (2015), cert. denied, No. S15C1753, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 720 (Ga. 2015); Ellis v. Hartford Run Apartments, LLC, 335 Ga. App. 118, 779 S.E.2d 103 (2015), cert. denied, No. S16C0607, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 289 (Ga. 2016); Gaskins v. Berry's Boat Dock, 334 Ga. App. 642, 780 S.E.2d 83 (2015); Coon v. Medical Ctr., Inc., 335 Ga. App. 278, 780 S.E.2d 118 (2015), aff'd, 300 G. 722, 797 S.E.2d 828 (2017); Hughes v. Cornerstone Inspection Grp., Inc., 336 Ga. App. 283, 784 S.E.2d 116 (2016); Bo Phillips Company, Inc. v. R. L. King Properties, LLC, 336 Ga. App. 705, 783 S.E.2d 445 (2016); Hill v. Jackson, 336 Ga. App. 679, 783 S.E.2d 719 (2016); Rivera v. Washington, 298 Ga. 770, 784 S.E.2d 775 (2016); Zook v. Arch Specialty Ins. Co., 336 Ga. App. 669, 784 S.E.2d 119 (2016); PLIVA, Inc. v. Dement, 335 Ga. App. 398, 780 S.E.2d 735 (2015); Houghton v. Sacor Financial, Inc., 337 Ga. App. 254, 786 S.E.2d 903 (2016); Adewumi v. Amelia Grove/Ashland Park Homeowners Ass'n, 337 Ga. App. 275, 787 S.E.2d 761 (2016); Campbell v. Ailion, 338 Ga. App. 382, 790 S.E.2d 68 (2016); Humphrey v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 337 Ga. App. 331, 787 S.E.2d 303 (2016); Barclay v. Stephenson, 337 Ga. App. 365, 787 S.E.2d 322 (2016); R&G Invs. & Holdings, LLC v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 337 Ga. App. 588, 787 S.E.2d 765 (2016), cert. denied, No. S16C1830, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 144 (Ga. 2017); State of Ga. v. International Keystone Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., 299 Ga. 392, 788 S.E.2d 455 (2016); Edel v. Southtowne Motors of Newnan II, Inc., 338 Ga. App. 376, 789 S.E.2d 224 (2016); Pass v. Forestar GA Real Estate Group, Inc., 337 Ga. App. 244, 787 S.E.2d 250 (2016), cert. denied, No. S16C1689, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 830 (Ga. 2016); SunTrust Bank v. Venable, 299 Ga. 655, 791 S.E.2d 5 (2016); Harris v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 338 Ga. App. 838, 792 S.E.2d 111 (2016); Greenberg Farrow Architecture, Inc. v. JMLS 1422, LLC, 339 Ga. App. 325, 791 S.E.2d 635 (2016); Stroud v. Hall County, 339 Ga. App. 37, 793 S.E.2d 104 (2016); Rigby v. Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop. Stabilization Corp., 339 Ga. App. 558, 794 S.E.2d 413 (2016); Liberty Capital, LLC v. First Chatham Bank, 338 Ga. App. 48, 789 S.E.2d 303 (2016); Trustgard Ins. Co. v. Herndon, 338 Ga. App. 347, 3790 S.E.2d 115 (2016); Northside Bank v. Mountainbrook of Bartow County Homeowners Ass'n, 338 Ga. App. 126, 789 S.E.2d 378 (2016); Progressive Mt. Ins. Co. v. Bishop, 338 Ga. App. 115, 790 S.E.2d 91 (2016); Bryant v. Optima Int'l, 339 Ga. App. 696, 792 S.E.2d 489 (2016); George v. Hercules Real Estate Services, Inc., 339 Ga. App. 843, 795 S.E.2d 81 (2016); Burrowes v. Bank of Am., N.A., 340 Ga. App. 248, 797 S.E.2d 493 (2017); Atl. Geoscience, Inc. v. Phoenix Dev. & Land Inv., LLC, 341 Ga. App. 81, 799 S.E.2d 242 (2017); Mashburn Constr., L.P. v. CharterBank, 340 Ga. App. 580, 798 S.E.2d 251 (2017); Popham v. Landmark Am. Ins. Co., 340 Ga. App. 603, 798 S.E.2d 257 (2017); Ga. Dep't of Admin. Servs. v. McCoy, 340 Ga. App. 877, 798 S.E.2d 687 (2017); City of Atlanta v. Hogan Constr. Group, LLC, 341 Ga. App. 620, 801 S.E.2d 606 (2017); Rintoul v. Tolbert, 341 Ga. App. 688, 802 S.E.2d 56 (2017); Hosp. Auth. v. Fender, 342 Ga. App. 13, 802 S.E.2d 346 (2017); Fox v. Norfolk S. Corp., 342 Ga. App. 38, 802 S.E.2d 319 (2017); Souza v. Berberian, 342 Ga. App. 165, 802 S.E.2d 401 (2017); Martin v. Ledbetter, 342 Ga. App. 208, 802 S.E.2d 432 (2017); Kolb v. Northside Hospital, 342 Ga. App. 192, 802 S.E.2d 413 (2017); Downes v. Oglethorpe University, Inc., 342 Ga. App. 250, 802 S.E.2d 437 (2017); American Safety Indemnity Co. v. Sto Corp., 342 Ga. App. 263, 802 S.E.2d 448 (2017); Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rockefeller, 343 Ga. App. 36, 805 S.E.2d 660 (2017), cert. denied, No. S18C0338, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 258 (Ga. 2018); Demere Marsh Assocs., LLC v. Boatright Roofing & Gen. Contr., Inc., 343 Ga. App. 235, 808 S.E.2d 1 (2017); Sure, Inc. v. Premier Petroleum, Inc., 343 Ga. App. 219, 807 S.E.2d 19 (2017); Alford v. Hernandez, 343 Ga. App. 332, 807 S.E.2d 84 (2017), cert. denied, No. S18C0459, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 327 (Ga. 2018); Viad Corp v. United States Steel Corp., 343 Ga. App. 609, 808 S.E.2d 58 (2017); Avery v. Paulding County Airport Auth., 343 Ga. App. 832, 808 S.E.2d 15 (2017); Coleman v. Glynn County, 344 Ga. App. 545, 809 S.E.2d 383 (2018), cert. denied, No. S18C0869, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 566; cert. denied, No. S18C0881, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 572 (Ga. 2018); Davis v. Ganas, 344 Ga. App. 697, 812 S.E.2d 36 (2018); MacDowell v. Gallant, 344 Ga. App. 856, 811 S.E.2d 513 (2018), cert. denied, No. S18C0963, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 626 (Ga. 2018); Peterson v. Peterson, 303 Ga. 211, 811 S.E.2d 309 (2018); Ga.-Pac. Consumer Prods., LP v. Ratner, 345 Ga. App. 434, 812 S.E.2d 120 (2018), cert. denied, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 736, cert. denied, No. S18C1130, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 725 (Ga. 2018); Crop Production Services, Inc. v. Moye, 345 Ga. App. 228, 812 S.E.2d 565 (2018); Cancel v. Medical Center of Central Ga., Inc., 345 Ga. App. 215, 812 S.E.2d 592 (2018), cert. denied, No. S18C1054, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 769 (Ga. 2018); Southern Trust Insurance Company v. Cravey, 345 Ga. App. 697, 814 S.E.2d 802 (2018), cert. denied, No. S18C1319, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 820 (Ga. 2018); Gold v. DeKalb County Sch. Dist., 346 Ga. App. 108, 815 S.E.2d 259 (2018), aff'd, 307 Ga. 330, 834 S.E.2d 808 (2019); Amberfield Homeowners Ass'n v. Young, 346 Ga. App. 29, 813 S.E.2d 618 (2018); HA&W Capital Partners, LLC v. Bhandari, 346 Ga. App. 598, 816 S.E.2d 804 (2018); Williams v. Durden, 347 Ga. App. 363, 819 S.E.2d 524 (2018); Mercer v. Mercer, 347 Ga. App. 563, 820 S.E.2d 189 (2018); Sheffield v. Conair Corporation, 348 Ga. App. 6, 821 S.E.2d 93 (2018), cert. denied, No. S19C0437, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 467 (Ga. 2019); Weickert v. Home Depot U.S. A., Inc., 347 Ga. App. 889, 821 S.E.2d 110 (2018), cert. denied, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 551 (Ga. 2019); Division Six Sports, Inc. v. Hire Dynamics, LLC, 348 Ga. App. 347, 822 S.E.2d 841 (2019); Sage Atlanta Props., Ltd. v. Hawxhurst, 349 Ga. App. 758, 824 S.E.2d 387 (2019); Hayman v. Paulding County, 349 Ga. App. 77, 825 S.E.2d 482 (2019); The Plantation at Bay Creek Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Glasier, 349 Ga. App. 203, 825 S.E.2d 542 (2019); Gutierrez v. Hilti, Inc., 349 Ga. App. 752, 824 S.E.2d 391 (2019); First Acceptance Ins. Co. of Ga. v. Hughes, 305 Ga. 489, 826 S.E.2d 71 (2019); Laymac v. Kushner, 349 Ga. App. 727, 824 S.E.2d 768 (2019), cert. denied, No. S19C1091, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 871 (Ga. 2019); Cars v. W. Funding II, 349 Ga. App. 517, 826 S.E.2d 370 (2019); Yim v. Carr, 349 Ga. App. 892, 827 S.E.2d 685 (2019), cert. denied, No. S19C1220, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 853 (Ga. 2019); Golden Isles Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Lowie, 350 Ga. App. 1, 827 S.E.2d 703 (2019); Williams v. Murrell, 348 Ga. App. 754, 824 S.E.2d 638 (2019); Phillips v. Adams, Jordan & Herrington, P.C., 350 Ga. App. 184, 828 S.E.2d 414 (2019); Pasha v. Battle Creek Homeowners Ass'n, 350 Ga. App. 433, 829 S.E.2d 618 (2019); Nugent v. Myles, 350 Ga. App. 442, 829 S.E.2d 623 (2019); Jones Lang LaSalle Operations LLC v. Johnson, 350 Ga. App. 439, 829 S.E.2d 629 (2019)

Houston Hospitals, Inc. v. Felder, 351 Ga. App. 394, 829 S.E.2d 182 (2019), cert. denied, No. S19C1628, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 210 (Ga. 2020); Howell v. Bates, 350 Ga. App. 708, 830 S.E.2d 250 (2019); Oconee Fed. S&L Ass'n v. Brown, 351 Ga. App. 561, 831 S.E.2d 222 (2019), cert. dismissed, No. S20C0074, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 201 (Ga. 2020); Dixon v. Dixon, 352 Ga. App. 169, 834 S.E.2d 309 (2019); 6428 Church St. v. SM Corrigan, LLC, 352 Ga. App. 437, 834 S.E.2d 603 (2019), cert. denied, No. S20C0468, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 386 (Ga. 2020); cert. denied, No. S20C0473, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 399 (Ga. 2020); Fayette Cty. Bd. of Tax Assess. v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 354 Ga. App. 584, 841 S.E.2d 104 (2020); Williams Inv. Co. v. Girardot, 354 Ga. App. 762, 841 S.E.2d 436 (2020); Curry v. Conopco, Inc., 354 Ga. App. 692, 840 S.E.2d 151 (2020); Campbell v. Cirrus Education, 355 Ga. App. 628, 845 S.E.2d 393 (2020); Spann v. Davis, 355 Ga. App. 673, 845 S.E.2d 415 (2020); Zahler v. Nat'l Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-1, 355 Ga. App. 458, 844 S.E.2d 530 (2020); Joseph v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, Ga. App. , 844 S.E.2d 852 (2020); Five Star Athlete Mgmt., Inc. v. Davis, 355 Ga. App. 774, 845 S.E.2d 754 (2020); Saik v. Brown, Ga. App. , S.E.2d (June 25, 2020); Zulke v. AC&DC Power Technologies, LLC, Ga. App. , S.E.2d (July 22, 2020); Walia v. Walia, Ga. App. , S.E.2d (July 30, 2020); JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Cronan, 355 Ga. App. 556, 845 S.E.2d 298 (2020); Campbell v. Cirrus Education, Inc., 355 Ga. App. 637, 845 S.E.2d 384 (2020); Premier Eye Care Assocs. v. Mag Mut. Ins. Co., 355 Ga. App. 620, 844 S.E.2d 282 (2020); City of Norcross v. Gwinnett County, 355 Ga. App. 662, 843 S.E.2d 31 (2020); McCalla Raymer, LLC v. Foxfire Acres, Inc., Ga. App. , 846 S.E.2d 404 (2020).

Cited in Saks Mgmt. & Assocs. v. Sung, Ga. App. , S.E.2d (Aug. 21, 2020).

Premier Eye Care Assocs. v. Mag Mut. Ins. Co., 355 Ga. App. 620, 844 S.E.2d 282 (2020).

Mullinax v. Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 354 Ga. App. 186, 840 S.E.2d 666 (2020); Helton v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 354 Ga. App. 208, 840 S.E.2d 692 (2020).

Sheffield v. Futch, 354 Ga. App. 661, 839 S.E.2d 294 (2020); GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Atlanta Botanical Garden, Inc., 306 Ga. 829, 834 S.E.2d 27 (2019); Chatham Area Transit Auth. v. Brantley, 353 Ga. App. 197, 834 S.E.2d 593 (2019); Head v. de Souse, 353 Ga. App. 309, 836 S.E.2d 227 (2019); First Communities Mgmt., Inc. v. Holmes, 353 Ga. App. 409, 837 S.E.2d 717 (2020); 280 Partners, LLC v. Bank of North Georgia, 352 Ga. App. 605, 835 S.E.2d 377 (2019); Sweet City Landfill, LLC v. Lyon, 352 Ga. App. 824, 835 S.E.2d 764 (2019); DeKalb County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. CWS SGARR Brookhaven, LLC, 352 Ga. App. 848, 836 S.E.2d 729 (2019); Bates v. Howell, 352 Ga. App. 733, 835 S.E.2d 814 (2019); Cannon v. Oconee County, 353 Ga. App. 296, 835 S.E.2d 753 (2019); Mitchell v. Capehart, 353 Ga. App. 461, 838 S.E.2d 125 (2020); Parham v. Stewart, 308 Ga. 170, 839 S.E.2d 605 (2020).

Purpose of Summary Judgment

Prompt and inexpensive method of disposing of cases.

- Motion for summary judgment is designed to provide a prompt and inexpensive method of disposing of any cause if the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits clearly show there is no issue of material fact, although allegations of the pleadings standing alone may raise such an issue. Maxey-Bosshardt Lumber Co. v. Maxwell, 127 Ga. App. 429, 193 S.E.2d 885 (1972).

Purpose of former Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq. was to afford to either party litigant, upon motion, a judgment forthwith if the record shows there was not a genuine issue existing between the parties. Southern v. Adams, 111 Ga. App. 217, 141 S.E.2d 320 (1965);(decided under former Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq.)

Very purpose of former Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq. was to afford either party litigant a judgment forthwith if the record showed there was not a genuine issue existing between the parties, but only after each party had an opportunity to make out a case or establish a defense, as the case may be. Scales v. Peevy, 103 Ga. App. 42, 118 S.E.2d 193 (1961); Sparks v. Rinker, 111 Ga. App. 191, 141 S.E.2d 185 (1965);(decided under former Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq.)

Summary resolution has its place; efficient and orderly dispensation of justice is enhanced when unnecessary and protracted litigation is avoided. Shmunes v. GMC, 146 Ga. App. 486, 246 S.E.2d 486 (1978).

Unnecessary jury trials eliminated.

- Summary judgment was clearly intended to dispose of litigation expeditiously and avoid the useless time and expense of going through a jury trial even though the petition fairly bristles with serious allegations, if, when given notice and an opportunity to produce affidavits by persons competent to testify on their own knowledge to the truth of such allegations, the pleader does nothing to contradict affidavits of the movant that show the opposite party has no right to prevail. Crutcher v. Crawford Land Co., 220 Ga. 298, 138 S.E.2d 580 (1964); Brown v. J.C. Penney Co., 123 Ga. App. 233, 180 S.E.2d 364 (1971); Summer-Minter & Assocs. v. Giordano, 231 Ga. 601, 203 S.E.2d 173 (1974); Motel Mgt. Sys. v. Billing, 143 Ga. App. 702, 240 S.E.2d 173 (1977);(decided under former Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq.)

Function of motion for summary judgment is to avoid a useless trial if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. General Gas Corp. v. Carn, 103 Ga. App. 542, 120 S.E.2d 156 (1961);(decided under former Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq.)

Former Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq. obviously had as one of its purposes, if there was no genuine issue as to any material fact, to allow the trial court to apply appropriate legal principles and define the legal rights of the parties without lengthy trials to establish already undisputed facts. Scales v. Peevy, 103 Ga. App. 42, 118 S.E.2d 193 (1961);(decided under Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq.)

Purpose of the Summary Judgment Act of 1959 (former Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq.) was to eliminate the necessity for a jury trial if there was no genuine issue as to any material fact in the case. General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Camden Constr. Co., 115 Ga. App. 189, 154 S.E.2d 26 (1967);(decided under former Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq.)

Purpose of former Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq. was to eliminate the necessity for a jury trial if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Holland v. Sanfax Corp., 106 Ga. App. 1, 126 S.E.2d 442 (1962); King v. Fryer, 107 Ga. App. 715, 131 S.E.2d 203 (1963); Lampkin v. Edwards, 222 Ga. 288, 149 S.E.2d 708 (1966); Boston Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 120 Ga. App. 585, 171 S.E.2d 626 (1969); Elder v. Smith, 121 Ga. App. 461, 174 S.E.2d 239, rev'd on other grounds, 226 Ga. 688, 177 S.E.2d 77 (1970); Tony v. Pollard, 248 Ga. 86, 281 S.E.2d 557 (1981);(decided under former Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq.)

Purpose of former Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq. was to eliminate the necessity for a trial by jury if, giving the opposing party the benefit of all reasonable doubts and all favorable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence, there was no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Butterworth v. Pettitt, 223 Ga. 355, 155 S.E.2d 20 (1967); Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Beaver, 120 Ga. App. 420, 170 S.E.2d 737 (1969); Kroger Co. v. Cobb, 125 Ga. App. 310, 187 S.E.2d 316 (1972); Maxey-Bosshardt Lumber Co. v. Maxwell, 127 Ga. App. 429, 193 S.E.2d 885 (1972); Summer-Minter & Assocs. v. Giordano, 231 Ga. 601, 203 S.E.2d 173 (1974); Beach v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 140 Ga. App. 882, 232 S.E.2d 158 (1977); Jones v. First Nat'l Bank, 142 Ga. App. 18, 234 S.E.2d 794 (1977); Dickson v. Dickson, 238 Ga. 672, 235 S.E.2d 479 (1977); Hewatt v. Bonner, 142 Ga. App. 442, 236 S.E.2d 111 (1977); Motel Mgt. Sys. v. Billing, 143 Ga. App. 702, 240 S.E.2d 173 (1977); Skinner v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 145 Ga. App. 372, 243 S.E.2d 732 (1978); Culwell v. Lomas & Nettleton Co., 148 Ga. App. 478, 251 S.E.2d 579 (1978); Mock v. Canterbury Realty Co., 152 Ga. App. 872, 264 S.E.2d 489 (1980); Riddle v. Driebe, 153 Ga. App. 276, 265 S.E.2d 92 (1980); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Davis, 153 Ga. App. 291, 265 S.E.2d 102 (1980); Lagerstrom v. Beers Constr. Co., 157 Ga. App. 396, 277 S.E.2d 765 (1981); Troutt v. Nash AMC/Jeep, Inc., 157 Ga. App. 399, 278 S.E.2d 54 (1981); Parlato v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 165 Ga. App. 758, 302 S.E.2d 613 (1983); Bowman v. United States Life Ins. Co., 167 Ga. App. 673, 307 S.E.2d 134 (1983);(decided under Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq.)

Purpose of permitting summary judgments is to dispose of unnecessary trials and not to upset a verdict authorized by the evidence merely because at a previous stage of the case a finding may not have been authorized in accordance with such verdict. Hill v. Willis, 224 Ga. 263, 161 S.E.2d 281 (1968).

Ga. L. 1967, p. 234, § 1 et seq. (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56) serves a useful purpose, namely, to eliminate the necessity of trial by jury if there is no genuine issue of fact to be tried. Brown v. J.C. Penney Co., 123 Ga. App. 233, 180 S.E.2d 364 (1971).

Point of summary judgment is to remove from the jury what is so clear as not to need rumination. Siefferman v. Peppers, 159 Ga. App. 688, 285 S.E.2d 61 (1981).

No intent to change existing procedures afforded to parties.

- Purpose of former Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq. was not to change or amend or do away with any of the existing procedures afforded parties to a lawsuit. Braselton Bros. v. Better Maid Dairy Prods., Inc., 110 Ga. App. 515, 139 S.E.2d 124 (1964);(decided under Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq.)

Not intended to eliminate all trial by jury.

- It is not the purpose of summary judgment to change the general rules with reference to submitting questions to the jury, and summary judgment should be granted only if there is no genuine issue of fact as shown by the record before the court. Wasserman v. Southland Inv. Corp., 105 Ga. App. 420, 124 S.E.2d 674 (1962); Clayton v. Steve-Cathey, Inc., 105 Ga. App. 570, 125 S.E.2d 118 (1962);(decided under Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq.)

Purpose of enacting Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq. was not to change the general rule that questions of negligence, of contributory negligence, of cause and proximate cause, and of whose negligence or of what negligence constitutes the proximate cause of an injury are, except in plain, palpable, and indisputable cases, solely for the jury. Malcom v. Malcolm, 112 Ga. App. 151, 144 S.E.2d 188 (1965);(decided under Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq.)

Trial of all the issues of fact by the jury was not intended to be abrogated by summary judgment. Ginn v. Morgan, 225 Ga. 192, 167 S.E.2d 393 (1969).

Material issues identified.

- Purpose of summary judgment procedure is to determine whether there is a material issue of fact to be tried, rather than to set up technical pitfalls for the unwary. Glenn v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 158 Ga. App. 98, 279 S.E.2d 481 (1981).

On summary judgment, a trial court determines only whether a material issue of fact exists, and such determination does not include "the discovery of the truth of such fact" or permit frustration of a plaintiff's constitutional right to a trial by jury "by inferring the existence of other facts" from predicate evidence. Bruno's Food Stores, Inc. v. Taylor, 228 Ga. App. 439, 491 S.E.2d 881 (1997).

Procedure pierces formal verbiage of pleadings.

- Primary purpose of summary judgment procedure was to allow a party to pierce the allegations of the pleadings, show the truth to the court, and receive judgment if there was no genuine issue of material fact, although an issue might be raised by the pleadings. Scales v. Peevy, 103 Ga. App. 42, 118 S.E.2d 193 (1961); Spratlin v. Manufacturers Acceptance Corp., 105 Ga. App. 463, 125 S.E.2d 110 (1962); Calhoun v. Eaves, 114 Ga. App. 756, 152 S.E.2d 805 (1966); Laite v. Baxter, 126 Ga. App. 743, 191 S.E.2d 531 (1972); Gregory v. Vance Publishing Corp., 130 Ga. App. 118, 202 S.E.2d 515 (1973); Flanders v. Columbia Nitrogen Corp., 135 Ga. App. 21, 217 S.E.2d 363 (1975); Maxwell v. Columbia Realty Venture, 155 Ga. App. 289, 270 S.E.2d 704 (1980);(decided under Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq.)

Purpose of a motion for summary judgment is to pierce formal verbiage of the pleadings by showing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Connors v. City Council, 120 Ga. App. 499, 171 S.E.2d 578 (1969); French v. Norman, 124 Ga. App. 567, 184 S.E.2d 663 (1971).

Summary judgment is designed to enable the judge, by piercing formal verbiage of the pleadings, to filter out sham issues that might otherwise cause needless and time-consuming litigation. Boston Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 120 Ga. App. 585, 171 S.E.2d 626 (1969); Porter v. Felker, 261 Ga. 421, 405 S.E.2d 31 (1991).

Very object of a motion for summary judgment is to separate what is formal or pretended in denial or averment from what is genuine and substantial so that only the latter may subject a suitor to the burden of a trial. Maxey-Bosshardt Lumber Co. v. Maxwell, 127 Ga. App. 429, 193 S.E.2d 885 (1972).

Applicability to Certain Actions, Proceedings, Issues, and Defenses

Attorney fees.

- When a company sought attorney fees, under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11, and punitive damages from its attorneys regarding their participation in a sale of the company's assets, summary judgment should have been granted in favor of the attorneys because no claims as to which such relief might have been awarded were found to be proper. R.W. Holdco, Inc. v. Johnson, 267 Ga. App. 859, 601 S.E.2d 177 (2004).

In an action to recover on a promissory note with past due interest, and upon entering summary judgment in favor of the lender, the trial court erred in awarding the lender $10,195.40 in attorney fees in a judgment in which the principal and interest amounted to only $6,259.12; under the formula delineated under O.C.G.A. § 13-1-11, such amount was limited to $650.91. Long v. Hogan, 289 Ga. App. 347, 656 S.E.2d 868 (2008), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 516 (Ga. 2008).

Evidence supported an award of attorney fees because the evidence presented by the client in a legal malpractice suit could authorize a jury to conclude that, despite owing the client a fiduciary duty, the attorney's persistent failure to adequately represent the client went beyond mere negligence and rose to the level of bad faith. Brito v. Gomez Law Group, LLC, 289 Ga. App. 625, 658 S.E.2d 178 (2008).

Breach of fiduciary duty.

- In a case in which a company sued the company's attorneys for breach of fiduciary duty for closing a sale of the company's assets, summary judgment was properly granted in favor of the attorneys because the attorneys made all proper disclosures to the employee and officer who had apparent authority to conduct the sale, and they justifiably relied on that authority, as well as on certain consent minutes from the corporation which was represented as being the company's parent. R.W. Holdco, Inc. v. Johnson, 267 Ga. App. 859, 601 S.E.2d 177 (2004).

Summary judgment was inappropriate in a breach of fiduciary duty action which centered around a verbal settlement agreement as material fact issues remained as to whether: (1) a company's offer to buy the minority shareholders' stock required a written purchase agreement; (2) the parties agreed to all material terms; and (3) a note signed by one of the minority shareholders had been cancelled. McKenna v. Capital Res. Partners, IV, L.P., 286 Ga. App. 828, 650 S.E.2d 580 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 752, 763 (Ga. 2007).

Because a claim filed by a minority shareholder against the officers and directors of a corporation alleging their depletion of corporate assets through excessive salaries related to the value or price the shareholder would receive in a stock appraisal action, the shareholder's exclusive remedy was within that action; thus, a separate breach of fiduciary duty claim filed in the shareholder's direct action against the officers and directors was properly disposed of via summary judgment. Levy v. Reiner, 290 Ga. App. 471, 659 S.E.2d 848 (2008).

Recoupment.

- In an action seeking a writ of possession for a mobile home, because the mobile home's tenants expressly waived any recourse against their bankrupt lender arising from a prior judgment, based on a voluntary settlement with the bankrupt lender accepting a general unsecured claim, the tenants could not later assert any right of recoupment; as a result, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment as to that claim against the tenants and in favor of a successor lender. Hill v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 280 Ga. App. 151, 633 S.E.2d 451 (2006).

Employee fraud.

- Trial court properly granted summary judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c) in an employee's fraud claim, wherein the employee contended that the employee was fraudulently induced to give up additional severance benefits in order to accept an at-will position with the successor to the employer, and that such position did not in fact exist, as the record clearly indicated that the employee worked and was paid for a period of almost two years prior to the employee's termination. Cramp v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 266 Ga. App. 38, 596 S.E.2d 212 (2004).

Acts of employees.

- Because an employer had not produced any evidence that established, as a matter of law, that a bartender's actions in breaking up a fight in their bowling center fell outside the class of activities its bartenders performed generally, a jury issue remained, and summary judgment should not have been granted. Brown v. AMF Bowling Ctrs., Inc., 236 Ga. App. 277, 511 S.E.2d 619 (1999).

Plaintiff who could not show that an employee was acting within the scope of employment at the time of a collision could not show a genuine issue of material fact in a wrongful death action against the employer, and summary judgment was therefore appropriate. Tyner v. Comfort Rest Sleep Prods., Inc., 236 Ga. App. 423, 512 S.E.2d 321 (1999).

Grant of summary judgment to an amusem*nt park in an injured worker's personal injury suit was proper because the worker had violated OSHA regulations and National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standards governing electrical safety in numerous respects, which were mandatory and had the force of law, and the worker's conduct fulfilled all of the requirements of negligence per se. Kull v. Six Flags over Ga. II, L.P., 264 Ga. App. 715, 592 S.E.2d 143 (2003).

Summary judgment in favor of a crane company was reversed because a question of fact remained regarding whether a crane operator, who was an employee of the company, was acting as the company's employee or as a borrowed servant of a general contractor on a construction site when the operator allegedly committed a negligent act that injured a worker. A contract between the company and the contractor labeling the operator a borrowed servant was not dispositive and a question remained regarding how much control the contractor actually had over the crane operator's actions. Gibson v. Tim's Crane & Rigging, Inc., 266 Ga. App. 42, 596 S.E.2d 215 (2004).

Employee on personal errand.

- Trial court properly granted summary judgment to the company on the injured person's lawsuit alleging that the company was liable to the injured party for the actions of its employee, who struck the injured party's vehicle while turning the truck the employee was driving into an intersection as the employee returned from a personal visit with relatives as the injured person could not show that the employee was acting within the scope of employment, that the company had actual knowledge of the employee's driving record, or that the employee's driving record showed a pattern of reckless driving. Upshaw v. Roberts Timber Co., 266 Ga. App. 135, 596 S.E.2d 679 (2004).

Trial court properly granted an employer's motion for summary judgment, in a personal injury action filed by a mother and daughter as the latter failed to show that the former was liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the accident caused by its employee, given that the employee was running personal errands at the time of the collision, despite the fact the errands seemed work-related, and was not on a special mission undertaken at the employer's direction; further, any reliance by the mother and daughter on the traveling sales person exception applied in workers' compensation cases was misplaced. Gassaway v. Precon Corp., 280 Ga. App. 351, 634 S.E.2d 153 (2006).

Trial court properly granted summary judgment to the health center on the patient's claim that the center was responsible for the negligent hiring/retention of the mental health assistant who allegedly raped the patient as the health center showed that the center exercised ordinary care not to hire a person who posed a reasonably foreseeable risk of inflicting harm on others by hiring a professional investigation service to do a background check on the mental health assistant; as a result of that background check, the service advised the health center that the mental health assistant had not been involved in criminal activity and the patient did not show that the health center otherwise knew that the mental health assistant posed a risk of harm to the center's patients. Munroe v. Universal Health Servs., Inc., 277 Ga. 861, 596 S.E.2d 604 (2004).

When a company sued the company's attorneys and accountants for fraud and aiding and abetting fraud regarding their participation in a sale of the company's assets because they did not notify the company's principal of the sale, summary judgment was properly granted in favor of the attorneys and accountants because the employee who conducted the sale had apparent authority to do so and actual fraud was insufficiently pled, under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9(b), as a response to the attorneys' and accountants' motion for summary judgment. R.W. Holdco, Inc. v. Johnson, 267 Ga. App. 859, 601 S.E.2d 177 (2004).

Because a corporation's president did not participate in the allegedly negligent work of employees of the corporation at a decedent's home or supervise or direct the employees in the work at the home, summary judgment in favor of the president in a wrongful death action brought by the decedent's children was affirmed; the president's alleged failure to provide proper training to the employees was not a sufficiently direct participation in a tort to expose the president to personal liability. Beasley v. A Better Gas Co., 269 Ga. App. 426, 604 S.E.2d 202 (2004).

In the employer's action to recover for theft of corporate funds, the employee was not entitled to summary judgment because the six-year statute of limitations applicable to constructive trust claims only barred the employer's action as to some, but not all, of the employee's thefts. Total Supply, Inc. v. Pridgen, 267 Ga. App. 125, 598 S.E.2d 805 (2004).

Employer was properly granted summary judgment in an employee's personal injury and loss of consortium suit filed against the employer because the employee's accidental injury, which occurred as the employee was walking to work from an employer-owned parking facility to the employee's work building and who was struck by an employer-operated vehicle, was compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq. Longuepee v. Ga. Inst. of Tech., 269 Ga. App. 884, 605 S.E.2d 455 (2004).

Because a contract between a crane owner and a general contractor stated that the owner's employee was a borrowed servant, a trial court correctly granted summary judgment in a negligence action arising from injuries resulting from the crane operation. Tim's Crane & Rigging, Inc. v. Gibson, 278 Ga. 796, 604 S.E.2d 763 (2004).

In a negligent hiring and supervision suit based on respondeat superior filed by a decedent's wife against an employer and its allegedly negligent employee, the trial court properly denied an employer's motion for summary judgment, given that the evidence was in dispute as to whether the employee was acting in the scope of employment at the time of the fatal injury to the decedent, and whether the employee might have foreseen that some injury would have resulted from an act or omission, or that consequences of a generally injurious nature might have been expected, based upon evidence that in the 22 years that the employee had driven for companies owned by the same people, the employee had received two speeding tickets and was involved in two minor car accidents. Remediation Res., Inc. v. Balding, 281 Ga. App. 31, 635 S.E.2d 332 (2006).

In a personal injury action, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to an employer on the issue of respondeat superior as the employer could not be found liable for its employee's personal actions undertaken at the time of the collision, which were not in furtherance of the employer's interests, and were not within the employee's scope of employment nor ratified by the employer. Hankerson v. Hammett, 285 Ga. App. 610, 647 S.E.2d 319 (2007).

In a personal injury action arising from an auto accident, summary judgment to an employer was reversed as an injured driver presented some evidence showing that at the time of the accident the employer's employee might have been on a work-related cell phone call or distracted by such a call that the employee chose not to answer, creating a jury question as to the employer's liability for the employee's actions. Hunter v. Modern Cont'l Constr. Co., 287 Ga. App. 689, 652 S.E.2d 583 (2007).

In a tort action filed by an executrix against a hospital, the hospital was properly granted summary judgment on a claim of medical battery as the undisputed facts supported an inference that the executrix's mother consented to the nursing staff determining what types of food the mother could tolerate, and as a result the nursing staff's conduct in exercising that discretion in deciding what types of food the mother could eat did not support a medical battery claim. Morton v. Wellstar Health Sys., 288 Ga. App. 301, 653 S.E.2d 756 (2007), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 292 (Ga. 2008).

County sheriff's authority over county-owned property.

- County sheriff had the independent authority to repaint and remark county-owned sheriff's vehicles assigned to the sheriff's exclusive use, but lacked the authority to modify portions of a county-owned building in which the sheriff's office and jail were housed as that facility was shared with the superior, state, and magistrate courts of Clayton County, as well as the clerks of those courts, the solicitor general, and the district attorney, and hence, not under the sheriff's exclusive use. As a result, subject to compliance with O.C.G.A. § 40-8-91, summary judgment in favor of the county as to the extent of the sheriff's authority was reversed as to the former, but affirmed as to the latter. Hill v. Clayton County Bd. of Comm'rs, 283 Ga. App. 15, 640 S.E.2d 638 (2006), overruled on other grounds, Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah v. Batson-Cook Co., 291 Ga. 114, 728 S.E.2d 189 (Ga. 2012).

Applying this rule in a Federal Employers' Liability Act case and permitting the claimant to reach a jury trial, rather than applying a different theory embodied in the comparable federal rule, did no violence to the principle that federal cases interpreting the substantive law control. Hepner v. Southern Ry., 182 Ga. App. 346, 356 S.E.2d 30 (1987).

Federal Employers' Liability Act.

- Trial court erroneously granted summary judgment to an employer, upon an employee's claim for benefits under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, for injuries to the right leg, right knee, and right ankle, given the evidence substantiating those injuries and that the employer was placed on some kind of notice regarding the injuries; but, summary judgment was upheld as to claims for benefits regarding the employee's injuries to both arms, wrists, hands, feet, left ankle, and left knee as no evidence substantiating those injuries, or as to medical causation, was presented. Phelps v. CSX Transp., Inc., 280 Ga. App. 330, 634 S.E.2d 112 (2006).

Quantum meruit for broker's fee.

- In a case in which a former employee alleged that the employee was entitled to quantum meruit against the former employer for having found a buyer for the employer's property, for which the employer had orally indicated that the employer would reward the employee, but the employee failed to raise in the trial court that the employee was a referral agent who was exempt from the real estate licensing statutes pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 43-40-29(a)(9), the issue was not reviewable on appeal; summary judgment under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c) was granted to the employer as the employee was not licensed under O.C.G.A. §§ 43-40-1(2)(A) and43-40-30(a). The true nature of the exchange was a sale of real estate, an agreement was prohibited by the licensing statutes; accordingly, it could not be the basis of a quantum meruit claim. Everett v. Goodloe, 268 Ga. App. 536, 602 S.E.2d 284 (2004).

Equitable subrogation.

- In an action seeking a declaration that a bank held a first priority lien against certain real property that a trust purchased at a non-judicial foreclosure sale, because the trust failed in the trust's burden to show that, as a matter of law, the application of the principle of equitable subrogation would impair its superior or equal equity, or that it would be unduly prejudiced thereby; and similarly failed to show that the bank was culpably and inexcusably negligent, the trial court did not err in denying the trust's motion for summary judgment. Greer v. Provident Bank, Inc., 282 Ga. App. 566, 639 S.E.2d 377 (2006).

Malicious prosecution claim by former employee.

- Employer, an armored truck company, reasonably believed that its ex-employee, a messenger, had taken five bags from a bank holding room, signed for only four, and absconded with the missing bag; the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the employer on the messenger's malicious prosecution claim. Gibbs v. Loomis, Fargo & Co., 259 Ga. App. 170, 576 S.E.2d 589 (2003).

Adverse possession by state.

- Questions of fact as to whether the state acquired land by adverse possession arise if the state's claim of acquisition by adverse possession is disputed by parties producing evidence that the parties have record title to the land, that the state's possession of the land was permissible, and that the state did not purport to have a valid claim of right to the land or give notice that it did have a valid claim to the land. Tanner v. Brasher, 254 Ga. 41, 326 S.E.2d 218 (1985).

Adverse possession by private party.

- Trial court properly granted summary judgment to the grantor's grandchildren as the grandchildren held the disputed parcel of property under color of title, via a deed to the grantor's daughter, albeit the fact that such was not effective as a deed conveying a present interest, for the prescription period of seven years, and the grantor's heirs at law did not contest the deed until suit was filed. Matthews v. Crowder, 281 Ga. 842, 642 S.E.2d 852 (2007).

Easem*nt.

- Trial court properly granted a corporation's summary judgment motion and awarded a corporation injunctive relief, barring an owner from interfering with the corporation's right of access to a highway, as the corporation's predecessor improved property on which it held a parol license, which created an easem*nt that ran with the land under O.C.G.A. § 44-9-4, and which passed to the corporation. Blake v. RGL Assocs., Inc., 267 Ga. App. 709, 600 S.E.2d 765 (2004).

Trial court erred in granting a couple's motion for summary judgment, in an action against a landowner declaring that a warranty deed included an express easem*nt across the landowner's land, as the language contained within the deed failed to contain any means of identifying the quantity, dimensions, or location of the easem*nt intended to be conveyed, and a survey failed to show the easem*nt; thus, the express easem*nt sought to be conveyed was void for vagueness and unenforceable. Smith v. Tolar, 281 Ga. App. 406, 636 S.E.2d 112 (2006).

Because a buyer's proposed landfill would not be a public utility, but would be privately-owned, it was not entitled to a written verification of zoning compliance so it could pursue a state permit to build a landfill; hence, when combined with the fact that the county did not violate the provisions of the Open Meetings Act under O.C.G.A. § 50-14-1(d), the county was properly granted summary judgment as to these issues. EarthResources, LLC v. Morgan County, 281 Ga. 396, 638 S.E.2d 325 (2006).

In an action arising from the sale of property, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the sellers, contrary to both O.C.G.A. §§ 44-5-62 and44-5-63, as a floodwater detention easem*nt burdened the property by permitting the impoundment of water on it to prevent flooding or increased water runoff on other property located downstream and, even though the lake was certainly open and obvious, the same could not necessarily be said of the easem*nt; moreover, a factual issue remained as damages and although the buyers' constructive notice of the easem*nt by reason of its recordation within the chains of title would provide a compelling reason for exempting the easem*nt from operation of the warranty deed, O.C.G.A. § 44-5-63 provided otherwise. McMurray v. Housworth, 282 Ga. App. 280, 638 S.E.2d 421 (2006).

Because the record contained no evidence that a neighboring landowner's predecessor in interest, or its agents, used the road continuously for at least 20 years, the predecessor did not acquire a private way by prescription and hence, the neighbor lacked any private way by prescription over a landowner's property to clear timber and remove barbed wire from the roadway without committing a trespass; hence, the trial court did not err in granting the landowner summary judgment as to the issue of trespass. Norton v. Holcomb, 285 Ga. App. 78, 646 S.E.2d 94 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1221, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 654 (Ga. 2007).

Because genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether a lessee's failure to reserve an easem*nt to the subject property at the time the lessee executed a corrective quitclaim deed was otherwise unreasonable, foreclosing the condemnation action, partial summary judgment to the lessee was unwarranted. Wright v. Brookshire, 286 Ga. App. 162, 648 S.E.2d 485 (2007).

Pursuant to an expressed dedication involving land owned by an adjacent landowner and a neighbor, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the neighbor as the declaration authorized the neighbor to rearrange their own building and parking spaces as long as the easem*nt was maintained. Wilcox Holdings, Ltd. v. Hull, 290 Ga. App. 179, 659 S.E.2d 406 (2008).

Because the language of an easem*nt agreement between two adjacent commercial landowners was ambiguous, parol evidence was admissible to show the parties' intent. Thus, questions of fact remained regarding intent, making summary judgment inappropriate. McGuire Holdings, LLLP v. TSQ Partners, LLC, 290 Ga. App. 595, 660 S.E.2d 397 (2008).

Action between adjoining landowners.

- In a suit between two landowners to enforce the terms of an easem*nt, while no error resulted from an order striking certain affidavits in support of a second landowner's claim for reimbursem*nt for its grading work, genuine material fact issues precluded summary judgment on this claim. Further, summary judgment was unwarranted as to the issue of whether the second landowner was entitled to use a detention pond on the first landowner's property. McGuire Holdings, LLLP v. TSQ Partners, LLC, 290 Ga. App. 595, 660 S.E.2d 397 (2008).

Appeal from probate court.

- Appeal to the superior court from the probate court is subject to established procedures for civil actions, thus entitling a party to invoke the summary judgment procedure. Woodall v. First Nat'l Bank, 118 Ga. App. 440, 164 S.E.2d 361 (1968).

Arbitration.

- Motion for summary judgment is not a proper procedural vehicle by which to seek to enforce an arbitration provision in a limited warranty because the remedy of a defendant who is aggrieved by the refusal of a plaintiff to arbitrate is to apply to the court for a stay of proceedings pending arbitration. Tillman Group, Inc. v. Keith, 201 Ga. App. 680, 411 S.E.2d 794 (1991).

Case referred to auditor.

- Court of record has no jurisdiction to entertain and grant summary judgment in a case which has been referred to an auditor for the purpose of having the auditor determine the questions of law and fact involved, if the auditor has heard the case and filed a report of the auditor's findings of law and fact. Braselton Bros. v. Better Maid Dairy Prods., Inc., 110 Ga. App. 515, 139 S.E.2d 124 (1964);(decided under Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq.)

Verbal contracts.

- When a party who leased certain land from its supposed owner, who could not read, and then attempted to enforce an option to purchase the land, which was included in documents the lessee gave the owner to sign, the owner was entitled to summary judgment canceling their agreement because the agreement did not adequately describe the land that was the subject of the transaction, and the lessee was not entitled to summary judgment and specific performance. Makowski v. Waldrop, 262 Ga. App. 130, 584 S.E.2d 714 (2003).

Sellers were properly granted summary judgment in an action filed by a buyer arising out of an oral land sales contract given that: (1) no evidence of the buyer's partial performance existed sufficient to remove that contract from the statute of frauds; (2) a wetlands study and interest rate negotiation were not a part of the contract; and (3) a later negotiated contract was an arm's length transaction, the price of which was negotiated at the time, and hence, did not relate to the original contract. Payne v. Warren, 282 Ga. App. 524, 639 S.E.2d 528 (2006).

In light of the unresolved facts as to whether a monetary transfer between the parties, evidenced by an oral agreement, was either a loan or an investment, and the borrowers failed to affirmatively disprove the lender's claim that the transfer was a loan as alleged in the complaint, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the borrowers. Marcum v. Gardner, 283 Ga. App. 453, 641 S.E.2d 678 (2007).

Because a buyer's direct and uncontroverted evidence sufficiently showed the existence of an enforceable oral agreement for a dealer to sell to the buyer a rare Mercedes-Benz, with the price term being the manufacturer's suggested retail price ultimately arrived at by the manufacturer, and the dealer's circ*mstantial evidence failed to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the price, the buyer satisfied the burden required to support an order granting summary judgment in the buyer's favor. Jones v. Baran Co., LLC, 290 Ga. App. 578, 660 S.E.2d 420 (2008).

Contracts.

- Because issues of fact existed as to whether the parties entered a binding contract terminating a warehousing agreement, and whether that agreement constituted an accord and satisfaction, summary judgment should not have been granted. Nebraska Plastics, Inc. v. Harris, 236 Ga. App. 499, 512 S.E.2d 388 (1999).

Summary judgment was properly granted to a hospital pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 in the hospital's action against a doctor, seeking recovery of monies loaned to the doctor that were not repaid, because it was found that the doctor breached the agreement within six years of the time that the action was commenced and, accordingly, the action was not time-barred under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24; the court noted that because the parties had indicated in the contract that the parties "expected" that the amount would be completely repaid within one year of when the repayments were commenced, such was merely a hope and not a binding condition that, when the year expired, started the running of the six-year limitations period, based on contract interpretation laws and the inapplicability of parol evidence under O.C.G.A. § 13-2-1(1). Walker v. Gwinnett Hosp. Sys., 263 Ga. App. 554, 588 S.E.2d 441 (2003).

Summary judgment was properly granted in favor of the seller because the trial court properly exercised the court's judgment and discretion in granting the seller's motion to open the seller's default judgment; no ratification of the parties' contract occurred because it was clear that the seller did not authorize the seller's sibling to act in the seller's behalf when the sibling signed the seller's name to the contract. MacDonald v. Harris, 265 Ga. App. 131, 593 S.E.2d 32 (2003).

When items stolen from an electric company were sold to a supply company, the supply company was not entitled to summary judgment dismissing the electric company's breach of contract claim against it because there were issues of fact concerning the scope of the contract between the parties on which this claim was based, including whether the contract covered new and used goods and whether the parties mutually departed from the agreement's terms. Fed. Ins. Co. v. Westside Supply Co., 264 Ga. App. 240, 590 S.E.2d 224 (2003).

Trial court properly granted summary judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 to those in possession of a colt in a tortious interference with a contract claim by a horse trainer, in which the trainer alleged having a contract to keep the recently born colt in exchange for continued services to the mare's owner; the court found that there was no showing that the possessors of the colt were aware of a contract regarding the ownership of the colt, the possessors had followed the necessary procedures for filing a financing statement under O.C.G.A. § 11-9-501 et seq., the possessors had allegedly foreclosed on the possessors' lien on the mare by the time that the possessors became aware of the trainer's claim, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 44-14-490, and the trainer did not record a lien against the colt pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 44-14-511. Medlin v. Morganstern, 268 Ga. App. 116, 601 S.E.2d 359 (2004).

When a retired police officer to whom a city had paid more retirement benefits than the police officer was entitled sued the city for breach of contract when the city corrected the error, the city was entitled to summary judgment because the city's contract with the officer required the payment of the amount of retirement benefits that the city paid after correcting the error, and the city clerk who caused the error had no authority to change that contract, so the contract was not breached. Dodd v. City of Gainesville, 268 Ga. App. 43, 601 S.E.2d 352 (2004).

Summary judgment for the storage companies on an owner's breach of contract claim was proper because the owner failed to show that the storage companies breached any duty owed under the contract; the contract clearly provided that the contract created no duty on the part of the storage companies to protect the owner's personal property and that the owner assumed all risk of loss. Liberty v. Storage Trust Props., L.P., 267 Ga. App. 905, 600 S.E.2d 841 (2004).

Because the trial court was faced with an ambiguity in a covenants declaration regarding the construction of improvements on commercial property, the court erred in granting summary judgment to the property's owner and the lessee, and finding that the ambiguity had to be construed against the developer, instead of first attempting to resolve the ambiguity by applying the rules of contract construction provided in O.C.G.A. § 13-2-2(4). White v. Kaminsky, 271 Ga. App. 719, 610 S.E.2d 542 (2004).

Trial court did not err in dismissing a nine-count complaint filed by two uninsured patients, for failing to state a claim and treated as a motion for summary judgment, alleging that a health care provider overcharged the patients for medical care received at rates grossly in excess of the rates charged to private medical insurers, or to Medicare/Medicaid benefit programs, as the parties entered into a valid contract, which the provider did not breach, and the patients failed to support the patients' claims that the provider committed an unfair trade practice or breached a fiduciary duty owed to the patients. Morrell v. Wellstar Health Sys., Inc., 280 Ga. App. 1, 633 S.E.2d 68 (2006).

In a dealer's action for breach of contract and trespass to chattel against two buyers following the buyers' purchase of a vehicle, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the dealer as the buyers' breach of contract, trespass to chattel, and default on the purchase agreement essentially waived any right they had to arbitrate the dispute; moreover, an appeal as to the propriety of the supersedeas bond imposed was dismissed as moot. Almonte v. West Ashley Toyota, 281 Ga. App. 808, 637 S.E.2d 755 (2006), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 71 (2007).

In a buyer's suit arising out of a failed deal to sell the seller's business seeking damages for breach of contract and specific performance, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the sellers as construction of the plain language of an addendum to the parties' letter of intent to sell the business showed that the parties had reached a binding agreement on all material terms concerning the purchase and sale of that business. Goobich v. Waters, 283 Ga. App. 53, 640 S.E.2d 606 (2006).

Based on the application of a merger clause in an expressed and lawful property sales contact, and the clear and unambiguous intent not to hold the lenders liable for transactions concerning the conveyance of a beach house made as consideration supporting the sale, summary judgment was properly granted to the lenders on the sellers' claims of fraud, concealment, breach of contract and unjust enrichment filed against the sellers. Donchi, Inc. v. Robdol, LLC, 283 Ga. App. 161, 640 S.E.2d 719 (2007).

Trial court did not err in awarding summary judgment to the State Medical Education Board, making a student liable for both the amount of the scholarship received and attorney's fees, as: (1) estoppels were unfavored under Georgia law; (2) the student came forward with no more than hearsay to support a claim that oral misrepresentations of fact were made regarding the scholarship; (3) the contract was not rescinded by either party; (4) no mutual mistake of fact was found; and (5) any impossibility in performing the contract was personal to the student. Calabro v. State Med. Educ. Bd., 283 Ga. App. 113, 640 S.E.2d 581 (2006).

Because a buyer failed to comply with provisions of its contract with a seller requiring written notice of a breach, this failure barred the buyer from relying on the seller's alleged breach of the agreement as a basis for the buyer's refusal to close and demand for refund of the earnest money; but, because the seller complied with the notice provision by notifying the buyer that the buyer's refusal to close placed the buyer in breach or default of the agreement and that the buyer had 15 days to cure the breach or default, upon the buyer's failure to do so, the buyer was entitled to summary judgment and to retain the earnest money as liquidated damages. Pillar Dev., Inc. v. Fuqua Constr. Co., 284 Ga. App. 858, 645 S.E.2d 64 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 669 (Ga. 2007).

Under the same transaction test, because the claims raised by a buyer in a Georgia state court were judicially determined in litigation between the parties in both the federal district court and the federal circuit court of appeals, and also sought redress for the same wrongs, the state court did not err in denying the buyer's partial summary judgment motion regarding those wrongs. BKJB P'ship v. Moseman, 284 Ga. App. 862, 644 S.E.2d 874, cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 558 (Ga. 2007).

Upon construction of a contract between an independent contractor and a billboard owner under O.C.G.A. § 13-2-2 because: (1) it was clear that the contractor did not waive any right to recover against the owner under any possible scenario, but only waived a right to recover against the owner's predecessor for damages if the waiver did not invalidate the insurance coverage; and (2) the contract only waived the owner's liability if the waiver did not invalidate the contractor's insurance, summary judgment was erroneously entered to the owner on grounds that the contractor waived a right to recover from the owner and because the trial court failed to consider whether the waiver invalidated the contractor's insurance. Holmes v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 284 Ga. App. 474, 644 S.E.2d 311 (2007).

While the trial court properly found that a separate and independent contract made the subject of the buyers' breach of contract counterclaim against the seller unenforceable, supporting summary judgment for the seller on the buyers' counterclaim, the court erred in finding that the buyers' denial of any liability to the seller on the seller's complaint was insufficient; thus, the seller was not entitled to summary judgment on the seller's complaint for payment under a consignment contract and for attorney fees. Jones v. Equip. King Int'l, 287 Ga. App. 867, 652 S.E.2d 811 (2007).

On appeal from an order granting a broker's customer summary judgment in the broker's breach of contract action, because the merger doctrine did not apply to the fee contract involving a broker and the customer and the loan contract between the lender and the customer, and material fact issues remained as to the compensation due to the broker, and as to what effect, if any, a modification of the amount of the broker's fee had on the broker's fee agreement with the broker's customer, summary judgment in the customer's favor was reversed. Atlanta Integrity Mortg., Inc. v. Ben Hill United Methodist Church, Inc., 286 Ga. App. 795, 650 S.E.2d 359 (2007).

While the trial court did not err in entering an order granting partial summary judgment to a city on the city's breach of contract claim against a county and the county's tax commissioner, ruling that the latter breached the county's contract to bill, collect, and remit ad valorem taxes on the city's behalf because the county was not given adequate notice that the trial court would address the amount of damages incurred by the city as a result of the county's breach, the grant of summary judgment as to the damages issue was reversed on due process grounds. Ferdinand v. City of East Point, 288 Ga. App. 152, 653 S.E.2d 529 (2007), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 213 (Ga. 2008).

In a breach of contract action filed by a school against an enrolled student's parents seeking payment of a full year's tuition, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the school as the parents failed in the parents' burden of showing that a liquidated damages clause in the contract amounted to an unenforceable penalty. Turner v. Atlanta Girls' Sch., Inc., 288 Ga. App. 115, 653 S.E.2d 380 (2007).

Because the third party failed to present sufficient evidence supporting that party's position that the third party had a right, as successor in interest, to sue on a creditor's account with the creditor's debtor in order to support the third party's right, summary judgment in the third party's favor in a suit against the debtor was erroneously entered. Ponder v. CACV of Colo., LLC, 289 Ga. App. 858, 658 S.E.2d 469 (2008).

Summary judgment for a bank was proper on a corporation's breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and fraud claims as the bank did not promise not to foreclose the bank's superior mortgage on a property under any circ*mstances; the bank simply promised to pay the corporation if lots were sold and the corporation removed the corporation's materialman's lien. Kesco, Inc. v. Brand Banking Co., 268 Ga. App. 874, 603 S.E.2d 49 (2004).

Trial court properly denied summary judgment to an independent medical utilization review provider for an employee benefit health plan on a plan participant's breach of contract claim as the participant asserted a third party beneficiary claim against the review provider under a side contract between the review provider and the plan sponsor. Monroe v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys., 268 Ga. App. 659, 602 S.E.2d 219 (2004).

Summary judgment was improperly granted in favor of a limited partner on that partner's claim that a corporation's breach of contract claim against the partner was barred by the four year statute of limitations applicable to contracts for the sale of goods under O.C.G.A. § 11-2-725 because the contract involved a conveyance of leasehold interests in real property for oil and gas exploration, not the sale of oil and gas. Summary judgment should have been awarded in favor of the corporation on the corporation's claim that the six year statute of limitations in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24, which was applicable to contracts in writing, applied and did not bar the action. ABF Capital Corp. v. Yancey, 264 Ga. App. 850, 592 S.E.2d 492 (2003).

Trial court improperly granted summary judgment to a claims administrator for an employee benefit health plan on a plan participant's breach of contract claim as the participant raised a jury question on the issue of whether the claims administrator performed the administrator's contractual obligations. Monroe v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys., 268 Ga. App. 659, 602 S.E.2d 219 (2004).

Contract for specific performance.

- Grant of summary judgment to the plaintiff on the plaintiff's action for specific performance of a contract provision that allegedly required the defendant to sell the defendant's stock to the plaintiff was affirmed; the trial court properly found that the contract required one partner to sell that partner's corporate stock to another partner at book value as determined by the corporation's CPA, and that the contract was valid, enforceable, and supported by valuable consideration. Auldridge v. Rivers, 263 Ga. App. 396, 587 S.E.2d 870 (2003).

Attorney fee contracts.

- Trial court properly granted summary judgment to an attorney in the attorney's action to collect fees due under a written fee agreement with a former client as the attorney provided the services outlined within the contract, and the former client failed to produce any competent evidence supporting an affirmative defense of failure of consideration after the attorney made a prima facie case for summary judgment. Browning v. Alan Mullinax & Assocs., P.C., 288 Ga. App. 43, 653 S.E.2d 786 (2007).

Real estate sales contract.

- In an action arising from the sale of a condominium unit, the trial court did not err in denying the owners' summary judgment motion on the owners' claim of a right of first refusal, as the owners had no such right, but the owners were properly granted summary judgment on the buyer's claims of tortious interference with contractual and business relations and for punitive damages as the owners had a legitimate right to protect when the owners voted on the sale of the subject unit. Quality Foods, Inc. v. Smithberg, 288 Ga. App. 47, 653 S.E.2d 486 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0437, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 316 (Ga. 2008).

Contract for marital settlement.

- Trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the executors on an action to enforce a marital settlement agreement entered into before one spouse died as the agreement, which was a contract, was not unenforceable for lack of consideration, but the surviving spouse was also not entitled to judgment as a matter of law because issues regarding the deceased spouse's capacity to enter into the agreement and the surviving spouse's possible rescission of the contract had to be considered by a jury. Guthrie v. Guthrie, 259 Ga. App. 751, 577 S.E.2d 832 (2003), aff'd, 277 Ga. 700, 594 S.E.2d 356 (2004).

Contract to make a will.

- In an action to enforce a contract to make a will, the trial court erred in denying both parties' motions for summary judgment since the contract recited adequate consideration and, thus, was not illusory but was binding, the contract was not in furtherance of an immoral relationship and thus unenforceable, and the contract had not been abandoned; thus, there were no issues for which a jury decision was required. Abrams v. Massell, 262 Ga. App. 761, 586 S.E.2d 435 (2003).

Contracts between contractors.

- When a subcontractor sought compensation from a contractor for increased labor costs caused by the contractor, the contractor was not entitled to summary judgment dismissing the subcontractor's claim as: (1) the subcontractor did not waive the subcontractor's claim by failing to respond to the contractor's denial thereof within 48 hours as the contractor only decided whether the subcontractor could legally assert the subcontractor's claim; (2) the subcontractor's agreement to perform the subcontractor's work according to the contract's timetable did not bar the subcontractor's claim, as this only barred claims for delays contemplated by the parties when the contract was signed, and this provision did not address whether the subcontractor was entitled to compensation for increased labor costs; (3) change orders the subcontractor signed did not bar the subcontractor's claim as it sought damages for disruption, and not merely damages for delay; and (4) a "no damages for delay" provision in the contractor's contract with the owner did not bar the subcontractor's claim because it conflicted with a superseding provision of the contractor's contract with the subcontractor allowing the subcontractor to seek compensation for interferences and delays. Atl. Coast Mech. v. R. W. Allen Beers Constr., 264 Ga. App. 680, 592 S.E.2d 115 (2003).

Summary judgment on contract issues.

- Appellees failed to present any evidence establishing the appellees' status as the current holders of an interest in the contract at issue, despite the appellant's allegation that the contract between them has since been assigned by the appellees to a third party; therefore, since the appellant's objection that the appellees are not the real parties in interest had yet to be addressed, the trial court erred in granting the appellees' motion for summary judgment. Sawgrass Bldrs., Inc. v. Key, 212 Ga. App. 138, 441 S.E.2d 99 (1994).

Lease contracts.

- Because fact issues remained as to whether a lessee's conduct in attempting to exercise a credit amounted to a waiver of the credit, and whether the lessee made a good-faith, prompt, and diligent effort to resolve the amount due under a commercial lease so as to prevent the lessor from terminating the lease and gaining possession, both of which a jury was to decide, summary judgment was improperly entered on the lessor's claim for rent, and properly denied on the lessor's petition for a writ of possession. Eckerd Corp. v. Alterman Props., 264 Ga. App. 72, 589 S.E.2d 660 (2003).

Because a lessee failed to create an issue of fact regarding whether the lessor breached the parties' underlying commercial lease or whether the lessee waived the alleged breach, the trial court correctly granted the lessor's motion for summary judgment on the lessee's breach of contract claim. Nguyen v. Talisman Roswell, L.L.C., 262 Ga. App. 480, 585 S.E.2d 911 (2003).

Trial court properly granted summary judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c) to the defendants in an action for breach of a lease by the successor in interest to the lessor as the defendants admitted that the defendants had defaulted on the lease and that the successor was owed back rent. Gilco Invs., Inc. v. Stafford Cordele, LLC, 267 Ga. App. 167, 598 S.E.2d 889 (2004).

Because a sublease was ambiguous regarding a sublessee's obligation to pay operating expenses due under the master lease, fact questions remained as to the parties' intent, and a trial court erred in entering summary judgment for the sublessee. Holcim (US), Inc. v. AMDG, Inc., 265 Ga. App. 818, 596 S.E.2d 197 (2004).

Indemnity contracts.

- In an action to recover under an indemnity agreement, because the undisputed facts showed that a party was estopped from denying the validity of a bond, and that the party indemnified a surety for payments made thereunder, the surety was properly granted summary judgment as to the party's liability for monies paid under the bond. Samda Inv. Group, LLC v. Western Sur. Co., 287 Ga. App. 235, 651 S.E.2d 152 (2007).

Because the debtor read a plain, unambiguous guaranty contract and signed the contract as written, the court enforced the contract as written and granted summary judgment to the bank; summary judgment on damages was reversed because, although the remainder of the damages could be calculated on the record, no evidence in the record supported the post-closing interest rate. Charania v. Regions Bank, 264 Ga. App. 587, 591 S.E.2d 412 (2003).

Guaranty contract.

- As no matter of fact was involved, the construction of a guaranty was a matter of law for the court, which found that the guaranty executed by a guarantor contained a very broad waiver clause that plainly and unambiguously waived any claims the guarantor might have had against the debtor and extended to claims arising in equity, or under contract, statute, or common law; the waiver obviously included a claim under O.C.G.A. § 10-7-41, so the trial court erred by denying summary judgment to the debtor and other defendants, and erred as well in granting summary judgment in favor of the guarantor. Brookside Cmtys., LLC v. Lake Dow N. Corp., 268 Ga. App. 785, 603 S.E.2d 31 (2004).

Because an agent for a limited liability company and a builder's vice president testified that the parties negotiated and agreed on the terms of a construction contract including price, time, and the form of the contract, and the limited liability company authorized the builder to begin, the facts showed that the parties entered into an enforceable contract, and since a contract existed, the members' personal guaranties of the construction contract were valid; a trial court's summary judgment in favor of the builder on the members' personal guaranties was affirmed. Marett v. Brice Bldg. Co., 268 Ga. App. 778, 603 S.E.2d 40 (2004).

In an action to collect unpaid rent and fees owed by a lessee to a lessor under a lease agreement, the trial court properly granted partial summary judgment to the lessor, and against the lessee and the lessee's guarantor, as: (1) the language in the lease could not be construed to limit or modify the guarantor's pre-existing obligations under the guaranty through the time of the guarantor's revocation of the lease; and (2) the language of the guaranty, standing alone, was unambiguous and created an unconditional, continuing guaranty. The Cupboard, LLC v. Sunshine Travel Ctr., 283 Ga. App. 34, 640 S.E.2d 584 (2006).

In an action on a guaranty, because the plain and unambiguous terms of the guaranty and the guaranty's addendum only obligated the guarantor to the lease obligations of the original tenant, who was also the guarantor's subsidiary, and not the obligations of a new tenant, the guarantor was properly absolved of any liability to the landlord for the obligations of that new tenant, entitling the tenant to summary judgment on that issue. Highwoods Realty L.P. v. Cmty. Loans of Am., Inc., 288 Ga. App. 226, 653 S.E.2d 807 (2007).

Successor in interest tax liability.

- Order granting summary judgment on the issue of a successor in interest's liability for unpaid taxes in favor of that successor was reversed as the successor failed to protect itself from successor liability for the unpaid sales and use taxes owed by the successor's predecessor under O.C.G.A. § 48-8-46, and the successor failed to protect itself against unrecorded tax liens to the extent allowed by the statute. Graham v. JD Design Group, Inc., 281 Ga. App. 347, 636 S.E.2d 66 (2006).

Warranty contracts.

- Summary judgment should have been granted to a store, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c), in an action by a dissatisfied customer who asserted causes of action for breach of an express warranty and a violation of the Fair Business Practices Act, O.C.G.A. § 10-1-390 et seq., as the customer failed to offer evidence of the terms of the warranty, which made both claims lack any foundation; the alleged warranty was based on a store employee's notation on the customer's receipt that the kitchen cabinets that the customer purchased had a "10-year warranty," but there was no indication of any further terms, so there was no enforceable warranty proven. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Miller, 268 Ga. App. 742, 603 S.E.2d 80 (2004).

Consent decree.

- Summary judgment was affirmed because no construction was required of a consent decree; therefore, the trial court was required to enforce the agreement as written. Since the terms of a settlement agreement were clear and unambiguous in requiring that a motorist pay $24,600 to settle a wrongful death claim, the settlement agreement was for new money and did not consider credit for $10,000 already paid by the motorist's insurer; if the parties had intended to give credit for the earlier payment, the settlement agreement would have stated this. Hicks v. Walker, 265 Ga. App. 495, 594 S.E.2d 710 (2004).

When a tenant who terminated the tenant's lease early and agreed to pay the landlord the difference between the tenant's rental obligation and rent the landlord was able to obtain from a third party said this agreement was a guaranty from which the tenant had been discharged, the landlord was entitled to partial summary judgment on the landlord's breach of contract claim in the landlord's suit to enforce the agreement because the agreement was not a guaranty subject to the discharge provisions of O.C.G.A. § 10-7-20 et seq., as the tenant did not agree to be answerable for the debt of another but, instead, agreed to continue the tenant's rental obligation to the landlord, subject to any credit the tenant might be entitled to for rent the landlord received from a third party. Equifax, Inc. v. 1600 Peachtree, L.L.C., 268 Ga. App. 186, 601 S.E.2d 519 (2004).

Breach of car dealership agreement.

- Summary judgment was properly entered for an automobile manufacturer on a dealership's claim that the manufacturer improperly terminated the parties' dealership agreement as the agreement was terminated after the dealership closed the dealership's business and the dealership's property was foreclosed; the termination was not procedurally defective as the termination notice was sent to the dealership's location of record, to the owner of the dealership at the owner's home address, and to the dealership's attorney. Greensboro Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 267 Ga. App. 773, 600 S.E.2d 631 (2004).

Summary judgment was properly entered for an automobile manufacturer on a dealership's claim that the manufacturer failed to pay for the repurchase of the dealership's parts, signage, tools, and equipment as: (1) the dealership failed to return the required release; (2) no vehicles were left at the dealership because the inventory had been seized, impounded, and sold; (3) the property on which the dealership was located had been foreclosed; (4) when the business relocated, the dealership was no longer receiving cars or parts from the manufacturer; and (5) the dealership presented no evidence of the value of the items that the dealership contended the dealership should have been paid for. Greensboro Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 267 Ga. App. 773, 600 S.E.2d 631 (2004).

Vehicle purchase agreements.

- Absent a confidential relationship between a lienholder and a prospective buyer of a vehicle subject to a lien, and absent any duty on the lienholder to disclose any problems with the vehicle's title to the buyer, the lienholder was properly granted summary judgment on the buyer's negligence, fraudulent concealment, and derivative claim for punitive damages. Lilliston v. Regions Bank, 288 Ga. App. 241, 653 S.E.2d 306 (2007), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 275 (Ga. 2008).

Foreclosure sales.

- In a wrongful foreclosure proceeding, summary judgment was properly granted in favor of the foreclosing seller because the seller showed that the buyer failed to maintain property insurance or to pay the taxes and assessments due, as required under a security deed; in addition, the propriety of the foreclosure sale was established through an attorney's affidavit and a newspaper publisher's affidavit. Ledford v. Darter, 260 Ga. App. 585, 580 S.E.2d 317 (2003).

Tax foreclosure sales.

- Trial court properly granted summary judgment to the property owner on the property owner's action that sought to set aside a deed executed pursuant to a judicial tax foreclosure sale. No genuine issue existed but that the tax sale was void because the sale was from a grantor who did not have title to the property to the property purchaser and that the sale could not pass title, which remained in the property owner. Canoeside Props. v. Livsey, 277 Ga. 425, 589 S.E.2d 116 (2003).

Request for disclosure of tax records.

- Trial court properly granted summary judgment to the corporation on the corporation's request for disclosure of the individual's tax records, which the corporation sought for the limited purpose of determining whether the individual's business properly qualified as a disadvantaged business regarding the awarding to it of a city contract for airport advertising, as Georgia's Open Records Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70 et seq., favored the disclosure of public records, and neither the individual nor the city could find a specific exception that applied to bar disclosure under such circ*mstances. City of Atlanta v. Corey Entm't, Inc., 278 Ga. 474, 604 S.E.2d 140 (2004).

Foreclosure actions.

- Because the debtor failed to send written notice of the correct address of the subject property to the bank or the bank's agents, and could not assert an absent grantee's priority to escape the consequences of the debtor's own failure to provide a correct property address to all future holders of the note and deed, the foreclosure sale was not set aside; thus, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the bank and the assignees of the security interest on the ground that the bank provided sufficient notice of the foreclosure sale. Jackson v. Bank One, 287 Ga. App. 791, 652 S.E.2d 849 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0335, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 169 (Ga. 2008).

In a foreclosure action between a bank and the bank's debtors, given that the debtors failed to substantiate the claims of error asserted on appeal with sufficient evidence to create a jury question, and the bank committed no wrong in attempting to collect on a prior judgment against the debtors, summary judgment was properly entered to the bank, disposing of all the debtors' counterclaims filed against the bank. All Fleet Refinishing, Inc. v. W. Ga. Nat'l Bank, 280 Ga. App. 676, 634 S.E.2d 802 (2006).

Wrongful foreclosure.

- Lender was properly granted summary judgment on a borrower's claims for wrongful foreclosure and breach of contract because the borrower defaulted and the borrower's claims were barred by releases of liability in loan modification documents. Heritage Creek Dev. Corp. v. Colonial Bank, 268 Ga. App. 369, 601 S.E.2d 842 (2004).

Georgia Land Sales Act.

- Trial court properly granted summary judgment against a home buyer's claim that the sale of the property at issue failed to comply with the Georgia Land Sales Act (Act), O.C.G.A. § 44-3-1 et seq., as the property contained a house suitable for occupancy at the time of the sale; further, despite the buyer's argument that the statutory exemption under O.C.G.A. § 44-3-4(2) did not apply to residential property, giving the words of the exemption their plain and ordinary meaning, the exemption had to be read as excluding from the Act property upon which either a commercial building, an industrial building, a condominium, a shopping center, a house, or an apartment house was situated. Mancuso v. Steyaard, 280 Ga. App. 300, 640 S.E.2d 50 (2006).

Land sales contracts.

- In an action between a buyer and a seller arising out of a land sales contract, because a question of material fact remained as to whether the failure to close was the buyer's fault, and because both an oral waiver and waiver by conduct could be inferred, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the seller. Miller v. Coleman, 284 Ga. App. 300, 643 S.E.2d 797 (2007).

In an action arising out of an alleged breach of a land sales contract, given that the trial court relied on findings of fact that had been resolved only in the context of the ruling on an interlocutory injunction filed by the buyer, and that issues of material fact plainly remained as to whether the seller fulfilled the contractual obligations to designate land adjacent to the buyer's property for use as a city or county road, the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the seller had to be reversed. Taylor v. Thomas, 286 Ga. App. 27, 648 S.E.2d 426 (2007).

In an action filed by a trust and its trustee against a school board alleging breach of a real estate contract, or in the alternative, specific performance of the contract at a reduced purchase price, summary judgment in favor of the school board was reversed on the breach of contract claim; however, summary judgment on the specific performance claim was affirmed as the trust failed to tender the full purchase price, which was a prerequisite to a specific performance demand, the trust was not excused from doing so, and a tender would not have been futile. Peaches Land Trust v. Lumpkin County Sch. Bd., 286 Ga. App. 103, 648 S.E.2d 464 (2007).

In a dispute over an installment contract to purchase land, because evidence sufficiently showed that a buyer partially performed a subsequent oral agreement that was not barred by a merger clause contained in the contract, and the seller accepted the benefit of such performance, summary judgment to the seller was erroneous; moreover, given that jury questions as to part performance of the oral agreement remained, the order denying the buyer's partial summary judgment motion was upheld. Hernandez v. Carnes, 290 Ga. App. 730, 659 S.E.2d 925 (2008).

Suit against real estate agents.

- Trial court properly dismissed an action that a homebuyer filed against the buyer's real estate agent and a seller's real estate agent after the ignition of natural gas that had leaked from the fireplace in the buyer's house because there was no evidence that either agent knew about the leak, concealed the leak, or provided false information about the value of the house. Resnick v. Meybohm Realty, Inc., 269 Ga. App. 486, 604 S.E.2d 536 (2004).

Trial court erred in granting summary judgment to a home seller and against a realtor in construing the unambiguous language in the brokerage agreement at issue, which was for a definite term and was not terminable at will; moreover, although a sale was not consummated, the realtor remained entitled to the realtor's six percent commission, and the seller remained obligated to pay that amount, which was the proper measure of damages. Ben Farmer Realty, Inc. v. Owens, 286 Ga. App. 678, 649 S.E.2d 771 (2007), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 81 (Ga. 2008).

Third party beneficiary.

- Trial court properly granted summary judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c) to the Stone Mountain Memorial Association and to the Georgia Department of Corrections in a breach of contract action by an inmate who was injured while on a work detail that was required by the Department on the Association's property as the inmate was not an intended beneficiary of the contract pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-2-20(b); although the contract provided for the safety of the workplace, those contract provisions were not intended to benefit the inmates on work details but, instead, the inmates were just incidental beneficiaries. Gay v. Ga. Dep't of Corr., 270 Ga. App. 17, 606 S.E.2d 53 (2004).

In a breach of contract action filed by an employee, who was a third-party beneficiary to an employment contract with a contractor, the trial court erred in granting the employee summary judgment as: (1) under the plain language of the employment agreement at issue between the parties, as well as the county's personnel policy, the contractor was authorized to terminate the employee based on the employee's inability or unfitness to perform the assigned duties due to an injury; and (2) the employee could not perform all the job's requirements. Am. Water Serv. USA v. McRae, 286 Ga. App. 762, 650 S.E.2d 304 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 761 (Ga. 2007).

Because a valid general release entered into by a home buyer and home builder effectuated a binding accord and satisfaction barring any future claims between the parties, and absent evidence to void the release based on fraud, the buyer's filed claims in a subsequent suit filed against the home builder were properly summarily dismissed; thus, assessment of attorney fees was not an abuse of discretion and a penalty for filing a frivolous appeal was ordered. Pacheco v. Charles Crews Custom Homes, Inc., 289 Ga. App. 773, 658 S.E.2d 396 (2008).

Contract action involving road construction.

- Summary judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 was properly granted in the county's action to recover money had and received by the contractor because the contractor asserted that the contract, which was for road striping and which was not opened for public bidding, was for a specialized service under O.C.G.A. § 32-4-63(5), an exception to the public bidding requirements under O.C.G.A. § 32-4-64; however, O.C.G.A. § 32-1-3(6) expressly defined road striping as a form of road construction and not as a special service. Howard v. Brantley County, 260 Ga. App. 330, 579 S.E.2d 758 (2003).

Trial court erred in granting summary judgment on a homebuyer's breach of contract claim against the buyer's realtor as material fact issues remained as to whether the realtor violated the realtor's duties under the Brokerage Relationships in Real Estate Transaction Act, O.C.G.A. § 10-6A-1 et seq.; however, summary judgment was proper, based on the testimony presented on the motion, as to the homebuyer's fraudulent concealment claim. Ikola v. Schoene, 264 Ga. App. 338, 590 S.E.2d 750 (2003).

Employment contracts.

- Trial court did not err by granting summary judgment to a company on an employee's action to enforce an employment agreement and a promise to convey 20 percent of the company's stock to the employee because: (1) the indefinite statement in the employment contract of the employee's duties, the term of the employment, and the employee's salary made the employment contract unenforceable; and (2) the promise of 20 percent of the company's stock was for past consideration, and that was not sufficient consideration to make the promise enforceable. Key v. Naylor, Inc., 268 Ga. App. 419, 602 S.E.2d 192 (2004).

Because there was some evidence that an employment contract was valid and enforceable, the employer was not entitled to summary judgment; but, the employer was entitled to judgment because the time period for payment of future commissions was too indefinite to be enforced as those commissions were not otherwise billable during the period of employment. Hiers v. ChoicePoint Servs., 270 Ga. App. 128, 606 S.E.2d 29 (2004).

In an employee's suit arising out of the termination of an employment contract, the trial court properly granted the employer's motion for summary judgment as: (1) as an at-will employee, the employee could be terminated without cause at any time; (2) the employer was authorized to protect the employer's interest in the employer's curriculum and property; (3) no evidence supported a claim of slander; and (4) vague statements accusing the employee of a crime did not constitute slander per se. Taylor v. Calvary Baptist Temple, 279 Ga. App. 71, 630 S.E.2d 604 (2006).

Upon a de novo review of the plain terms outlined in an employment contract, a former employer was not entitled to receive commission payments from a former employee, a licensed sales agent, for deals closed with the employee's subsequent employer as any contrary reading would result in an unenforceable contract, under O.C.G.A. § 43-40-19(c); hence, summary judgment was properly granted to the employee on that issue, and the former employer's claim for money had and received also failed. Richard Bowers & Co. v. Creel, 280 Ga. App. 199, 633 S.E.2d 555 (2006).

In an action regarding an alleged breach of an employment contract seeking commissions on deals made by a real estate agent that a former real estate broker alleged it was entitled to, the trial court erred in entering summary judgment against the agent, finding that the agent owed the broker commissions as to one of two contested deals, because: (1) the agent closed the deal with that client after terminating employment with the broker; and (2) it was undisputed that the agent had not agreed to share commissions with the broker on deals struck after the agent left the broker's employ. Thus, since summary judgment was properly entered in the agent's favor regarding commissions paid to the agent as to the second of the two contested clients, the broker was not entitled to litigation costs under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11. Morgan v. Richard Bowers & Co., 280 Ga. App. 533, 634 S.E.2d 415 (2006).

Trial court did not err in denying an employer's summary judgment motion, determining that the employee had performed the services necessary to be entitled to the allegedly agreed-upon per diem compensation; hence, the employee's status as an at-will employee was not determinative, and did not bar the cause of action. Walker Elec. Co. v. Byrd, 281 Ga. App. 190, 635 S.E.2d 819 (2006).

Trial court did not err in granting an employer's motion for summary judgment: (1) denying the employee's request for mandamus relief, given that the employee had no clear legal right to a job reinstatement, and based on a federal conviction, that claim was moot; and (2) denying the employer's quantum meruit claim, as the existence of an employment contract, under which the employee sought the same compensation as a quantum meruit claim, precluded any quantum meruit recovery. Williams v. City of Atlanta, 281 Ga. 478, 640 S.E.2d 35 (2007).

In a renewal action resulting from the termination of a commission agreement in favor of a payee, because the payee's quantum meruit and reformation claims were barred by res judicata, and the fact that the state court potentially lacked jurisdiction over the reformation claim was immaterial, the trial court erred in denying the payor's motion for summary judgment. ChoicePoint Servs. v. Hiers, 284 Ga. App. 640, 644 S.E.2d 456 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1166, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 499 (Ga. 2007).

In an action arising from an alleged employment contract between the parties, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to an employer as genuine issues of material fact remained regarding whether a contract indeed existed between the parties, which the employee actually signed and acknowledged. Shilling v. Cornerstone Med. Assocs., LLC, 290 Ga. App. 169, 659 S.E.2d 416 (2008).

In a breach of contract action centering around a contract of employment with a county employer and the county's board of tax assessors, because the employment contract was never approved by the county commission, and the county's payment of a salary to the employee was not considered a ratification of the contract in the contract's entirety, the employee possessed only an at-will employment. Thus, summary judgment was properly entered against the employee. Powell v. Wheeler County, 290 Ga. App. 508, 659 S.E.2d 893 (2008).

Non-solicitation covenants in employment contracts.

- In an action arising from an alleged breach of a non-solicitation covenant within a consultant agreement, because the employee subject to the covenant understood the covenant to apply only to those clients the employee's employer acquired when it bought the employee's former company, or with whom the employee had material contact during the course of that employment, the trial court misconstrued the agreement by limiting the agreement's scope, and the employer was erroneously granted summary judgment based on the employee's alleged breach. Atl. Ins. Brokers, LLC v. Slade Hanco*ck Agency, Inc., 287 Ga. App. 677, 652 S.E.2d 577 (2007).

Action under Fair Dismissal Act.

- In an action in which an employee, who was terminated for failing to obtain an educator's certificate, waived a rehearing, and was paid a full salary through the date of a hearing, the employee's due process rights under the Fair Dismissal Act, O.C.G.A. § 20-2-940, were not violated; consequently, the school board was properly granted summary judgment. Oliver v. Lee County Sch. Dist., 270 Ga. App. 61, 606 S.E.2d 88 (2004).

Summary judgment based on lack of foreseeability of crime.

- Trial court erred by granting summary judgment based on the lack of foreseeability of a third-party crime; specifically, the parking lot owners clearly knew of prior crimes on the premises prior to the plaintiff sustaining injuries. Rautenberg v. Pope, 351 Ga. App. 503, 831 S.E.2d 209 (2019), cert. denied, No. S20C0054, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 276 (Ga. 2020).

Solemn admission in judicio.

- Trial court properly granted a seller's motion for partial summary judgment and denied the escrow agent's motion to dismiss, in the seller's suit to recover the earnest money deposited by the buyers because the buyers admitted in the buyers' answer that the buyers knew the identity and location of the property, and although the buyers later amended the buyers' answer to raise a Georgia Statute of Frauds, O.C.G.A. § 13-5-30, defense, the buyers never withdrew the buyers' admission, and the buyers and the escrow agent were bound by the admission; the admission constituted a solemn admission in judicio under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-24(b)(7) (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-26), and created a conclusive presumption of law under former subsection (a) of that section. Nhan v. Wellington Square, LLC, 263 Ga. App. 717, 589 S.E.2d 285 (2003).

Res judicata.

- Appeals court agreed with the trial court that the doctrine of res judicata barred the negligence and breach of contract claims asserted by two property owners against a contractor as: (1) the claims were essentially identical to the allegations in a counterclaim filed in a prior Cherokee County action; (2) the parties in the two cases were identical for purposes of res judicata; and (3) the Cherokee County suit resulted in an adjudication on the merits. Perrett v. Sumner, 286 Ga. App. 379, 649 S.E.2d 545 (2007).

Stock agreement not illegal or immoral.

- Although the parties intended to circumvent Georgia Department of Revenue regulations by issuing corporate stock to an employee's spouse, the stock agreement was not illegal or immoral, a trial court erred in voiding the interest of the employee's spouse, and summary judgment in favor of the corporation in the spouse's action for an accounting, dissolution, and other relief was reversed; the corporation's failure to add a different shareholder's name to the corporate stock register did not demand a finding, for summary judgment purposes, that the person was not a shareholder, and the denial of the corporation's summary judgment motion as to that shareholder was affirmed. Edwards v. Grapefields, Inc., 267 Ga. App. 399, 599 S.E.2d 489 (2004).

Oral contract for transfer of real property.

- Summary judgment was properly entered against the deceased's child on a claim against the deceased's estate for specific performance in regard to an alleged oral contract for the conveyance of property since no evidence was presented regarding the value of the land or the home or the value of the services performed in exchange for the alleged promise. Miller v. Miller, 262 Ga. App. 546, 586 S.E.2d 36 (2003), overruled on other grounds, Mateen v. Dicus, 281 Ga. 455, 637 S.E.2d 377.

Landowners' trespass and negligence suit.

- Trial court properly denied a neighbor's motion for summary judgment and the appellate court reversed the denial of the cross-motion for summary judgment filed by the adjoining landowners in a trespass and negligence suit because the neighbor purchased property without first obtaining a survey and the adjoining landowners' home was already encroaching upon the neighbor's property by two feet at the time of the purchase; the adjoining landowners were not liable for their predecessor's conduct in building the house and a fence across the property line of the neighbor's predecessor in title, in the absence of evidence that their predecessor was acting as their agent, and were, therefore, entitled to summary judgment. Navajo Constr., Inc. v. Brigham, 271 Ga. App. 128, 608 S.E.2d 732 (2004).

Landowner's trespass and nuisance suit.

- In two cases involving a dispute for nuisance and trespass arising out of excessive water runoff which flowed onto a landowner's land, the trial court's grant of summary judgment to a construction contractor as to the issue of the contractor's liability was reversed, while the denial of summary judgment to a developer as to the issue of the contractor's liability was affirmed, as: (1) the combination of the lay and expert testimony as to the presence of the excess runoff and its cause presented questions of fact for a jury to decide; (2) merely because the county approved the development activities did not mean that either the contractor or the developer or both could not be held liable for nuisance; and (3) the landowner's action against the alleged creators of the water-runoff nuisance was authorized, regardless of their having sold the property. Green v. Eastland Homes, Inc., 284 Ga. App. 643, 644 S.E.2d 479 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 629 (Ga. 2007).

Premises liability to invitee.

- In a premise liability action, because questions of fact remained as to whether a student was a university's invitee at the time the student was shot on what was alleged to be the university's property at the time of the assault, and thus, whether the university owed the student a duty of ordinary care, and no evidence was presented that the student lost an "invitee" status, summary judgment in the university's favor was reversed. Clark Atlanta Univ., Inc. v. Williams, 288 Ga. App. 180, 654 S.E.2d 402 (2007), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 227 (Ga. 2008).

In a premises liability action filed by a guest of a property owner, because the guest failed to show that the owner had any actual or constructive knowledge of the alleged hazard that allegedly caused the guest's injuries, specifically, a hole in an otherwise flat, grassy area of the owner's yard, the court properly granted the owner summary judgment. Thomas v. Deason, 289 Ga. App. 753, 658 S.E.2d 165 (2008).

Restrictive covenants.

- On appeal from an order in a declaratory judgment action, the trial court did not err in finding, upon cross-motions for summary judgment, that restrictive covenants which had been made applicable to the subdivision over 20 years earlier remained in effect and prohibited a buyer from re-subdividing certain tracts into residential lots with less than five acres, but did err in ruling that interpretation of the covenants was a legal matter for the court, rather than a factual matter for the jury. Britt v. Albright, 282 Ga. App. 206, 638 S.E.2d 372 (2006), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 199 (Ga. 2007).

Credibility.

- If credibility is crucial, summary judgment becomes improper and a trial indispensable. Winkles v. Brown, 227 Ga. 33, 178 S.E.2d 865 (1970).

If a question of credibility arises as to a material issue, summary judgment should not be granted. Georgia Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Almon, 122 Ga. App. 42, 176 S.E.2d 205 (1970); Ash v. Spear, 137 Ga. App. 12, 223 S.E.2d 26 (1975).

Questions of credibility cannot be resolved on summary judgment. Jones v. Howard, 153 Ga. App. 137, 264 S.E.2d 587 (1980).

False light and invasion of privacy.

- Trial court properly granted summary judgment to an auto dealer, mortgage broker, and lender on an accused person's claim for invasion of privacy by placing a person in a false light as the accused person did not show that the false information - that the accused person allegedly participated in a fraudulent financing scheme - was distributed to the public at large. Additionally, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment on the issue of the accused person's claim that there was an invasion of privacy through appropriation as the accused person did not show any evidence that they took the accused person's name and likeness for their own advantage. Blakey v. Victory Equip. Sales, Inc., 259 Ga. App. 34, 576 S.E.2d 38 (2002).

Defamation actions.

- Summary judgment procedures are particularly appropriate in defamation actions when U.S. Const., amend. i is applicable. Williams v. Trust Co., 140 Ga. App. 49, 230 S.E.2d 45 (1976).

Because of the importance of free speech, summary judgment is the rule, not the exception, in defamation cases. Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440 (S.D. Ga. 1976), aff'd, 580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978).

Debtor's defamation claim, under O.C.G.A. § 51-5-1(a), against a creditor for reporting its repossession of collateral from the debtor to credit reporting agencies was properly summarily dismissed, under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c), because such a claim was preempted by the Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., absent the creditor's malice or willful intent to injure the debtor, which were not shown. Corbin v. Regions Bank, 258 Ga. App. 490, 574 S.E.2d 616 (2002).

Summary judgment for a city manager was appropriate in a community activist's defamation action because the activist was a limited-purpose public figure by reason of extensive participation in city affairs, and the activist failed to show actual malice by the manager. Sparks v. Peaster, 260 Ga. App. 232, 581 S.E.2d 579 (2003).

Summary judgment was improperly granted to an employer pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c) in a terminated employee's suit alleging breach of contract, defamation, and tortious interference with contract because there were disputed questions of material fact and matters of credibility that a jury had to resolve regarding whether the corporation's president discharged the employee in good faith or did so for personal reasons unrelated to the employee's job performance. Salhab v. Tift Heart Ctr., P.C., 260 Ga. App. 799, 581 S.E.2d 363 (2003).

Statement that a sheriff provided to the Georgia Department of Labor (DOL) after the sheriff decided not to rehire an employee and the employee filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits was privileged, and the trial court ruled correctly that the sheriff was entitled to summary judgment on the employee's claim alleging slander, even though the sheriff's statement was published by a newspaper one week later and the newspaper published a follow-on article that stated that the sheriff stood by the statement the sheriff made to the DOL. Cooper-Bridges v. Ingle, 268 Ga. App. 73, 601 S.E.2d 445 (2004).

Trial court erroneously granted summary judgment against an election candidate, and in favor of the incumbent, on the former's defamation claims stemming from a printed newspaper advertisem*nt as issues of fact remained as to the actual malice exhibited by the incumbent in publishing the advertisem*nt, and the flagrant accusations stated therein went beyond the criticism, hostility, and unfairness a candidate might expect to encounter while running for political office. Howard v. Pope, 282 Ga. App. 137, 637 S.E.2d 854 (2006).

Libel actions.

- In an action by a contractor against a newspaper and the newspaper's editor, because: (1) the average reader would have interpreted a printed headline's use of the term "rape" as an attempt to convey the severity of the damage to the land that the contractor inflicted rather than to characterize the contractor's conduct that resulted in the damage as criminal; and (2) the article referred to by the headline did not constitute libel per se as the editor unquestionably did not intend, and readers did not interpret, the word "rape" as having any sexual connotation in the context used in the article, the editor and the newspaper were properly granted summary judgment as to the contractor's libel and libel per se claims. Lucas v. Cranshaw, 289 Ga. App. 510, 659 S.E.2d 612 (2008).

Defamation actions by public figures.

- If public figures bring defamation actions, summary judgment, rather than a trial on the merits, is a proper vehicle for affording constitutional protection if there is no substantive basis for a finding of knowing falsity or reckless disregard. Williams v. Trust Co., 140 Ga. App. 49, 230 S.E.2d 45 (1976).

In as much as the First Amendment mandates that a public figure plaintiff prove actual malice by clear and convincing evidence, a court ruling on a motion for summary judgment in a defamation case must be guided by the New York Times "clear and convinci'... Text too big - Please use 'Extract as File...' option

Article 6 - Trials - § 9-11-56. Summary Judgment - Georgia Code | Trellis Law (2024)